# About this resource centre This resource centre is dedicated to the implementation of the OECD Development Cooperation Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment. {% columns %} {% column %} The **English version** is available [**here**](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_76d82856-en)**.** {% embed url="" %} {% endcolumn %} {% column %} The **French version** is available [**here**](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC\(2024\)15/FINAL/fr/pdf)**.** {% embed url="" %} {% endcolumn %} {% endcolumns %} {% embed url="" %} ## Objectives of the principles {% hint style="success" %} Reinvigorate international support to media and the information environment. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Encourage current development co-operation providers to increase levels of financial and other forms of assistance and to improve the relevance and effectiveness of their existing support to preserve, protect, and promote public interest media and information integrity. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Guide development co-operation providers’ endeavours to the challenges facing the global information environment. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Ensure that the international response to the crisis in the media sector is fit for purpose in a rapidly changing information environment. {% endhint %} ## What are the six Principles? The principles, published in March 2024, include a non-exhaustive, indicative list of practical, concrete ways to operationalise each principle.
The first principle on ‘[do no harm to public interest media](/principles/1-do-no-harm)’, is intended as a minimum standard which all development co-operation providers are expected to respect. The other principles are more ambitious, seeking to function as a guide and an inspiration to development co-operation providers to increase the relevance and effectiveness of their support. {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} ## Consultation & adoption The adoption of the principles followed two years of consultations among more than 200 representatives from bilateral donor agencies, implementing organisations, civil society representatives, and media development experts. The [Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD)](https://gfmd.info/), in cooperation with the [Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA)](https://www.cima.ned.org/), played a leading role in this process, working closely with the OECD DAC secretariat and member states. For more details about the [development and adoption of the principles as well as key milestones in their implementation](https://oecd-media-support-principles.gfmd.info/timeline/adoption) see: {% embed url="" %} ## Implementation and next steps At the request of the OECD DAC and partners, GFMD maintains a list of [events, meetings and other opportunities](https://oecd-media-support-principles.gfmd.info/timeline/next-steps) to promote the implementation of principles. For more information see the implementation section of the resource centre: {% embed url="" %} ## The toolkit To support the practical implementation of the OECD Development Co-operation Principles, the [**Team Europe Democracy (TED) Network**](https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/projects/team-europe-democracy-ted_en) has developed a dedicated [**Toolkit**](/toolkit/about), hosted within this resource centre. The Toolkit translates the Principles into **practical, user-focused guidance** that can be applied across policy and programming contexts. It is designed for staff working in development co-operation, external action, and related sectors, including those without specialised media expertise. It provides: * [**Guidance by Principle**](/toolkit/principle), explaining how each Principle can be applied in practice * [**Guidance by Role**](/toolkit/role), showing how the Principles translate into day-to-day decision-making across different functions * **Checklists and tools** to support programme design, risk assessment, coordination, and evaluation * [**Case studies and examples**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights) illustrating how support can be adapted to different political and operational contexts The Toolkit complements the Principles by helping bridge the gap between **high-level commitments and operational practice**, supporting more coherent, effective, and context-sensitive approaches to media and information environment support. ## Other resources To further support your understanding of the OECD media support principles, their relevance and potential impact, we’ve curated a selection of additional resources that provide deeper insights into media development and the information environment: {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} # Feedback and Contributions Help improve this resource by sharing your feedback, experience, or expertise. This [**resource centre**](/) and the accompanying [**Toolkit**](/toolkit/about) support the implementation of the [**OECD Development Co-operation Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment**](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf). Both are designed as **practical, user-driven resources**. Your feedback and contributions help ensure they remain relevant, accurate, and grounded in real-world experience. {% hint style="info" %} ### Feedback on the Toolkit The [**Team Europe Democracy (TED) Toolkit**](/toolkit/about) is maintained by the [**TED Network**](https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/projects/team-europe-democracy-ted_en). We welcome your feedback on: * **Clarity** and **usefulness** of the guidance * **Gaps** or **areas requiring further detail** * **Recommendations** that may require **revision** or **adaptation** * **Examples** or **practices** that should be included For feedback on the Toolkit, please contact:\ ****. {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} ### Feedback on the Resource Centre The [**OECD Principles resource centre**](/) is hosted and maintained by [**GFMD**](https://gfmd.info/). We welcome input on: * Additional **resources** or **research** to include * **Corrections** or **updates** to existing content * **Suggestions** to improve **accessibility** and **usability** For feedback on the resource centre, please contact:\ ****. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ### Contribute your expertise This resource centre is strengthened by contributions from practitioners, donors, and researchers. You are invited to contribute: * **Case studies** or **examples** from your work * **Tools, templates,** or **methodologies** * **Lessons learned** from programme design and implementation * **Research** or **analysis** relevant to media and the information environment Relevant contributions may be used to update the Toolkit or expand the resource centre. {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} ### Request advice or guidance If you are working on issues related to the OECD Principles and require further guidance, you can contact: **** This includes questions related to: * **Applying** the OECD Principles **in practice** * **Navigating** available **resources** * **Identifying** relevant **tools** or **approaches** {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} ### An evolving resource Both the Toolkit and this resource centre will continue to evolve over time. User feedback, contributions, and shared experiences will help ensure that they remain: * **Practical** and **relevant** * Responsive to **changing contexts** * **Aligned** with **emerging evidence** and **good practice** {% endhint %} # What the principles say # Preamble An adapted text of the introduction to the OECD Development Co-operation Principles for Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment with additional sub headings. {% columns %} {% column %} {% embed url="" %} {% endcolumn %} {% column %} {% embed url="" %} {% endcolumn %} {% endcolumns %} {% hint style="info" %} For the references used in the Introduction please see pages 14-18 of the [Development Co-operation Principles for Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment.](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf) {% endhint %} ## Introduction > Democracy depends on a well-informed public. > > Freedom of expression, media independence, and access to information are the cornerstones of democracy and democratic governance. > > Access to information and freedom of expression are fundamental in ensuring the ability of citizens to receive accurate and unbiased information. > > Further, it is indispensable for meaningful citizen participation in the conduct of public affairs, building fair and just societies, and pursuing meaningful and sustainable development and peace. > > This ability, in turn, requires journalists who can safely produce quality content irrespective of their gender, nationality, ethnicity, race, language, religion, or any other status; media outlets that can operate with sufficient resources and without undue interference; and information ecosystems\* predicated upon human rights-respecting frameworks, gender equality and the ethical use of technology. {% hint style="info" %} **\*** For a working definition, see, Internews (2015), [Mapping Information Ecosystems to Support Resilience](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/mapping-information-ecosystems-support-resilience), “Information ecosystems are complex adaptive systems that include information infrastructure, tools, media, producers, consumers, curators, and sharers.\ They are complex organizations of dynamic social relationships through which information moves and transforms in flows.” {% endhint %} ### Sustainable development & democracy > A well-functioning independent media system is critical to sustainable development, and a bulwark of peaceful, economically prosperous societies. Greater citizen engagement (Larizza, 2017\[1]), higher levels of transparency, stronger accountability (Reinikka R., 2005\[2]; Groves D. W., 2022\[3]), lower corruption (Freille S., 2007\[4]; Brunetti and Weder, 2003\[5]) and more social cohesion (Breuer, 2024\[6]) are all attributable to the presence of professional news media. > > A vibrant news sector is also fundamental as the first line of defence against democratic backsliding and autocratisation, whose first step is often to undermine media freedom and financial viability (CIMA, 2021\[7]). > > Credible news media shed sunlight on critical social, economic and political issues to ensure a well-informed civil society and accountability of industry and private interests. ### International norms > International norms have long recognised the importance of freedom of expression and of the media, including in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially: > > * Article 19; the [General Comment on Article 19: freedoms of opinion and expression](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-comment-no34-article-19-freedoms-opinion-and) > * The [1991 Windhoek Declaration, Windhoek+30 Declaration: Information as Public Good](https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/windhoek30declaration_wpfd_2021.pdf) > * Various other instruments at the global and regional levels, including target [16.10 of the Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16). ### OECD guidance > In 2014, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued a series of guidelines on [Accountability and Democratic Governance: Orientations and Principles for Development](https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264183636-en). > > Targeting the development assistance community, the guidelines aimed to inspire “new approaches to risk taking, analysis and programming around systems of accountability and ‘do no harm’ efforts in political engagement.” > > In addition to areas such as elections, political parties, and parliaments, the guidelines included a [dedicated chapter on media assistance](https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264183636-12-en) that acknowledged the central and powerful role of the media\*and advocated a number of strategic principles for incorporating media assistance into the larger framework of development assistance. {% hint style="info" %} \* “The media provides news and information to the public, brings issues to the public agenda and facilitates public debate and discussion. It serves as a watchdog for the public interest and holds state and non-state actors accountable. The media is crucial for good governance: it creates the conditions for inclusive policy dialogue, as well as providing a platform for broad-based participation in actual policy processes.” From the OECD 2014, [Principles for Media Assistance](https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264183636-12-en). {% endhint %} ### Digital disruption > The rise of new technologies, including social media, has had far reaching consequences on information ecosystems. > > The current global information environment is increasingly characterised by a structural shift towards digital and mobile platforms dominated by user-generated content (including automated content generators) (Newman N., 2023\[9]) which has had positive consequences for vibrant public debate, but which has also facilitated a significant rise in mis- and disinformation and hate speech. > > This technological shift also resulted in a clear generational gap and other digital divides with young people predominantly using digital platforms to communicate and access information, including news. > > The new information environment has also led to a collapse of the traditional business model for media and journalism. > > This steep decline in economic viability of traditional journalism is accompanied by an even steeper increase in informational and user generated content which overshadows, undermines and contradicts verified reporting and content in the public interest. ### An urgent call to action > The complex and interrelated nature of these challenges require a fresh and sophisticated approach to development assistance. > > There is a need for more and better support to media and journalism, contextualised within a larger information ecosystem. > > The 2014 principles viewed media assistance as support for “editorial independence, financial sustainability, professional capacity, and a lively civil society.” > > Ten years later, the urgency of needs calls for a renewed and increased commitment to assistance that represents a more strategic response to current challenges, takes a more holistic, systemic approach to public interest media (IFPIM, 2021\[10])\*, and balances growing tensions between addressing mis- and disinformation and respecting freedom of expression and opinion-building – all within the context of evolving information technologies, including artificial intelligence. {% hint style="info" %} \* **ii)** For a working definition, see [Enabling Media Markets to Work for Democracy: An International Fund for Public Interest Media (2021)](https://ifpim.org/resources/feasibility-study/), which defines public interest media as “media that is free and independent, that exists to inform people on the issues that\ shape their lives, in ways which serve the public’s rather than any political, commercial or factional interest, to enable public debate and dialogue across society, and to hold those in power to account on behalf of the public interest.” {% endhint %} ### Effective support to media and the information environment > [This document](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf) puts forward principles which set out what relevant and effective support to media and the information environment might look like. > > The target audience for these principles is primarily development actors within the DAC, whose 32 members include many of the world’s largest providers of official development assistance (ODA). > > In addition, it addresses media support practitioners and organisations, local media outlets, national governments, parliaments, political parties, international policy makers, private foundations and investors, and other stakeholders engaged in the future of media and media support. > > The principles derive from and respond to consultations conducted by the\ > [Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD)](https://gfmd.info/) and the [Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA)](https://www.cima.ned.org/), which between December 2021 and June 2022 gathered input from representatives from bilateral donor agencies, implementing organisations, civil society groups, and media development experts via nearly 200 in-person and online discussions.\* {% hint style="info" %} \* For further details on the consultation process, see [Renewing the principles for effective media development and support to journalism](https://oecd-media-support-principles.gfmd.info/timeline/adoption). For another recent civil society-led initiative calling for more effective ODA support to media, see [Uniting for Democracy – Supporting Free & Independent Media – Presseclub Concordia](https://concordia.at/uniting-for-democracy-appeal-feb-2024/). {% endhint %} > In November 2022, the DAC Network on Governance agreed to develop new principles, recognising a need to ensure that the international response to the crisis in the media sector fits better in a rapidly changing information environment. > > That same month, the intergovernmental Council of UNESCO’s International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC) also welcomed the process for developing such principles (UNESCO, 2022\[11]). > > [This document](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_76d82856-en.html) captures that intent. ## Why is official development assistance (ODA) to public interest media and information integrity important for development actors? > The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines official development assistance (ODA) as “government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (OECD, 2024\[12]) > > Understanding of this definition has changed over time, recognising, for example, the emergence of “non-DAC providers or philanthropic foundations, the diversification of financial instruments for development, or the increasing overlap of development cooperation policy objectives with those of other sectors such as migration and security” (OECD, 2024\[12]). ### OECD Commitments > In 2021, on the occasion of its 60th anniversary, the OECD released its vision for the next decade, in which OECD members reaffirmed not only their commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, but also acknowledged a dramatically changing world, including global financial crises, the COVID-19 pandemic, the challenges of climate change, and rising inequality and vulnerability (OECD, 2021\[13]) . > > This renewed commitment also recognised the key role of information ecosystems, with OECD members pledging to “support open societies in the digital and data driven age.” > > This includes the intention to “advance responses to the challenges of digitalisation, including the necessity to develop new skills, the evolution of the traditional model of work and modes of business, the need to update competition policy, the need to guard against threats to democracy, digital security and privacy and to combat disinformation online” (OECD, 2021\[13]). ### Reinforcing democracy > In 2022, at the Global Forum and Ministerial Meeting on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy, the OECD launched the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative, which aims to provide evidence-based guidance and good international practices to help countries reinforce democratic values and institutions (OECD, 2022\[14]). > > Among the initiative’s five pillars are combating mis- and disinformation and transforming public governance for digital democracy. > > In addition, the OECD adopted the Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy (OECD, 2022\[14]), which, among other statements, includes: > > * The recognition that “free, pluralistic and resilient media and information ecosystems are critical for democracies”. > * An acknowledgement of the risks posed by destabilised information ecosystems on the values of democracy, social cohesion, the defence of human rights, and the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups. > * A commitment to addressing mis/disinformation while protecting freedom of speech. ### Erosion of trust > Indeed, the erosion of trust in media has emerged as one of the leading concerns facing the information ecosystem, notably through the increased weaponization of mis- and disinformation, a perceived media contiguity with discredited elites, as well as a perceived lack of independence or professionalism. > > The 2023 Edelman Trust Barometer shows that two out of every five respondents (42%) views journalists as a divisive force in society. > > While no major source is universally trusted for general news and information, trust in traditional media\* remains significantly higher (at 59%) than trust in social media (at only 41%) (Edelman, 2023\[15]). {% hint style="info" %} \* Under traditional media we understand print, radio and analogue TV. {% endhint %} ### Risks journalists, journalism & information integrity > Public interest media and information integrity, however, are increasingly at risk. > > UNESCO’s 2022 World Trends Report on journalism as a public good found that over the past five years, approximately 85 percent of the world’s population experienced a decline in press freedom in their country (UNESCO, 2022\[16]). > > From 2019 to the end of 2023, UNESCO recorded the killings of 433 journalists, who died in circumstances related to their work (UNESCO, 2024\[17]). > > At the same time, imprisonment of journalists has reached record highs. Similarly, in 2022 the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute observed a record 35 countries suffering significant deteriorations in freedom of expression at the hands of governments – up from only five countries 10 years ago. V-Dem also found that harassment and censorship of the media worsened in 21 of the 33 countries considered “autocratising” (V-Dem Institute, 2023\[8]). > > According to Reporters without borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index 2023, the situation is “good” or “satisfactory” in only 52 out of 180 countries (RSF, 2024\[18]). ### Self-censorship & gender-based violence > Self-censorship is increasing because of more hostile media and information environments, particularly affecting women. > > Gender-based violence (GBV), both digital and physical, constitutes an attack on democracy itself as it leads to self-censorship (women retreating from the public sphere because of harassment). > > In a global survey carried out by UNESCO and the International Centre for Journalists (ICFJ), as part of a research project titled The Chilling, more than a third of female journalists reported making themselves less visible as a result of the attacks and intimidation they endure – for example by asking to be taken off air, writing behind a pseudonym or self-censoring on social media. > > Nearly three quarters of women journalists surveyed reported facing online violence or harassment. Moreover, the potential impacts of Generative AI on GBV have been highlighted by UNESCO (UNESCO, 2023\[19]). > > Women face additional challenges including discrimination in the newsrooms, a lack of women as sources, stereotyping of women and dismissal of women’s issues as soft stories. ### Media viability > Moreover, traditional business models and the financial viability of the media sector face serious challenges (Economist Impact, 2022\[20]). > > Advertising revenues have shifted massively from traditional media to social media platforms, and circulation and sales of print media are in sharp decline. > > With readership and advertising markets moving online, advertising revenue for newspapers plummeted by nearly half in the ten-year period ending in 2019 (UNESCO, 2022\[16]). > > In low- and middle-income countries in particular, media outlets operate in an unstable business and political environment and with limited access to investment capital, philanthropy, and government support. > > Even in countries with long traditions of safeguarding free and independent journalism, financial and technological transformations have forced news outlets, especially those serving local communities, to close (Economist Impact, 2022\[20]). > > In some cases low or no-fee information services are provided by state-controlled media, which may out compete other news providers. > > The COVID-19 pandemic and its global economic impact exacerbated these trends, which now threaten to create an “extinction level” event for independent journalism outlets (Gabbatt, 2020\[21]). In recent years, various initiatives have emerged in an effort to respond to this grave crisis. These include: {% hint style="success" %} The [International Initiative on Information and Democracy](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/multilateralism-a-principle-of-action-for-france/alliance-for-multilateralism/the-information-and-democracy-partnership/article/initiative-for-information-and-democracy-joint-statement-11-11-2018), driven by member states along with RSF, which has led to: 1) the endorsement by 43 countries of the [International Partnership on Information and Democracy](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/multilateralism-a-principle-of-action-for-france/alliance-for-multilateralism/international-partnership-for-information-and-democracy/), defining principles of the global communication and information space and 2) the creation of the Forum on Information and Democracy to expand these principles and issue concrete recommendations for regulation and self-regulation. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} The [Media Freedom Coalition (MFC)](https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/about/what-is-the-mfc/), established in 2019 as a partnership of now more than 50 countries, which advocates for media freedom, including the safety of journalists and media workers, through a combination of advocacy efforts, diplomatic interventions, support for legal reforms, international events, and funding for media freedom initiatives. The MFC has a Working Group dedicated to Media Development. MFC members initiated and continue to support the [Global Media Defence Fund](https://www.unesco.org/en/global-media-defence-fund), administered by UNESCO; this fund complements existing UNESCO funding mechanisms such as the [International Programme for the Development of Communication](https://www.unesco.org/en/international-programme-development-communication) and the [Multi-Donor Programme on Freedom of Expression and Safety of Journalists](https://www.unesco.org/en/multi-donor-programme-freedom-expression-and-safety-journalists). {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} The [International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM)](https://ifpim.org/the-fund/), established in 2021as a multistakeholder initiative designed to diagnose and address the challenges facing public interest media in low- and middle-income countries and help to identify pathways toward long-term sustainability. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} The [International Media Policy and Advisory Centre (IMPACT)](https://impact.gfmd.info/), established by Global Forum for\ Media Development (GFMD), aims to provide donors, funders, policy-makers, and practitioners\ with the necessary groundwork needed to make informed, evidence-based decisions about\ media development and journalism support strategies, programming, funding, and advocacy. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} The [Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI)](https://www.journalismtrustinitiative.org/) launched in 2018 by RSF, is an international standard, a label for showcasing and promoting trustworthy journalism. The JTI aims at a healthier information space by developing and implementing indicators for trustworthiness of journalism and thus, promotes and rewards compliance with professional norms and ethics. To date, more than 850 media organisations from eighty countries are engaged in the JTI process. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} The 193 Member States of UNESCO in November 2021 endorsed the principles of the\ [Windhoek+30 Declaration: Information as a Public Good](https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/windhoek30declaration_wpfd_2021.pdf), which reaffirms the value of free,\ pluralistic, and independent media, and calls attention to the urgent importance of securing\ economic viability for news, transparency of internet companies, and increasing media and\ information competencies amongst the public. {% endhint %} > As part of the Summit for Democracy’s Media Freedom Cohort, several organisations and states committed to work with the DAC Network on Governance to update the existing media assistance principles, so they better respond to the current context, and include a more operational focus. > > Organisations and states which made this commitment included the Media Freedom Coalition’s Media Development Working Group, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), GFMD, and CIMA. This is in line with the DAC Network on Governance commitment in its Programme of Work and Budget 2023-2024. > > Harnessing growing opportunities for co-ordinated action afforded by the above mentioned initiatives, the below draft principles draw from the original 2014 principles (accessible in Accountability and Democratic Governance: Orientations and Principles for Development) as well as international policy documents, such as the Windhoek+30 Declaration, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement, the 2021 DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, and a growing body of evidence and research emerging from practice-based learning and evaluation and scholarly enquiry into media development. What have we learned from ODA efforts to improve the information\ environment? ------------ > Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members have supported the development of independent media since World War II. > > That assistance became more systematic and structured in the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, when such support was critical to the transitions of previously one-party state-controlled media systems. > > In subsequent years, media development programs spread throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, responding to a diversity of contexts, from fragile and conflict-affected states, to transitional countries taking steps to reform, to more advanced middle-income economies where the media holds promise for growth and investment. > > Despite decades of research on the vital role of public interest media and healthy information ecosystems for development, international support to the sector stagnated at a tiny fraction of official development assistance (ODA).\* > > The DAC Network on Governance’s mapping of ODA support to media and the broader information environment shows that for the period 2016 to 2022 the total ODA (per year) allocated to media and the information environment (including funding for information and communication technology and broadband infrastructure) is on average only 0.5% of the total ODA. {% hint style="info" %} \* The DAC Network on Governance’s mapping study of ODA for media and information environment excludes funding for international public broadcasters, such as Deutsche Welle or the BBC World Service. {% endhint %} > When ODA for infrastructure-related purposes is excluded, this number shrinks to 0.24%. Furthermore, the analysis shows that only up to 8% of ODA allocated for the media and information environment directly supports media organisations in partner countries (that is 8% of the 0.5%!). > > In addition, only a small number of development co-operation providers are supporting this sector. > > Between 2010 and 2019, 68% of the total ODA for media and information system development – excluding spending on international public broadcast corporations– was provided by six DAC members: United States (21%), Germany (17%), Sweden (10%), Japan (7%), France (7%) and the United Kingdom (6%) (CIMA, 2022\[22]). In short, only a few development co-operation providers provide the bulk of media support, a relatively small part is country allocable, and a significant proportion goes to public service broadcasters, leaving only a fraction of the total that reaches media outlets in partner countries. > > Overall, this is a markedly modest ODA contribution for a sector that plays such a catalytic function in enabling democratic governance, economic development, and fulfilling human rights. The current level of support is insufficient to address the challenges above and signals that support for public interest media and information integrity has not yet emerged as a clear priority for DAC members. > > Coupled with this comparatively low level of funding has been a scepticism towards media assistance and the challenges involved with demonstrating impact (lack of robust impact measurement) (Arsenault A., 2010\[23]; Nelson and Susman-Peña, 2012\[24]; Odugbemi S., 2010\[25]). ### Improving support to the media sector > Development co-operation provider support to the media sector can be more effective. > > Short-term goals and donor-driven interventions, along with the instrumentalization of media are frequently observed. > > While use of the media to achieve wider development goals can have value, these initiatives do not necessarily help media to build the resilience they need to address the major challenges they face (GFMD, 2023\[26]). > > Also, development co-operation provider co-ordination could be improved, including greater coherence among overlapping or competing mandates between foreign policy and development institutions. > > Despite these challenges, there has been a clear growth of engagement on media development issues through intergovernmental platforms (e.g., MFC and UNESCO’s IPDC) and multistakeholder platforms (e.g., International Institute for Information Design). ### A maturing media development community > A community of media development and journalism support organisations have emerged, including the establishment of GFMD in 2005 and CIMA in 2006 – the organisations which have managed the consultations leading up to the development of the below principles. > > This community represents years of experience in a variety of challenging environments and has continued to hone its knowledge and expertise. > > An increasing focus on research, learning, innovation and harnessing of data to improve the relevance and effectiveness of aid has followed, along with innovations and improvements. > > Media development donors have helped to refine diagnostic tools, promote co-creation of country-level agendas, develop local multistakeholder networks, and incentivise co-ordination at the regional and country levels. > > Some have also experimented with aid modalities, such as loan guarantees to fund small and medium-sized independent media enterprises in emerging markets with riskier political contexts. > > Cross-border investigative journalism networks and media sustainability incubators are among the numerous new initiatives in the field. ### Democractisation and media support > More recent assessments on democracy support find that targeted support to free media has been more likely to have a positive effect on democratisation than other forms of development assistance (Gisselquist R., 2021\[27]; Nino-Zarazua M., 2020\[28]). > > This aligns with wider research findings on the critical role of media in democratic systems. Good quality media coverage has been proven to drive democratic engagement (for example in Sierra Leone (Casey, 2015\[29]) and Mozambique (Gracio, 2021\[30]) and increase government responsiveness to citizen needs (for example in India (Besley, 2002\[31]). > > Media coverage of politics also has a positive impact by amplifying other information interventions such as televising election debates (in Sierra Leone (Bidwell, 2018\[32]) and Uganda (Platas, 2019\[33]), publicising citizens’ scorecards (for example in India (Banerjee, 2011\[34]) and disseminating findings from government audits in Brazil (Ferraz, 2008\[35]) and Mexico (Larreguy, 2020\[36]). ### Investigative journalism > The work of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists which led the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, FinCEN Files, and Pandora Papers projects, is another critical example of the value of supporting media interventions. > > As the biggest cross-border investigations in journalism history, the results have helped trigger investigations and prompted government inquiries and legislative reform in multiple countries. > > In many cases, it has provided the basis for law-enforcement to identify and freeze stolen assets, showing both the importance of this work and the veracity of the allegations it brings forward. > > These revelations have contributed to hold powerful individuals to account, spur criminal investigations, drive legislative reforms, recover billions of dollars in taxes and penalties, and promote economic development. Actions taken by governments recovered USD 1.4 billion in taxes and penalties in the five years after the Panama Papers were first published. ### ODA support to media remains small > Although support to the media constitutes a small proportion of total ODA, some development cooperation providers are prioritising this area, and are considering how to make their support more effective. > > Media development co-operation providers such as the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) have revised their media support strategies. > > An SDC guidance note on media assistance, for example, has reportedly helped the agency improve the quality of media funding (SDC, 2020\[37]). > > The DAC Network on Governance has taken numerous actions, including a 2019 policy dialogue on media development aiming to re-prioritise media in the governance agenda; an overview of governance ODA between 2010 and 2019, which demonstrated limited ODA investments supporting media and information; a specific component under the DAC Network on Governance Programme of Work and Budget 2023-2024\*; and webinars and meetings on issues such as mis/disinformation and media viability. > > These events were met by calls for the DAC Network on Governance and the DAC to sharpen its focus on media and information integrity, to provide clearer guidance on how ODA could have a more meaningful impact. {% hint style="info" %} \* “Effective ODA strategies to defend and promote the integrity of information ecosystems in a context of autocratisation”, which includes the following objectives: 1) Enhance understanding of effective ODA strategies to support the capability and impact of public interest media, 2) Better understand how ODA can support information integrity and respond to rise of mis- and\ disinformation, 3) Improve awareness of opportunities and constraints of digital technologies on information eco-systems, with a focus on the role of ODA. {% endhint %} > The principles below unite these myriad factors: the vital role of media and journalism in development and democracy, the severity of the crises facing public interest media and information integrity, emerging initiatives to improve innovation and coordination, and growing understanding of aid and development effectiveness and the impact of assistance. ## References For the references used in the Introduction please see pages 14-18 of the [Development Co-operation Principles for Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment.](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf) # 1 - Do no harm Ensure that assistance does no harm to public interest media. ## Do no harm This may include: {% hint style="success" %} Ensuring that engagement reinforces democratic norms, human rights standards and principles, media freedom, media sustainability, journalist ethics, journalist safety, information integrity and editorial independence. {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} Avoiding approaches that displace local actors, distort salaries, risk editorial independence, confuse information with institutional communication, imply contradictory injunctions of stated interests and values. {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} Ensuring that assistance is gender sensitive, gender transformative and intersectional to promote equality and equity in media content, media coverage, reporting and editorial practices, selfregulatory equality policies, business and management strategies and public policy making. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Endeavouring that any use of media to achieve other development goals (“media for development)” upholds journalistic standards of quality, professionalism, and independence, and supports core media resilience. {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} Taking all precautions to ensure the safety and security of project beneficiaries and implementers, for example by developing and implementing risk mitigation strategies. • Requiring that implementers have record of upholding the highest professional standards of journalism and program implementation in the media sector. {% endhint %} # 2 - Increase funding Increase financial and other forms of support to public interest media and the information environment, in order to strengthen democratic resilience. ## Increase funding This may include: {% hint style="success" %} Increasing the overall volume of financial and other support to the media and information environment. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Acknowledging that public interest news and public interest media are public goods and thus worthy recipients of public funding. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Incorporating assistance to media and the information environment as a vital element of development co-operation providers’ response to democratic backsliding, rising authoritarianism and mis- and disinformation, as well as a contribution towards democracy and development. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Prioritising support for countries where multiple concurrent crises (for example political, economic, climate- or conflict-related) risk creating information deserts. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Integrating support to public interest media and the information environment within wider and coherent development co-operation, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding policies or strategies (e.g., in efforts to tackle climate change or conflict, supporting for anti-corruption efforts, and promoting free and fair elections, citizen engagement, and gender equality, etc.). {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting initiatives that offer security assistance, such as health insurance, life risk funds, or relocation to journalists and media professionals working in high-risk environments. {% endhint %} ## Why support media & information integrity In an era marked by intensifying geopolitical competition, digital disruption, and democratic backsliding, access to independent, credible information has become both a democratic necessity and a security imperative. Around the world, authoritarian actors are investing in state-aligned media systems, disinformation infrastructure, and information control strategies—both domestically and across borders. Simultaneously, economic pressures, repression, and platform-driven revenue losses are undermining the viability and independence of public interest media globally. In this context, the European Union, its Member States and other actors face a strategic challenge: to ensure that development, foreign policy, and democracy assistance efforts adequately respond to the fragility of the global information environment. While the EU has made strong commitments to media freedom and pluralism in its Team Europe Democracy (TED) programming these ambitions are not yet fully reflected in operational frameworks, budget priorities, or coordination mechanisms across institutions. Recognising this gap, the TED Network Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD) has developed this practical toolkit in cooperation with the TED network. The toolkit will provide concrete guidance to support media development, combat information disorder, and integrate information integrity into EU and Member State programming. {% hint style="info" %} For more information on the evidence and arguments for supporting media and information integrity see: {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} ## The security case for supporting media and information integrity The [consultation](/timeline/adoption) to support the development of the principles and previous [surveys of donors and GFMD members](/toolkit/go-deeper/studies-reports-and-briefings) highlight long-held concerns that many donors still struggle to understand what media development is and why it is important. While some contributors believe that understanding has improved in recent years – including a shift away from the instrumentalisation of media to achieve other development goals – many note that frequent staff turnover, the rarity of specialised staff, and a lack of dedicated strategies can complicate the prioritisation of journalism support and media assistance, particularly in the face of rapid changes in market dynamics, technological advances, and political uncertainties. In addition to the historic challenges to media assistance as part of good governance and democracy programming, this could be further challenged by the pivot by the EU, EU member states and others to prioritise security as a cornerstone of policymaking. This toolkit puts forward the case that a holistic approach to security policy must not be confined to military capability or border control alone—it must also encompass the integrity of information ecosystems. {% embed url="" %} Disinformation campaigns, often state-sponsored, have become a powerful tool for undermining democratic institutions, polarising societies, sometimes as part of hybrid warfare destabilising the EU, its neighbours and strategic partners around the world. Protecting the information space at home and abroad is now as vital to European security as safeguarding physical borders. To this end, the EU must expand its security framework to include robust support for independent journalism as a frontline defence against information warfare, both within and beyond its borders. Independent journalism plays a critical role in countering disinformation and fostering public trust. Yet, many media outlets face financial precarity, political pressure, and technological disruption, leaving them vulnerable to co-option or collapse. Without sustainable, independent journalism, the information space is increasingly dominated by opaque algorithms, state-backed propaganda, and profit-driven clickbait. To reinforce the EU’s security pivot, this toolkit aims to help policymakers design funding mechanisms and programmes that support independent journalism as a bulwark against authoritarian influence, fostering stability and democratic resilience—both of which are in the EU’s long-term interests. Strengthening media resilience is not only a matter of defending against external threats—it is essential for preserving internal cohesion and advancing the EU’s strategic influence abroad. # 3 - Whole of system perspective Take a whole of system perspective on supporting the media and information environment to make support more relevant, effective and sustainable. ## Whole of system perspective > Consider the media and information environment as a development sector in itself, a critical part of efforts to promote and protect democracy, human rights, gender equality and development as well as a sector which can support implementation of other development goals. {% hint style="success" %} Pursuing a holistic and systemic approach towards the media and information environment, which takes into account its legal, political, economic, gender, technological and societal dimensions. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Adopting a long-term approach to media assistance, acknowledging that empowering relevant stakeholders and systems needs time and long-term strategic programming. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Developing solid and up-to-date diagnostics and thorough analysis of the media and information environment in each country based on data and evidence, as well as an assessment of the potential and specific needs of the people, particular audiences and public interest media organisations in each context. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting a diverse range of media, journalism and information stakeholders, which may include print, broadcast, new and social media, long- and short-form video production, podcasting, startup media, not-for-profit hybrids, storytellers, individual content creators, minority-language media, gender sensitive and gender transformative media, investigative journalism, media associations and others. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting innovation in media business models to improve organisations’ financial resilience and sustainability, allowing organisations to survive whilst avoiding excessive dependence on donor support. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting the broader enabling environment for public interest media and information, including a human rights based legal and regulatory system, access to information for journalists, journalists’ safety measures, media representative bodies, journalists’ or editors’ associations, media researchers, media monitors, advocacy organisations and coalitions as well as investing in media education in society and in media organisations in particular. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Where relevant, connecting infrastructure investments in the information environment\ (telecommunications, broadband, etc.) with initiatives that safeguard information integrity. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting engagement with national and global multistakeholder fora and engaging with social media and tech companies on policy debates, norm setting, experience exchanges, and information sharing. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Designing and supporting efforts to build resilience to mis- and disinformation for example through strengthening the skills and capacities of local media, increasing access to trustworthy information online and offline, and supporting fact checking, prebunking and improved digital and media literacy. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting processes which enable media organisations to engage with large digital platforms to build the sustainability of public interest media, increase access to trustworthy information online and offline, and minimise the risks of stifling legitimate freedom of expression. {% endhint %} # 4 - Strengthen local ownership Strengthen local leadership and ownership, empowering media partners as well as other actors in the information environment. ## Strengthen local leadership and ownership > Strengthen local leadership and ownership, empowering media partners as well as other actors in the information environment such as civil society organisations and online content creators to meaningfully participate in policies and programmes. This may include: {% hint style="success" %} Building on acquired good practices for the meaningful participation of local actors in diagnostics, priority-setting, design, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Contextualising risks and opportunities for public interest media and information integrity, tailoring assistance to each individual context and with particular attention to underrepresented and marginalised groups. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Ensuring that assistance responses remain grounded in local realities, bottom-up, evidence-based, and demand-driven, with audiences and the public interest always at the centre. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Accounting for diversity, equality, inclusion, and accessibility principles and standards based on international and regional human rights instruments. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Providing incentives for international implementers to work through local and regional partners and ensuring a more significant share of ODA for media development reaches local and regional actors directly, fostering their longevity, resilience and viability. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Increasing the availability and accessibility of direct, flexible, and reliable support, including core funding and longer-term, multi-year funding, where appropriate and feasible. {% endhint %} # 5 - Coordinate Improve co-ordination of support to the media and information environment. ## Coordination > Improve co-ordination of support to the media and information environment, both\ > among donor agencies and between development and diplomatic efforts to support\ > media freedom, especially in contexts of crisis. This may include: {% hint style="success" %} Building on good practices to improve donor co-ordination at the national and global level, including opportunities for joint, locally led diagnostics and data sharing. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Ensuring co-ordination efforts in individual countries meaningfully involve local partners and foster accountability towards them. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Ensuring multistakeholder co-ordination with tech companies, tech developers, content creators and young people, as appropriate. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Consider including funding for co-ordination and collaboration between actors in public interest media and the information environment. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Streamlining administrative requirements for support to lower transaction costs for actors and\ providers and incorporating adaptive and flexible processes into results management of funding. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Ensuring that diplomatic efforts to protect media freedom also recognise the importance of supporting the media and information environment through ODA. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Broadening co-ordination efforts to initiate dialogue with non-DAC development co-operation providers, philanthropic organisations and other development co-operation providers to the media sector. {% endhint %} # 6 - Invest in knowledge Invest in knowledge, research, and learning. ## Invest in knowledge, research, and learning. This may include: {% hint style="success" %} Drawing on the experience and research of media development institutions with technical\ expertise, local and global networks, and a history of success. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Taking account of the growing body of research and analysis in diagnosis and programme design and incentivise new research. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Exploring new pathways to media viability, including digital media trends, audience analysis, national laws and regulations, self-regulatory bodies and professional associations, advertising markets, government subsidies, and business models. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Remaining up to date with rapid advancements in technology, including algorithms, bots, surveillance, and artificial intelligence and their potential threats or benefits to media sustainability, journalism safety, and information integrity. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Sharing of findings on context specific approaches that work, including approaches that are effective in building resilience to mis- and disinformation, and in strengthening democracy, human rights and gender equality. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting innovation and experimentation; incorporating adaptation into policy, planning, and implementation, and ensuring ODA projects and programmes adapt quickly considering lessons learned. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Facilitating the inclusion of new knowledge and learning in school curricula (particularly in journalism schools). {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Supporting the development and use of metrics and indicators to understand and analyse national information ecosystems. {% endhint %} # About the TED toolkit A Team Europe Democracy (TED) guide for strengthening support to independent journalism and information integrity
### Introduction The [**OECD Development Co-operation Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment**](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf) (March 2024) provide a shared foundation for donor action. They set out what **effective, responsible, and sustainable support** to media and the information environment should look like. This Toolkit builds on that foundation. It translates the OECD Principles into **practical guidance** to support their application in policy and programming. It is designed for staff working across development, governance, digital policy, and external action, including those without **specialised media expertise**. The Toolkit reflects a growing recognition that **independent journalism and resilient information ecosystems** are central to democratic governance, economic development, and societal stability. It supports donors in integrating these considerations more systematically into their work. {% embed url="" %} #### What the Toolkit Provides The Toolkit is a practical, modular resource that can be used across different roles, institutions, and contexts. It includes: * **Role-based guidance** to support decision-making across different functions, from strategy and policy to programme implementation and communications * **Principle-based guidance** explaining how each OECD Principle can be applied in practice * **Checklists and tools** to support programme design, risk assessment, coordination, and evaluation * **Contextual guidance** for working in fragile, authoritarian, or rapidly changing environments * **A separate “go deeper” section** with case studies and examples illustrating how the Principles are applied in different contexts The Toolkit is designed to be used flexibly. Users can engage with it based on their role, their immediate task, or the specific Principle they are working with. #### Objectives The Toolkit aims to: * **Support the practical application** of the OECD Principles in day-to-day decision-making * **Strengthen the quality, consistency, and sustainability** of support to independent media and information ecosystems * **Integrate media and information integrity considerations** across sectors and policy areas * **Provide accessible guidance for non-specialist staff** working in complex and evolving contexts * **Encourage more coordinated and coherent approaches** among donors and partners *** {% hint style="info" %} ### An Evolving Resource The Toolkit is intended to evolve over time. It will be updated to reflect user feedback, emerging evidence, and changes in policy and operational contexts. Feedback from practitioners and institutions is essential to ensure that the Toolkit remains relevant, practical, and grounded in real-world experience. For comments or suggestions, please contact: {% endhint %} # How to use the toolkit This Toolkit is designed as a **practical, flexible resource** that can be used across different roles, institutions, and contexts. It is structured to support both **quick decision-making** and more in-depth programme design or policy development. You can enter the Toolkit at different points depending on your needs. You do not need to read it from start to finish.
### Start with the OECD Principles The Toolkit is structured around the [**six OECD Development Co-operation Principles**](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf), which provide the overall framework for effective and responsible support. The [**Guidance by Principle**](/toolkit/principle) section explains each Principle, including: * What it aims to address * Common challenges and risks * What effective support looks like in practice This is particularly useful if you are looking to **understand the overall approach** or align a programme or strategy with recognised good practice. ### Apply the guidance to your role To translate the Principles into day-to-day practice, the Toolkit provides [**Guidance by Role**](/toolkit/role). Each role-based section shows how the Principles apply across different functions, such as strategy, policy, programme management, and communications. It highlights **practical implications for decision-making**. For example, guidance may include recommendations such as:\ **“Integrate safety and care costs - digital, legal, and psycho-social - as standard eligible expenses in media-support programmes.”** This is particularly useful if you are looking for **targeted, actionable guidance** relevant to your responsibilities. ### Use the quick checklist Each role section begins with a **quick checklist**, providing a fast way to **assess whether key considerations have been addressed**. It can be used to: * Sense-check ongoing or planned interventions * Identify risks or gaps * Support internal discussions and decision-making The checklist is intended as a starting point, not a substitute for deeper analysis. ### Explore key considerations Following the checklist, each section outlines **key considerations** that explain why these issues matter and where common challenges arise. These narrative sections draw on consultations, interviews, and practitioner experience and are particularly useful when designing or adapting programmes. ### Go deeper with examples and resources A separate section provides [**case studies, examples**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights)**, and additional resources**. These illustrate how the Principles are applied in different contexts and support learning, adaptation, and internal discussions. ### Use the Toolkit flexibly The Toolkit is designed to support different workflows. For example: * A [**Head of Mission or Ambassador**](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) may use the guidance to inform strategic positioning, political engagement, and decisions on visibility and risk * A [**policy officer**](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) may begin with the Principles to inform strategy * A [**programme manager**](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) may move between checklists and detailed guidance during design * A [**communications team member**](/toolkit/role/communications-teams) may focus on guidance related to visibility, messaging, and risk In all cases, the aim is to support **more informed, coherent, and context-sensitive decisions**. {% hint style="info" %} #### Share Your Feedback The Toolkit is a **living resource**, shaped by its users.\ Your insights help ensure it remains practical, relevant, and grounded in experience. We’d love to hear from you: * What’s missing or unclear? * What would you like to see expanded? * Are there examples or practices you think should be added? **Contact:** {% endhint %} # How the toolkit was made Methodology for the development of this Toolkit. {% hint style="info" %} This Toolkit is based on **consultations, interviews, and research** conducted with donors, practitioners, and media development organisations. It brings together operational insights from across the global media support community. {% endhint %} ### A consultation-driven process Between May and July 2025, the Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD) conducted: * **3 focus groups** with representatives from EU institutions, Member States, and partner organisations * **15 structured interviews** with senior experts from public institutions, civil society, and academia All discussions followed the **Chatham House Rule**, allowing participants to share candid perspectives, including on politically sensitive issues. Insights, examples, and experiences from these consultations have been integrated throughout the Toolkit. All contributions are **anonymised** to protect participants and ensure that findings reflect shared challenges rather than individual positions. ### Grounded in sector evidence and practice The Toolkit builds on **existing research, policy frameworks, and collective learning** from the media development field, including the OECD Development Co-operation Principles. Consultations and research highlighted recurring challenges in donor support to media and the information environment, including: * **Limited institutional understanding** of media development * **Short-term and fragmented funding approaches** * **Weak coordination** across donors and programmes * **Barriers to local ownership and leadership** * **Gaps in evidence, research, and learning** These findings are consistent with broader sector analysis and reinforce the need for more coherent and sustained approaches to media support. ### From principles to practical guidance While the OECD Principles provide a shared framework for donor engagement, consultations confirmed a gap between **high-level commitments and operational practice**. This Toolkit addresses that gap by translating the Principles into **practical guidance tailored to different roles and institutional functions**. ### Alignment with ongoing processes The Toolkit is aligned with ongoing efforts within the Team Europe Democracy (TED) Network and the wider international community, including: * Work on strengthening coordination and funding approaches for media support * Ongoing monitoring and implementation of the OECD Principles * Collaboration with donor networks and multilateral initiatives {% hint style="info" %} ### An evolving resource The Toolkit is intended to remain **adaptive and responsive**. It will be updated over time to reflect: * User feedback * Emerging evidence and research * Changes in policy and operational contexts Ongoing engagement with practitioners and institutions will help ensure that the Toolkit continues to support **effective, coordinated, and context-sensitive media support**. {% endhint %} # Feedback # Guidance by principle The what - understanding how the OECD Principles apply to media support This section provides a structured overview of the six OECD Development Co-operation Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment. It explains how each principle applies in practice across different contexts, and why it matters for effective, responsible, and sustainable support to media and the broader information environment. Each principle represents a core building block for donor engagement. Taken together, they provide a shared framework for designing, funding, and assessing support that strengthens independent journalism, supports public interest media, and contributes to more resilient information ecosystems. For each principle, you will find: * **A narrative overview** explaining why the principle matters and how it applies across the media and information environment * **A practical checklist** to support programme design, implementation, and review * **Key risks and common challenges** that can undermine effectiveness or create unintended harm * **Guidance on how the principle links to others**, highlighting interdependencies across the framework * **References to relevant examples and case studies**, with links to a dedicated section ### Who this section is for This section is intended for a wide range of actors working on or engaging with media support, including: * Donor staff across strategic, policy, and operational roles * Implementing partners and intermediary organisations * Researchers and analysts examining media development and information ecosystems It is particularly useful for readers seeking to understand the principles in depth and to apply them in decision-making and programme design. ### Why it matters The OECD Principles provide a shared foundation for donor engagement in media support. Applying them helps ensure that interventions strengthen - rather than distort - the media and information ecosystems they aim to support. In practice, media support operates within complex political, economic, and technological environments. Decisions on funding, partnerships, visibility, and coordination can have significant downstream effects - including on market dynamics, editorial independence, and the safety of journalists and media actors. Using the principles as a reference point supports more coherent, context-aware, and risk-informed approaches. It also helps align objectives, incentives, and instruments across different parts of the system. These principles are applied in practice through the decisions and actions of different actors across the system. The [**Guidance by Role**](/toolkit/role) section translates them into role-specific considerations and actions. # 1️⃣ Do No Harm Ensure that assistance does no harm to public interest media. {% hint style="info" %} ### How to use this section * For a quick self-assessment, see [**Checklist: Do No Harm**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm/checklist-do-no-harm) * For practical examples and applications, see [**Case studies and field insights**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights) {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} ### **In brief: Principle 1 - Do no harm** Support to media and the information environment must not unintentionally expose journalists, media organisations, or the organisations that support them to harm. This includes risks linked to visibility, funding modalities, partnerships, and data management. Support should be designed and implemented in line with human rights principles, including freedom of expression and access to information. Context awareness, flexibility, and risk mitigation are essential at all stages of programme design and implementation. {% endhint %} ### Why this principle matters Media support operates in politically sensitive and often volatile environments. Interventions that are not carefully designed can expose journalists, media organisations, and media development partners to physical, legal, digital, or reputational risks. These risks may arise from: * public visibility linked to donor funding * misalignment with national regulatory frameworks * exposure of sensitive data or networks * association with foreign actors in restrictive environments In such contexts, even well-intentioned support can undermine the safety, credibility, and operational viability of media actors and their partners, as well as affecting commitments to human rights, media freedom, and editorial independence. ### Where this shows up in practice Risks often emerge from the interaction between programme requirements and local realities: * **Visibility requirements** may increase exposure of journalists, media outlets, or implementing partners in restrictive or hostile environments * **Funding structures** may create dependency, distort local media markets (including through salary inflation), or expose organisations managing sub-grants to financial or legal risk * **Partnership models** may unintentionally transfer risk to local actors without corresponding decision-making power or safeguards, or displace existing local actors * **Data collection and reporting requirements** may expose sensitive information about journalists, sources, or networks * **Compressed timelines** may limit the ability of both media organisations and support organisations to assess and mitigate risks effectively These risks are often not immediately visible at design stage but can have **long-term consequences** for **safety, trust, and sustainability**. These dynamics are illustrated in [case study 1: Credibility risk linked to donor visibility](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-1-credibility-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility) and [case study 3: Operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety). ### What this looks like in practice **Do** * Conduct context-specific risk assessments covering political, legal, digital, and security dimensions * Adapt visibility requirements to local conditions, including the option for low-visibility or anonymous support * Ensure that risk is shared appropriately across all partners, including intermediaries and local implementing organisations * Apply conflict-sensitive and politically informed approaches to programme design and implementation * Build in flexibility to adjust activities, timelines, or partnerships as risks evolve * Protect sensitive data related to journalists, sources, and partner organisations * Account for how risks may affect different groups differently, including gender-specific and intersectional risks **Avoid** * Applying standard visibility or communication requirements without assessing local risk * Transferring risk to local media organisations or support partners without adequate safeguards or resources * Requiring detailed reporting that exposes sensitive operational or personal information * Designing programmes with rigid structures that cannot adapt to changing political or security contexts * Distorting local media markets, including through salary inflation or unequal resource distribution * Displacing local actors or undermining existing media ecosystems * Assuming that risk is limited to direct beneficiaries rather than affecting the full delivery chain **Consider** * How donor visibility and branding may affect the perceived independence or safety of media actors and implementing partners * Whether partnership structures create unequal exposure to risk between international and local actors * How compliance and reporting requirements interact with security considerations * Trade-offs between transparency, accountability, and safety * How risk evolves over time, particularly in rapidly changing political environments > **Field insight** > > “Visibility can be a risk. In some contexts, being seen to receive international support is enough to attract unwanted attention.” > > *- Consultation input, media development practitioner* {% hint style="info" %} ### Key takeaway Applying a “do no harm” approach means recognising that all forms of support carry risk. Effective media support requires continuous assessment, flexibility, and shared responsibility to ensure that interventions do not undermine the safety, independence, or viability of media actors and their partners. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **For practical examples of how visibility and communication choices can affect both credibility and safety, see:** * [Case study 1: credibility risk linked to donor visibility](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-1-credibility-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility) * [Case study 3: operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety) {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ### How this links to other principles * **Principle 2 (Increase funding):** Funding decisions can introduce risks if they are short-term, inflexible, or misaligned with context, potentially undermining sustainability and independence * **Principle 3 (Whole-of-system):** Risks and unintended consequences often emerge from how interventions interact with the broader media and information ecosystem * **Principle 4 (Local ownership):** Excluding local actors or transferring disproportionate risk to them can weaken ownership and increase the likelihood of harm * **Principle 5 (Coordination):** Lack of coordination can create conflicting requirements, duplication, or exposure risks for partners * **Principle 6 (Knowledge and learning):** Continuous learning and evidence are essential to identifying, understanding, and mitigating risks over time {% endhint %} # Checklist: Do No Harm {% hint style="info" %} Use this checklist to assess whether your approach aligns with **Principle 1: Do no harm** across programme design, implementation, and review. Apply it when developing new interventions, adapting ongoing programmes, and assessing risks in changing contexts. {% endhint %} ☐ Have you assessed **political, digital, legal, and reputational risks**, including potential unintended consequences, for all actors involved? ☐ Are visibility and communication requirements adapted to the **local political and media context**? ☐ Have you considered how funding structures may affect **sustainability, incentives, and editorial independence**? ☐ Are appropriate safety measures in place (**physical, digital, legal, and psychosocial where relevant**)? ☐ Are secure communication practices and **data-minimisation approaches** being used? ☐ Are compliance and reporting requirements **proportionate to partner capacity and context**? ☐ Have you taken steps to avoid influencing editorial content or **undermining credibility and independence**? ☐ Have you planned for how risks will be managed **during and after the programme lifecycle**? ☐ Are coordination and communication aligned across actors to avoid **unintended exposure or mixed signals**? ☐ Are risk-related decisions (e.g. visibility adjustments) **explicitly documented and revisited over time**? ☐ Is the intervention designed and implemented in line with **human rights principles, including freedom of expression and access to information**? {% hint style="info" %} ### Common risk flags * Public visibility in **politically sensitive or restrictive environments** * Insecure **communication** or **data handling practices** * Short-term or fragmented funding with no **continuity planning** * Disproportionate **reporting** or **compliance burdens** * Donor requirements influencing **editorial direction** * **Lack of coordination** across donors or implementing actors * **No exit strategy** or **transition planning** * Insufficient anticipation of second-order effects or unintended consequences in **programme design or implementation** {% endhint %} **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/i5f412qDSmQr2KUUnIWo" %} # 2️⃣ Increase the amount and effectiveness of funding Increase financial and other forms of support to public interest media and the information environment, in order to strengthen democratic resilience. {% hint style="info" %} ### How to use this section * For a quick self-assessment, see [**Checklist: Increase Funding**](/toolkit/principle/2-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding/checklist-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding) * For practical examples and applications, see [**Go Deeper: Case studies and field insights**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights) {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} ### **In brief** Principle 2 focuses on ensuring that funding for independent media and media development is **adequate, predictable, and adapted to the realities of the media sector**. In practice, this means recognising that media organisations and media support actors operate under **economic, political, and technological pressures** that cannot be addressed through short-term or highly restricted funding alone. Different types of support — including core funding, project funding, and emergency support — play complementary roles. When funding is limited, fragmented, or overly rigid, it can **undermine sustainability, distort incentives, and weaken editorial independence**. When designed well, funding can strengthen the resilience, plurality, and long-term viability of the media ecosystem. These dynamics are illustrated in [case study 2: funding instability and system-level dependency](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-2-funding-stability-and-system-level-dependency-rfe-rl). {% endhint %} ### Why this principle matters Independent media and media development organisations require **stable and appropriate financing** to function as professional institutions and public-interest actors. Short-term or narrowly defined funding can create **cycles of dependency**, limit strategic planning, and shift attention away from editorial priorities toward administrative compliance. It may also exclude smaller or local actors that lack the capacity to navigate complex funding systems ([*see case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks)). These challenges are consistently reflected across the media development sector. Organisations report that short funding cycles, fragmented support, and complex compliance requirements limit their ability to plan, invest, and operate sustainably (*see* [*State of Media Development report*](https://akademie.dw.com/en/the-state-of-media-development-vis-%C3%A0-vis-the-oecd-principles/a-71897327)). **Emerging models** also demonstrate that funding structures can be **designed to support editorial independence** while maintaining accountability, for example through intermediary mechanisms that separate funding decisions from editorial processes. At the same time, funding interventions can shape the media market. **Funding approaches that are not sufficiently aligned with the principles risk** distorting local media markets, creating dependency, or undermining sustainability. Applying this principle helps ensure that funding contributes to **pluralistic, independent, and economically viable media systems**, rather than creating fragmentation or unintended market effects. ### Where this shows up in practice This principle is most visible in how funding decisions shape the viability, independence, and sustainability of media actors: * **Funding modalities** - including the balance between core and project-based funding, and between short-term and multi-year support - can limit the ability of media organisations to plan, invest, and operate sustainably * **Eligibility and access requirements** may exclude smaller or local actors, particularly where administrative thresholds or compliance expectations are not adapted to context * **Compliance and reporting requirements** can create disproportionate burdens, diverting resources away from core journalistic activities * **Coordination across donors and funding instruments** may be limited, resulting in fragmented support or overlapping funding streams * **Crisis and emergency funding mechanisms** may be absent or insufficiently accessible, reducing the ability to respond to rapidly changing conditions Across multiple survey cycles, media organisations have highlighted that managing multiple short-term grants and reporting requirements can divert significant time and resources away from core journalistic work. These tensions often arise in balancing flexibility and accountability, speed and due diligence, and independence and donor priorities. How these trade-offs are managed has direct implications for sustainability, market dynamics, and editorial independence. These dynamics are illustrated in [*case study 2: funding stability and system-level dependency (RFE/RL)*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-2-funding-stability-and-system-level-dependency-rfe-rl). ### What this looks like in practice **Do** * Provide a **mix of funding modalities**, including core, project, and emergency support, adapted to context * Use **multi-year and predictable funding** where possible to enable planning and institutional stability * Ensure funding supports both **media organisations and media development/support actors**, recognising their interdependent roles * Adapt eligibility, compliance, and reporting requirements to **partner capacity and context** * Coordinate with other donors to improve **coherence, predictability, and coverage** * **Design funding mechanisms** that **protect editorial independence**, for example by ensuring a clear separation between funders and editorial decision-making. **Avoid** * Relying exclusively on **short-term or project-based funding** for structural challenges * Applying **uniform funding models** across different media markets and political contexts * Designing funding in ways that **influence editorial priorities or undermine independence** * Creating **administrative burdens** that exclude smaller or local actors * Introducing funding that **distorts local markets or displaces existing actors** **Consider** * What combination of funding modalities is needed to support **both immediate needs and long-term sustainability** * How funding decisions may affect **market dynamics, competition, and incentives** * Whether current funding structures allow media organisations to maintain **editorial independence and audience trust** * How to balance **flexibility and accountability** in different operational contexts * How funding can strengthen the capacity of local actors to **access and manage funding directly over time** > **Field insight** > > “Short-term funding cycles make it difficult to retain staff or plan beyond immediate outputs. We spend more time applying than building something sustainable.” > > *- Media development practitioner* {% hint style="info" %} ### Key takeaway Effective support requires not only increasing funding, but ensuring that it is **structured, coordinated, and adapted to the realities of media systems**. Well-designed funding strengthens sustainability, independence, and resilience - and avoids the risks of **fragmentation, dependency, and unintended market distortion**. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **For practical examples of how funding design affects sustainability, access, and system-level outcomes, see:** * [Case study 2: funding instability and system-level dependency](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-2-funding-stability-and-system-level-dependency-rfe-rl) * [Case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks) **Further reading:** * **DW Akademie (2025)** – [*State of Media Development*](https://akademie.dw.com/en/the-state-of-media-development-vis-%C3%A0-vis-the-oecd-principles/a-71897327). Sector-wide analysis based on surveys and interviews, examining funding models, coordination, localisation, and system-level approaches to **media support.** * **Dragomir, M. (2025)** – [*Funding Without Strings: The Case for IJ4EU’s Investigative Journalism Support Model*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17512786.2025.2596819). Analysis of funding design approaches that protect editorial independence while supporting investigative journalism. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ### How this links to other principles * **Principle 1 (Do no harm):** Funding design choices can introduce risks, including unintended consequences for safety, independence, and local markets * **Principle 3 (Whole-of-system):** Funding must align with regulatory, technological, and market conditions to be effective * **Principle 4 (Local ownership):** Access to funding and funding design directly affect the ability of local actors to lead and sustain their work {% endhint %} # Checklist: Increase the amount and effectiveness of funding {% hint style="info" %} Use this checklist to assess whether your approach aligns with **Principle 2: Increase and adapt funding to support independent media** across programme design, implementation, and review. Apply it when developing new funding instruments, adapting ongoing programmes, and reviewing funding portfolios. {% endhint %} ☐ Is the overall level of funding **adequate to support sustainability**, not only short-term outputs? ☐ Does the funding model include an appropriate **mix of modalities** (e.g. core, project, and emergency funding)? ☐ Are funding timelines **predictable and multi-year where possible**, allowing media organisations and media development actors to plan ahead? ☐ Are funding structures designed to support **editorial independence and avoid distorting incentives**? ☐ Have you considered how funding may affect **local media markets, competition, and existing actors**? ☐ Are eligibility criteria and application processes **accessible to a diverse range of actors**, including smaller or local organisations? ☐ Are compliance and reporting requirements **proportionate to the size, capacity, and risk profile of partners**? ☐ Are funding mechanisms flexible enough to **adapt to changing political, economic, or security conditions**? ☐ Is there coordination with other donors to ensure **coherence, complementarity, and reduced fragmentation**? ☐ Are there provisions for **rapid or emergency funding** in response to crises affecting media actors? ☐ Does the funding approach support the long-term ability of partners to **access and manage funding independently over time**? {% hint style="info" %} ### Common risk flags * Over-reliance on **short-term, project-based funding** for structural challenges * Funding that creates **dependency without building sustainability** * Administrative requirements that **exclude smaller or local actors** * Lack of predictability leading to **staff turnover and institutional instability** * Funding that **influences editorial priorities or undermines independence** * Fragmented donor approaches with **overlapping or duplicative funding streams** * Insufficient consideration of **potential market distortion or unintended economic effects** * Absence of emergency mechanisms in **volatile or crisis contexts** {% endhint %} **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/TtP50ctl4YfxhnmdRb8u" %} # 3️⃣ Adopt a whole-of-system approach Take a whole of system perspective on supporting the media and information environment to make support more relevant, effective and sustainable. {% hint style="info" %} ### How to use this section * For a quick self-assessment, see [**Checklist: Adopt a whole-of-System approach**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach/checklist-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) * For practical examples and applications, see [**Case studies and field insights**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights) {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} ### **In brief** Principle 3 focuses on understanding and supporting the **media and information environment as an interconnected system**, rather than a collection of individual projects or isolated interventions. In practice, this means recognising that media organisations and media development actors operate within a broader ecosystem shaped by **laws, markets, technologies, governance structures, and social dynamics**. Funding, regulation, and policy decisions interact - and can either reinforce or undermine each other. When interventions are designed in isolation, they risk **fragmentation, duplication, and limited impact**. A whole-of-system approach helps ensure that different actions - financial, regulatory, and programmatic - are aligned and mutually reinforcing. {% endhint %} ### Why this principle matters Independent media do not function in isolation. Their viability and independence depend on **market conditions, regulatory frameworks, digital infrastructure, and audience trust**. Interventions that focus narrowly on content production or individual organisations may overlook structural constraints such as **platform dominance, weak advertising markets, legal restrictions, or limited access to infrastructure** ([*see case study 4: governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-4-governance-risk-and-the-role-of-media-oversight-in-infrastructure-investments)). Similarly, policy or regulatory reforms may fail if they are not matched with **financial and institutional support**. This is reflected in practice, where stakeholders report that support often remains fragmented, with limited coordination and insufficient alignment across interventions, reducing overall effectiveness. Applying a whole-of-system approach helps ensure that support contributes to **resilient, pluralistic, and economically viable media ecosystems**, rather than addressing symptoms in isolation. It also reduces the risk that well-intentioned interventions create **gaps, overlaps, or unintended consequences across the system**. ### Where this shows up in practice This principle is most visible in how different parts of the media and information ecosystem are addressed in combination: * **Alignment between funding, policy, and regulation** may be limited, leading to situations where strategic priorities are not reflected in funding decisions or regulatory frameworks * **Coordination across institutions, donors, and implementing actors** may be uneven, resulting in parallel or overlapping interventions rather than coherent approaches * **Integration of media support with digital, governance, and economic programmes** may be partial, limiting the ability to address structural factors affecting media viability * **Engagement with local ecosystems** - including civil society, regulators, and private sector actors - may not reflect the full range of actors shaping the information environment * **Use of data and evidence to understand system dynamics** may be insufficient, reducing the ability to identify interdependencies and emerging risks These challenges often arise when different actors **operate in parallel rather than in coordination**, when interventions **address individual components without considering system effects**, or when incentives are **misaligned across funding, policy, and implementation**. These dynamics are illustrated in [case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts). ### What this looks like in practice **Do** * Design interventions that consider the **interdependence between media organisations, media development actors, regulators, platforms, and markets** * Align funding with **relevant policy, regulatory, and digital frameworks** where possible * Coordinate with other donors and stakeholders to improve **coherence and coverage across the ecosystem** * Support both **institutional capacity and enabling environments**, including legal and market conditions * Use data and analysis to understand **how different parts of the system interact and evolve over time** **Avoid** * Treating media support as a **standalone sector disconnected from governance, digital, or economic policies** * Designing interventions in isolation without considering **existing initiatives or system-wide effects** * Focusing exclusively on **short-term outputs without addressing structural constraints** * Creating parallel structures that **duplicate or compete with existing local systems** * Overlooking how interventions may **shift incentives or create imbalances within the ecosystem** **Consider** * How different interventions - funding, policy, regulation - interact within the **same ecosystem** * Whether coordination mechanisms are sufficient to **avoid duplication and fragmentation** * How to balance support for **individual organisations with broader system-level reforms** * What role different actors (public, private, civil society) play in shaping the **information environment** * How system dynamics may evolve over time, including **technological and market changes** > **Field insight** > > “The whole-system approach means engaging governments, agencies, civil society, and media together. Without that dialogue, we just fund isolated projects.” > > *- Development agency representative* {% hint style="info" %} ### Key takeaway Supporting independent media requires more than isolated interventions. It requires **alignment across funding, policy, regulation, and market dynamics** within the broader information ecosystem. A whole-of-system approach helps ensure that interventions are **coherent, complementary, and capable of producing sustained impact**, rather than fragmented or short-lived results. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **For practical examples of how system-level dynamics affect media support, see:** * [Case study 4: governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-4-governance-risk-and-the-role-of-media-oversight-in-infrastructure-investments) * [Case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts) **Further reading:** * **Media Viability Manifesto initiative (2024)**, [*The Media Viability Manifesto: A Common Framework for Joint Action*](https://mediaviabilitymanifesto.org/wp-content/uploads/MV_Manifesto-EN-WEB-20240904-1.pdf) {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ### How this links to other principles * [**Principle 1 (Do no harm):**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm) System interactions can create unintended consequences if risks are not assessed across the ecosystem * [**Principle 2 (Increase funding):**](/toolkit/principle/2-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding) Funding decisions influence market dynamics and must align with broader system conditions * [**Principle 4 (Local ownership):**](/toolkit/principle/4-support-local-leadership-and-ownership) Local actors are essential to understanding and shaping system dynamics in context {% endhint %} # Checklist: Adopt a whole-of-system approach {% hint style="info" %} Use this checklist to assess whether your approach aligns with **Principle 3: Take a whole-of-system approach** across programme design, implementation, and evaluation. Apply it when designing interventions, coordinating across actors, and assessing how programmes interact with the broader media and information environment. {% endhint %} ☐ Have you analysed how the intervention interacts with the broader **media and information ecosystem**, including legal, market, and technological factors? ☐ Are funding, policy, and programme design decisions **aligned and mutually reinforcing**, rather than operating in isolation? ☐ Have you identified existing initiatives and actors to avoid **duplication, fragmentation, or competition for the same partners**? ☐ Are coordination mechanisms in place to ensure **information-sharing and alignment across donors and implementing actors**? ☐ Does the intervention take into account the roles of **media organisations, media development actors, regulators, platforms, and civil society**? ☐ Are system-level constraints - such as regulatory barriers, market conditions, or infrastructure gaps - reflected in programme design? ☐ Does the approach balance support for **individual organisations** with efforts to strengthen the **enabling environment**? ☐ Are data and evidence used to understand how different parts of the system **interact and evolve over time**? ☐ Are there mechanisms to adapt the intervention as **system dynamics change**, including political, technological, or market shifts? ☐ Is engagement with local actors structured in a way that reflects **how the ecosystem functions in practice**, not only formal institutional roles? ☐ Are potential system-level effects - including unintended consequences across markets or partnerships - **considered and monitored**? {% hint style="info" %} ### Common risk flags * Interventions designed in isolation without considering **system interactions** * Duplication of **existing initiatives or competition** for the same partners * Lack of coordination across donors leading to **fragmentation or gaps in support** * Overemphasis on individual projects without addressing **structural constraints** * Misalignment between **funding, policy, and regulatory approaches** * Insufficient consideration of **how platform dynamics or market conditions affect media viability** * Limited understanding of how **local ecosystems function in practice** * Inability to adapt as system conditions change {% endhint %} **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/HYHSz9pxf4RAmWms4Tkv" %} # 4️⃣ Support local leadership and ownership Strengthen local leadership and ownership, empowering media partners as well as other actors in the information environment. {% hint style="info" %} ### How to use this section * For a quick self-assessment, see [**Checklist: Support local leadership and ownership**](/toolkit/principle/4-support-local-leadership-and-ownership/checklist-support-local-leadership-and-ownership) * For practical examples and applications, see [**Case studies and field insights**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights) {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} ### **In brief** Principle 4 focuses on ensuring that **local media organisations and media development actors are able to lead, decide, and shape their own development**, rather than being positioned primarily as implementers of externally designed programmes. In practice, this means recognising local actors as **professional institutions with contextual knowledge, audience relationships, and long-term stakes in the media ecosystem**. Their leadership is essential to ensuring that support is relevant, sustainable, and trusted. When local actors are excluded from decision-making or confined to subcontracting roles, interventions risk **misalignment with local realities, weakened ownership, and limited long-term impact** ([*see case study 1: credibility risk linked to donor visibility*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-1-credibility-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility)). Strengthening local leadership supports **editorial independence, innovation, and institutional resilience**. {% endhint %} ### Why this principle matters Local ownership is central to the sustainability and legitimacy of media systems. Media organisations and media development actors operate within **specific political, cultural, and market contexts** that external actors cannot fully replicate. However, funding structures, compliance requirements, and risk management practices often favour organisations that are already familiar with donor systems. This can create **barriers to entry for local actors**, reinforce existing power imbalances in partnerships, and limit the diversity of the media ecosystem ([*see case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks)). Media development actors also report that partnership structures and programme design processes do not always fully reflect local priorities or enable meaningful participation in decision-making. Applying this principle helps ensure that support contributes to **locally grounded, pluralistic, and resilient media environments**, while reducing dependency on external actors and strengthening long-term capacity. ### Where this shows up in practice This principle is most visible in how programme design and funding decisions shape the role and position of local media actors within partnerships: * **Partnership structures and consortium design** may concentrate decision-making power with international actors, limiting the ability of local partners to shape priorities and approaches * **Eligibility criteria and access to funding** may favour larger or international organisations, excluding smaller or local media actors * **Compliance, reporting, and due diligence requirements** may create barriers to participation for local actors with limited administrative capacity * **Division of roles, responsibilities, and resources across partners** may not reflect local expertise or contribution, affecting both effectiveness and ownership * **Capacity strengthening and institutional development approaches** may prioritise externally defined models rather than building on existing local structures and practices These tensions often arise in balancing accountability and accessibility, risk management and inclusion, and speed of delivery and meaningful participation. How these trade-offs are addressed shapes whether **local actors are** positioned as **independent partners or** primarily **as implementers of externally defined priorities.** ### What this looks like in practice **Do** * Enable **local media organisations and media development actors to act as lead partners**, with decision-making authority and budget control * Design funding and compliance requirements that are **proportionate to context and partner capacity** * Include **capacity strengthening, mentorship, and peer learning** as integral components of programmes * Ensure local actors are involved in **problem definition, design, implementation, and evaluation** * Support pathways for partners to **progress from sub-grantee to direct funding recipient over time** Avoid * Structuring partnerships where local actors are primarily **subcontracted to deliver predefined outputs** * Applying compliance and reporting requirements that **exclude or disadvantage smaller or first-time applicants** * Concentrating decision-making and financial control with **international implementers** * Treating capacity strengthening as a **separate or optional activity**, rather than embedded in implementation * Designing programmes without **meaningful consultation or engagement with local actors** **Consider** * How partnership structures affect **power dynamics, incentives, and ownership** * Whether current requirements unintentionally favour actors with **prior donor experience** * How to balance **risk management with inclusive access to funding** * What support is needed for local actors to **meet compliance requirements over time** * How programmes can strengthen both **institutional capacity and long-term sustainability** > **Field insight** > > "Compliance requirements are often the biggest barrier. Even strong local organisations are excluded because they have not worked with these systems before.” > > *- Donor representative* {% hint style="info" %} ### Key takeaway Supporting local leadership requires more than including local actors in implementation. It requires **shifting decision-making, resources, and accountability closer to those operating within the media ecosystem**. Well-designed approaches strengthen ownership, sustainability, and independence while avoiding risks such as **reinforcing dependency and limiting long-term impact**. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **For practical examples of how funding structures and compliance requirements affect local leadership and ownership, see:** * [Case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks) * [Case study 1: credibility risk linked to donor visibility](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-1-credibility-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility) {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ### How this links to other principles * [**Principle 1 (Do no harm):**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm) Excluding local actors or transferring risk to them can create unintended consequences * [**Principle 2 (Increase funding):**](/toolkit/principle/2-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding) Access to appropriate and flexible funding determines whether local actors can lead * [**Principle 3 (Whole-of-system):**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) Local actors are essential to understanding and shaping system dynamics {% endhint %} # Checklist: Support local leadership and ownership {% hint style="info" %} Use this checklist to assess whether your approach aligns with **Principle 4: Support local leadership and ownership** across programme design, implementation, and partnership management. Apply it when designing programmes, selecting partners, and managing grants. {% endhint %} ☐ Are **local media organisations and media development actors** meaningfully involved in defining priorities, objectives, and approaches from the outset? ☐ Do partnership structures enable local actors to **hold decision-making roles**, including as lead partners where appropriate? ☐ Are financial resources and budget control **shared in a way that reflects local leadership and responsibility**? ☐ Are eligibility criteria and application processes **accessible to local actors**, including those without prior donor experience? ☐ Are compliance and reporting requirements **proportionate to partner capacity and context**, and adapted where needed? ☐ Are there mechanisms in place to support partners in **building compliance and financial management capacity over time**? ☐ Do programme timelines and processes allow for **meaningful consultation and co-decision**, rather than token participation? ☐ Are roles and responsibilities across consortia structured to avoid **systematic subcontracting of local actors**? ☐ Does the intervention support local actors to **progress from sub-grantee to direct funding recipient over time**? ☐ Are risks, responsibilities, and visibility requirements **shared fairly across partners**, without transferring disproportionate burden to local actors? ☐ Does the approach contribute to strengthening **long-term institutional capacity, sustainability, and leadership**? {% hint style="info" %} ### Common risk flags * Local actors engaged only at **implementation stage**, not in design or decision-making * Partnership models where local actors are **subcontracted without influence over strategy or resources** * Compliance and reporting requirements that **exclude smaller or first-time applicants** * Concentration of financial control and decision-making with **international implementers** * Short-term capacity-building activities without **long-term institutional strengthening** * Lack of pathways for local actors to **access funding directly over time** * Consultation processes that are **symbolic rather than decision-shaping** * Disproportionate risk transferred to local partners without **corresponding authority or support** {% endhint %} **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/s4L1umDsMrM5yHd6bPsf" %} # 5️⃣ Improve coordination Improve coordination of support to the media and information environment. {% hint style="info" %} ### How to use this section * For a quick self-assessment, see [**Checklist: Improve coordination**](/toolkit/principle/5-improve-coordination/checklist-improve-coordination) * For practical examples and applications, see [**Case studies and field insights**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights) {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} #### In brief Principle 5 focuses on ensuring that support to independent media and media development is **coordinated, coherent, and mutually reinforcing across actors and instruments**. In practice, this means recognising that fragmented support - across donors, institutions, and programmes - can create **duplication, administrative burden, and inconsistent incentives** for media organisations and media development actors. When coordination is weak, actors may fund similar activities in parallel, apply different reporting requirements, or compete for visibility. This can divert time and resources away from core activities and reduce overall impact. Effective coordination helps ensure that support is **efficient, complementary, and easier to access and manage**. {% endhint %} ### Why this principle matters Media organisations and media development actors often operate in **resource-constrained and high-risk environments**, where administrative burden and unpredictability can directly affect sustainability and performance. Fragmented funding and inconsistent procedures can force organisations to manage **multiple reporting systems, timelines, and compliance requirements simultaneously**, reducing the time available for journalism, capacity building, or system-level work ([*see case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts)). Sector evidence also points to persistent challenges related to fragmentation and duplication of efforts, reflecting limited coordination across funding programmes and actors. At the same time, lack of coordination can lead to **gaps in coverage, duplication of efforts, and missed opportunities for learning and scaling effective approaches** ([*see case study 4: governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-4-governance-risk-and-the-role-of-media-oversight-in-infrastructure-investments)). Applying this principle helps ensure that support is delivered in a way that **maximises impact, reduces inefficiencies, and strengthens trust between donors and partners**. ### Where this shows up in practice This principle is most visible in how coordination is structured and operationalised across donors, instruments, and implementing actors: * **Alignment of funding cycles, calls, and priorities across donors** may be limited, reducing opportunities for complementary or sustained support * **Harmonisation of reporting, compliance, and due diligence requirements** may be insufficient, increasing administrative burden for partners working across multiple programmes * **Information-sharing and coordination mechanisms between actors** may be underused or inconsistently applied, limiting visibility on who is doing what and where * **Joint programming, pooled funding, or co-financing arrangements** may be difficult to establish or sustain, reducing the potential for collective impact * **Use of shared data, monitoring, and learning systems** may be fragmented, limiting opportunities for joint analysis and adaptation These challenges often arise when donors **operate in parallel without systematic information exchange**, when **administrative requirements are inconsistent across programmes**, or when coordination is **treated as optional** rather than integral to programme design. Evidence from coordination efforts also highlights structural constraints that can limit effectiveness in practice, including competition for funding between actors, limited incentives for donor participation, and coordination mechanisms that default to information-sharing rather than joint strategy development. How coordination is prioritised and structured directly affects **efficiency, partner burden, and overall impact**, particularly where **incentives and participation** are **not aligned** across actors. These dynamics are illustrated in [case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts). ### What this looks like in practice **Do** * Establish regular **coordination mechanisms** between donors, implementing partners, and other stakeholders * Align funding approaches to improve **complementarity, predictability, and coverage** * Harmonise reporting, compliance, and due diligence requirements where possible * Use **shared monitoring, evaluation, and learning approaches** to build a common evidence base * Explore **pooled funding or joint programming** to reduce duplication and administrative burden **Avoid** * Designing programmes without considering **existing initiatives or funding streams** * Requiring partners to comply with **multiple, conflicting reporting or compliance systems** * Prioritising individual visibility over **collective impact and coherence** * Creating parallel coordination structures that **duplicate existing mechanisms** * Treating coordination as a **one-off activity rather than an ongoing process** **Consider** * Whether coordination mechanisms are sufficient to **reduce duplication and administrative burden** * How to balance **institutional visibility with efficiency and partner needs** * What level of harmonisation is feasible across different funding instruments and contexts * How shared approaches can improve **learning, accountability, and scalability** * How coordination can be structured without **over-centralising decision-making or limiting flexibility** > **Field insight** > > “Sometimes a brilliant idea has already been done by someone else 18 months ago… so having a more formal, regular exchange between European donors would be useful.” > > *- European Commission employee* {% hint style="info" %} ### Key takeaway Coordination is not an administrative add-on. It is a **core condition for effective, efficient, and credible support to independent media**. Well-coordinated approaches reduce duplication, ease administrative burden, and improve impact, avoiding risks of **fragmentation, inefficiency, and reduced trust across the system**. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **For practical examples of how coordination affects efficiency, administrative burden, and system coherence, see:** * [Case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts) * [Case study 4: governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-4-governance-risk-and-the-role-of-media-oversight-in-infrastructure-investments) **Further reading:** * **GFMD (2023)** – [*Transforming Media Development: Recommendations for Effective Funding and Collaboration*](https://gfmd.info/h-content/uploads/2023/09/Transforming-Media-Development--gfmd.pdf?x32453). Analysis of funding practices, coordination challenges, and sector perspectives on improving media development support. * **GFMD (2022)** - [Coordinating media assistance and journalism support efforts](https://gfmd.info/briefings/coordinating-media-assistance-journalism-support/). Report analysing the scope and focus of media assistance coordination efforts, highlighting common pitfalls as well as best practice models. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ### How this links to other principles * [**Principle 1 (Do no harm):**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm) Poor coordination can increase risk, including unintended exposure or conflicting requirements * [**Principle 2 (Increase funding):**](/toolkit/principle/2-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding) Coordination improves the effectiveness and predictability of funding * [**Principle 3 (Whole-of-system):**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) Coordination is essential to aligning interventions across the ecosystem * [**Principle 4 (Local ownership):**](/toolkit/principle/4-support-local-leadership-and-ownership) Fragmented systems increase burden on local actors and limit their ability to lead {% endhint %} # Checklist: Improve coordination {% hint style="info" %} Use this checklist to assess whether your approach aligns with **Principle 5: Strengthen coordination and coherence of support** across programme design, implementation, and review. Apply it when designing programmes, engaging with other donors, and reviewing funding portfolios. {% endhint %} ☐ Have you identified existing initiatives and actors to ensure the intervention is **complementary and not duplicative**? ☐ Are coordination mechanisms in place with relevant donors and partners, with **clear roles, responsibilities, and ownership**? ☐ Are funding approaches aligned with other actors to improve **coherence, coverage, and predictability**? ☐ Are reporting, compliance, and due diligence requirements **harmonised or aligned where possible** to reduce administrative burden? ☐ Have you assessed the cumulative administrative burden placed on partners, including **multiple reporting systems and audit requirements**? ☐ Are there systems in place for **regular information-sharing and coordination** across programmes and actors? ☐ Are joint approaches - such as **pooled funding, co-financing, or shared frameworks** - considered where appropriate? ☐ Are visibility, communication, and branding requirements coordinated to avoid **conflicting expectations or increased risk for partners**? ☐ Are coordination efforts designed to support **efficiency without over-centralising decision-making or limiting flexibility**? ☐ Are data, monitoring, and learning approaches **shared or aligned** to support collective understanding and improvement? ☐ Are digital tools or platforms used to support coordination, while ensuring **appropriate data protection and security**? {% hint style="info" %} ### Common risk flags * Duplication of activities or funding streams across donors * Coordination dependent on **informal or ad hoc relationships rather than structured mechanisms** * Multiple and conflicting reporting or compliance requirements for the same partners * Excessive administrative burden reducing time for **journalism or programme delivery** * Competition for visibility undermining **coherence and collaboration** * Limited information-sharing leading to **gaps or overlaps in support** * Lack of shared data or learning across programmes * Coordination efforts that create **additional layers of bureaucracy without reducing burden** {% endhint %} **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/UMt6Z3UtgXuye2qzwPBg" %} # 6️⃣ Invest in knowledge and learning Invest in knowledge, research, and learning. {% hint style="info" %} ### How to use this section * For a quick self-assessment, see [**Checklist: Invest in Knowledge and Learning**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm/checklist-do-no-harm) * For practical examples and applications, see [**Case studies and field insights**](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights) {% endhint %} {% hint style="info" %} #### In brief Principle 6 focuses on ensuring that support to independent media and media development is **informed by evidence, strengthened through learning, and continuously adapted based on experience**. In practice, this means recognising that knowledge - including research, monitoring, evaluation, and field-based insight - is often **fragmented, inaccessible, or underused**. Learning is frequently treated as a reporting requirement rather than a tool for improving interventions. When knowledge is not shared or applied, support risks being based on **assumptions rather than evidence**, leading to duplication, inefficiencies, and limited impact. Investing in knowledge systems helps ensure that interventions are **responsive, accountable, and grounded in how media ecosystems function in practice**. {% endhint %} ### Why this principle matters Media organisations and media development actors operate in **complex and rapidly evolving environments**, shaped by political change, technological disruption, and shifting market conditions. Effective support requires understanding **what works, for whom, and under what conditions**. Emerging approaches are also being developed to assess the potential real-world impact of misinformation, helping fact-checkers and other actors prioritise claims based on their likelihood to cause harm. Early trials suggest that such tools can improve decision-making by focusing limited resources on the most consequential information risks. ([*see Cunliffe-Jones, P. (2025)*](https://camri.ac.uk/blog/2025/04/02/trial-finds-predictive-model-helps-fact-checkers-identify-false-claims-with-potential-to-cause-harm/)*)* However, evidence is often fragmented across programmes, donors, and institutions. Evaluations may be commissioned but not shared, and learning may remain confined to internal reporting systems ([*see case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts)). This limits the ability of actors to **build on existing knowledge, avoid repetition, and adapt approaches over time**. Across the sector, organisations also report that existing research and learning are not consistently used to inform programme design and decision-making, further limiting the effectiveness of support. Coordination challenges can further limit the effectiveness of learning, particularly where knowledge-sharing mechanisms are weak, incentives for collaboration are limited, or learning remains confined within individual programmes. At the same time, knowledge systems are not neutral. If designed primarily for accountability, they can create **administrative burden without improving practice**. If designed well, they can support **adaptive management, strengthen decision-making, and improve outcomes across the system**. Applying this principle helps ensure that knowledge becomes a **shared resource**, supporting both accountability and continuous improvement. ### Where this shows up in practice This principle is most visible in how knowledge, research, and learning are integrated into programme design, implementation, and adaptation: * **Monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) frameworks and requirements** may prioritise reporting over learning, limiting their usefulness for decision-making * **Research commissioning and dissemination practices** may not ensure that findings are accessible or used by relevant stakeholders * **Data collection, management, and protection practices** may not be clearly linked to programme objectives, or may create risks for sensitive information * **Knowledge-sharing mechanisms across programmes and actors** may be fragmented, reducing opportunities for collective learning and coordination * **Integration of learning into programme design and adaptation** may be limited, affecting the ability to respond to changing conditions These challenges often arise when **learning** is **treated primarily as a compliance requirement** rather than a management tool, when **research and evaluation findings are not** **systematically used**, or when data is collected **without a clear purpose or feedback** into decision-making. How knowledge and learning are prioritised directly affects the **relevance, adaptability, and effectiveness of support**. ### What this looks like in practice **Do** * Integrate **learning and adaptation** into programme design, not only evaluation stages * Ensure research and evaluation findings are **accessible, usable, and shared** with relevant stakeholders, including local actors * Align monitoring and evaluation approaches to support **both accountability and learning** * Use a combination of **quantitative and qualitative data**, including field-based insights * Support local actors to **participate in and lead research, evaluation, and knowledge production** ([*see case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks)) **Avoid** * Treating monitoring and evaluation as a **compliance exercise disconnected from decision-making** * Commissioning research or evaluations that are **not shared or not used in practice** * Creating data collection requirements that **increase burden without clear value** * Relying exclusively on external consultants without incorporating **local knowledge and expertise** * Designing knowledge systems that **exclude media organisations and media development actors as users of evidence** **Consider** * How learning can be embedded in **ongoing programme management and adaptation** * Whether knowledge generated is **accessible to those who can use it, including local actors** * How to balance **data collection with proportionality and partner capacity** * What mechanisms are needed to ensure that lessons are **shared across programmes and actors** * How to protect **sensitive data and sources**, particularly in high-risk environments > **Field insight** > > “Lessons are often collected, but not shared or used. We keep repeating similar approaches because we don’t have a clear way of learning across programmes.” > > *- Media development practitioner* {% hint style="info" %} ### Key takeaway Knowledge and learning are not by-products of media support. They are **core components of effective and adaptive interventions**. When evidence is shared and applied, support becomes more responsive, efficient, and impactful. When it is fragmented or underused, interventions risk **repetition, inefficiency, and missed opportunities for improvement**. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **For practical examples of how coordination and funding structures affect knowledge-sharing and learning across programmes, see:** * [Case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts) * [Case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks) **For further reading:** * **Cunliffe-Jones (2025)** – [*Fake News – What’s the Harm?*](https://camri.ac.uk/blog/2025/04/02/trial-finds-predictive-model-helps-fact-checkers-identify-false-claims-with-potential-to-cause-harm/) and University of Westminster / University of Wisconsin-Madison trial on assessing the real-world impact of misinformation * **GFMD (2022)** - [Coordinating media assistance and journalism support efforts](https://gfmd.info/briefings/coordinating-media-assistance-journalism-support/). Report analysing the scope and focus of media assistance coordination efforts, highlighting common pitfalls as well as best practice models. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ### How this links to other principles * [**Principle 1 (Do no harm):**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm) Learning helps identify and mitigate risks and unintended consequences * [**Principle 2 (Increase funding):**](/toolkit/principle/2-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding) Evidence supports better allocation and design of funding * [**Principle 3 (Whole-of-system):**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) Knowledge is essential to understanding system dynamics and interactions * [**Principle 4 (Local ownership):**](/toolkit/principle/4-support-local-leadership-and-ownership) Local actors should be contributors to and users of knowledge * [**Principle 5 (Coordination):**](/toolkit/principle/5-improve-coordination) Shared learning reduces duplication and strengthens coherence {% endhint %} # Checklist: Invest in knowledge and learning {% hint style="info" %} Use this checklist to assess whether your approach aligns with **Principle 6: Invest in knowledge, evidence, and learning** across programme design, implementation, and evaluation. Apply it when designing programmes, developing monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and coordinating learning across actors. {% endhint %} ☐ Is the intervention informed by **relevant and up-to-date evidence**, including local and contextual knowledge? ☐ Are monitoring, evaluation, and learning approaches designed to support **both accountability and adaptive management**? ☐ Are learning objectives and deliverables **integrated into programme design**, not only end-of-project evaluation? ☐ Are both **quantitative and qualitative methods** used to capture outcomes, including changes in trust, resilience, and institutional capacity? ☐ Are local media organisations and media development actors involved in **generating, interpreting, and applying knowledge**? ☐ Are research findings, evaluations, and insights **shared in accessible and usable formats**, including for local partners? ☐ Are there mechanisms in place to ensure that learning is **fed back into programme design and decision-making**? ☐ Are knowledge and learning approaches **coordinated across donors and programmes** to reduce duplication and build a shared evidence base? ☐ Are data collection and reporting requirements **proportionate to partner capacity and clearly linked to use**? ☐ Are evaluation findings treated as a **shared resource**, contributing to broader sector learning where appropriate? ☐ Are data management practices aligned with **data protection, security, and the safety of journalists and sources**? {% hint style="info" %} ### Common risk flags * Monitoring and evaluation treated as a **compliance exercise rather than a learning tool** * Research and evaluation findings **not shared or not accessible to relevant stakeholders** * Data collection requirements that **increase burden without informing decisions** * Limited use of qualitative or context-based insights * Local actors positioned only as **data providers, not users or co-producers of knowledge** * Duplication of studies or lack of coordination across programmes * Learning not integrated into **programme adaptation or future design** * Weak data protection or handling practices in **sensitive environments** {% endhint %} **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/cAi2ntJ3VupEjssgX5Hx" %} # Guidance by role And best practice in supporting information integrity and independent media This section provides practical guidance tailored to the different roles involved in designing, funding, and implementing support to independent media and information integrity. While the OECD DAC Principles define what effective support looks like, this part of the Toolkit focuses on how these principles can be applied in day-to-day decision-making - across policy, programming, and implementation functions. Rather than focusing on institutions, the guidance is organised by role. This reflects how decisions are made in practice: across different levels of responsibility, and often across institutional boundaries. Each role-based section includes: * **A quick “Start here” checklist** to support rapid decision-making * **Key considerations for programme design and implementation**, based on common challenges and trade-offs * **Detailed guidance aligned with the six OECD Principles** * **Examples and field insights** drawn from consultations, interviews, and donor experience ### Who this is for This section is designed for professionals working across development cooperation, foreign policy, and related fields, including: * [**Policy and strategy staff**](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) shaping priorities, frameworks, and funding allocations * [**Programme and project managers**](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) designing and overseeing interventions * [**Communications and public diplomacy teams**](/toolkit/role/communications-teams) engaging with media and information environments * [**Heads of mission**](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) **and** [**senior leadership**](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads) responsible for strategic direction and coherence * **Cross-sectoral teams** integrating media and information integrity into broader programmes It is also relevant for implementing partners seeking to better understand how donor priorities translate into operational decisions. ### Why this matters Supporting independent media and information integrity requires consistent decision-making across different roles and levels of responsibility. In practice, outcomes are shaped not only by strategy, but by how programmes are designed, how risks are managed, how funding is structured, and how coordination takes place. By aligning these decisions with the OECD Principles, development actors can improve the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of their support - ensuring it strengthens, rather than inadvertently undermines, media and information ecosystems. # Programme and project managers Programme and Project Managers play a central role in translating strategic priorities into operational programmes. Decisions taken at this level—on design, funding structures, partnerships, and risk management—directly shape whether support strengthens or undermines media and information ecosystems. This section provides practical guidance to support programme design and implementation in line with the OECD DAC Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment. ### How to use this section Depending on your needs, you can navigate directly to: * [**Start here: Quick checklist**](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers/start-here-quick-checklist-for-programme-and-project-managers)\ A rapid “stress test” to validate programme design decisions before launch or approval. * [**Key considerations for programme design**](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers/key-considerations-for-programme-design)\ Key challenges, decision points, and what effective programme management looks like in practice. * [**Detailed guidance by principle**](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers/applying-the-oecd-principles-in-practice)\ Actionable recommendations aligned with the six OECD Principles. {% hint style="info" %} **Tip**\ If you are new to media and information integrity programming, start with the [narrative section](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers/key-considerations-for-programme-design).\ If you are reviewing or designing a programme, begin with the [checklist](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers/applying-the-oecd-principles-in-practice). {% endhint %} # Start here: Quick checklist for Programme & Project Managers {% hint style="info" %} **How to use this checklist**\ This is a quick entry point. For detailed guidance and examples, see the principle-based checklists below. {% endhint %} ### Context & relevance ☐ Is support to independent media and information integrity clearly reflected in programme objectives and design? ☐ Are links between media support and broader objectives (e.g. governance, accountability, stability) clearly articulated? ☐ Is the role of media actors clearly distinguished from other civil society actors in programme design? ### Do no harm ☐ Have you identified risks specific to different types of media actors (e.g. local outlets, investigative journalists, public interest media)? ☐ Have you assessed risks to partners and beneficiaries (legal, digital, physical, reputational)? ☐ Are safeguards in place to protect partners, beneficiaries, and project staff from unintended harm? ☐ Have you considered how visibility, branding, or donor association may affect partner safety and credibility? ☐ Have you considered what happens when the project ends, including sustainability and exit risks? {% hint style="info" %} ### Quick test Would the programme still be relevant if media and information integrity were removed from the design?\ Are media-related risks and opportunities clearly reflected in programme logic and assumptions?\ Does the programme enable adaptation to changing media and political conditions? {% endhint %} ### Increase financial and other forms of support ☐ Do you seek to promote and implement fit-for-purpose funding approaches (e.g. multi-year, flexible, not solely project-based, aligned with like-minded partners)? ☐ Are funding approaches suited to the political, regulatory, and market environment in which media actors operate? ☐ Does the programme support sustainability beyond the project cycle (e.g. revenue models, institutional capacity, networks)? ☐ Are programme choices aligned with what available instruments realistically allow? ### Take a whole-of-system approach ☐ Does the programme reflect the full media ecosystem (content production, distribution channels, infrastructure, regulation, audiences)? ☐ Are interconnections with other sectors (e.g. digital, governance, anti-corruption, public administration) reflected in programme design? ☐ Does the programme address structural factors affecting media viability (e.g. market conditions, regulatory environment, platform dynamics)? ### Strengthen local leadership and ownership ☐ Are local media actors meaningfully involved in defining priorities and approaches? ☐ Does the programme support editorial independence and avoid instrumentalising media actors? ☐ Are different types of local media actors (including smaller or emerging actors) considered in programme design? ### Improve coordination of support ☐ Have you mapped and aligned with other donor and partner interventions across sectors and donors? ☐ Are existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. working groups, platforms, joint initiatives) actively used? ☐ Have you established and applied clear criteria for selecting media beneficiaries and partners? ☐ Is coordination taking place on risk management, including sharing of relevant information where appropriate? ☐ Is political economy analysis applied and, where possible, shared or discussed with other donors? ### Invest in knowledge, research, and learning ☐ Is programme design informed by media-specific analysis (e.g. audience trust, information flows, market conditions)? ☐ Are data and evidence used to adapt implementation over time? ☐ Are lessons learned captured and shared across teams and partners? **Download and print this checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/CXOaVXCyaGYNDmUicrbL" %} # Key considerations for programme design {% hint style="info" %} ### In brief **Programme and Project Managers translate strategic priorities into operational programmes.** Decisions on design, funding structures, partnerships, and risk management directly shape whether support strengthens - or unintentionally undermines - media and information ecosystems. {% endhint %} ### Why this role matters There is a persistent gap between commitments to media freedom and information integrity, and how these priorities are reflected in programmes on the ground. **This gap is often shaped at the programme level, within broader institutional constraints.** Choices about what is funded, how funding is structured, and how risks are managed influence whether interventions strengthen ecosystems - or create unintended harm, fragmentation, or dependency. Programme managers operate within budgetary, contractual, and procedural frameworks, and responsibility for programme design is often shared with implementing partners. ### Why it matters **Programme design is where the OECD Principles are either applied or overlooked.** Small decisions at this stage can have long-term systemic effects. > Field Note\ > “If support ends, what happens to the journalists or organisations that relied on it?”\ > *– Donor representative* ### Where this role has influence Programme and Project Managers shape how support is structured and delivered. **Key areas of influence include:** **Programme design and scope**\ How objectives and theories of change are defined - including the ability to interlink media support with related priorities such as governance, security, digital transformation, and information integrity **Funding modalities**\ Whether funding is short-term or multi-year, rigid or flexible, project-based or institutional. **Partner selection and requirements**\ Who is able to access funding, and under what conditions ([*see case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks)). **Risk management**\ How political, operational, and safety risks are identified, assessed, and mitigated ([*see case study 3: operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety)). **Monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL)**\ What is measured, how success is defined, and whether learning is built into the programme. **Coordination and alignment**\ How programmes connect (or fail to connect) with other donor interventions and local actors. **These decisions shape not only individual projects, but the wider ecosystem in which they operate.** > Field Note\ > “Local actors are expected to deliver, but the system is not always set up for them to access funding directly.”\ > *– Local implementing partner* ### Core challenges Across contexts, Programme and Project Managers consistently face a set of recurring challenges: **Limited contextual understanding**\ Programmes are not always informed by sufficiently detailed insight into local media ecosystems, market dynamics, or political constraints, although this has improved in many contexts over time. **Short-term and inflexible funding structures**\ Rigid funding cycles and compliance requirements can limit sustainability and reduce the ability to adapt, often reflecting broader institutional frameworks. **Risk of unintended harm**\ Interventions can expose partners to political or security risks, distort local markets, or create long-term dependency if risks are not actively managed. **Fragmented and ad hoc coordination**\ Coordination between donors often depends on individual initiative rather than structured mechanisms. **Unclear prioritisation of media support**\ Media and information integrity are not always treated as core development or security priorities, making integration inconsistent. **Pressure for rapid delivery**\ Administrative timelines and reporting requirements can conflict with the need for context-sensitive and adaptive approaches. **These challenges are interconnected and can reinforce each other**, making it difficult to apply a systematic approach without deliberate effort. > Field Note\ > “Coordination still depends too much on individual initiative rather than systems.”\ > *– Consultation participant* ### What good looks like in practice **Effective programme and project management applies the OECD Principles consistently across the programme cycle.** This includes design, implementation, and evaluation. In practice, this means: * Grounding programme design in a clear understanding of the local media and information ecosystem * Using funding modalities that reflect how media organisations operate in practice * Integrating risk awareness - including safety and political sensitivities - across all stages of programming, with flexibility to adapt * Supporting locally led approaches and reducing barriers to access * Coordinating with other donors and actors to avoid duplication and fragmentation * Building in learning and adapting programmes over time **This often involves navigating trade-offs** - for example between accountability and flexibility, visibility and safety, or speed and contextual relevance. Rather than treating media support as a standalone activity, effective programmes take a broader perspective - recognising links to governance, digital transformation, security, and economic development. {% hint style="info" %} ### In practice **Strong programmes are not defined by their size or visibility, but by how well they respond to context and support local actors.** Over time, their effectiveness is measured by whether they contribute to a more resilient and functioning media and information ecosystem. {% endhint %} # Applying the OECD Principles in Practice ### Principle 1: Ensure support does no harm **In practice:**\ Programme decisions can shape risk exposure, trust, and market dynamics. **Risk awareness needs to be integrated across the full programme cycle**, rather than treated as a one-off safeguard at design stage. **Do** * Conduct context and political economy analysis to understand the operating environment * Assess risks to partners and beneficiaries, including legal, digital, and physical safety * Use risk assessments that are context-specific and regularly updated during implementation * Share risk analysis and insights with other donors where possible, particularly in high-risk environments * Include safety-related costs (legal support, digital security, psychosocial support) in programme budgets * Build flexibility into visibility and communication requirements, adapted to context * Reassess risks throughout implementation as conditions evolve **Avoid** * Applying standardised approaches to risk without adapting to context * Visibility or communication requirements that could increase exposure of partners in sensitive environments * Assuming that media support is neutral in politically contested contexts * Designing programmes without considering sustainability or what happens when support ends **Consider** * How visibility interacts with political sensitivities in the specific context * Whether funding or programme design could unintentionally distort local media markets * How risks identified by different donors could be shared or jointly managed ### Principle 2: Increase financial and other forms of support **In practice:**\ The effectiveness of support depends not only on the volume of funding, but on how it is structured. **Rigid or short-term funding can limit impact, particularly where organisations require stability to operate and adapt.** **Do** * Use multi-year funding where possible to support continuity and sustainability * Include core or institutional support alongside project-based funding where appropriate * Align funding with the real cost structures of media organisations * Combine financial support with capacity strengthening and organisational development * Explore pooled funding or joint mechanisms with other donors **Avoid** * Funding approaches that prevent partners from planning beyond short grant cycles * Budget structures that limit the ability to adapt activities or reallocate resources during implementation * Funding models that prioritise administrative simplicity over effectiveness * Applying the same funding approach to all partners regardless of context or capacity **Consider** * How funding structures influence long-term sustainability of supported organisations * Trade-offs between flexibility and accountability requirements (e.g. reporting and compliance obligations) * How funding approaches affect the ability of smaller or local actors to access support ### Principle 3: Take a whole-of-system approach **In practice:**\ Supporting individual outlets or isolated activities is rarely sufficient. **Interventions are more effective when they reflect how media and information ecosystems function as interconnected systems.** **Do** * Base programme design on media ecosystem analysis * Support a mix of actors across the ecosystem, including content producers, support organisations, and enabling environment actors * Combine support for content, organisational sustainability, and the broader enabling environment * Identify and address systemic gaps such as revenue models, distribution, or trust **Avoid** * Isolated, single-actor interventions without consideration of the wider ecosystem * Focusing only on content production without addressing sustainability factors * Treating media support as separate from related areas such as governance or digital developments * Replicating standard programme models across different contexts without adaptation **Consider** * Which parts of the ecosystem are underserved or missing * How the programme interacts with existing actors, incentives, and market dynamics * Whether the intervention strengthens or fragments the overall ecosystem ### Principle 4: Strengthen local leadership and ownership **In practice:**\ Locally led approaches improve relevance, sustainability, and legitimacy. However, **enabling meaningful participation often requires adapting donor processes and reducing barriers to access** ([*see case study 6: local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-6-local-leadership-and-adapting-compliance-frameworks))**.** **Do** * Involve local actors early in programme design and priority-setting * Use mechanisms such as regranting or partnerships to reach smaller or less-resourced organisations * Simplify application and compliance requirements where possible * Invest in organisational and financial capacity of partners * Support priorities identified by local actors and informed by needs assessments **Avoid** * Designing programmes without meaningful input from local stakeholders * Over-reliance on international intermediaries where local capacity exists * Requirements that unintentionally exclude smaller or emerging organisations * Assuming that limited access to funding reflects lack of expertise **Consider** * Who is currently unable to access funding, and what barriers exist * Trade-offs between inclusiveness and fiduciary or compliance requirements * How decision-making can progressively shift closer to local actors over time ### Principle 5: Improve coordination of support **In practice:**\ Fragmentation reduces impact and increases burden on partners ([*see case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts)). **While coordination is widely recognised as important, it is often not systematically implemented.** **Do** * Map other donor interventions and actors before designing programmes * Share information on programmes, priorities, and lessons learned * Participate in formal or informal coordination mechanisms * Align, where possible, on indicators and reporting approaches * Explore opportunities for joint programming or co-funding **Avoid** * Designing programmes in isolation from other donors and actors * Duplicating existing interventions due to lack of information-sharing * Relying solely on informal or personality-driven coordination * Creating parallel systems that increase administrative burden on partners **Consider** * What coordination structures exist and how effective they are in practice * Whether coordination could reduce duplication and burden on partners * Trade-offs between donor visibility or ownership and joint approaches ### Principle 6: Invest in knowledge, research, and learning **In practice:**\ Limited data and shared learning continue to constrain programme effectiveness. **Learning is most effective when it is built into programme design and implementation,** rather than treated as a reporting requirement. **Do** * Conduct baseline assessments of media and information ecosystems * Use available data on audiences and information consumption where possible * Design monitoring, evaluation, and learning approaches that reflect the complexity of media support * Allocate time and resources for learning and adaptation, in addition to reporting requirements * Share findings and insights with other donors and stakeholders **Avoid** * Applying standard monitoring and evaluation approaches that do not capture media-specific outcomes * Treating reporting primarily as a compliance exercise * Underinvesting in research and data collection * Keeping lessons learned internal to individual programmes **Consider** * What success looks like beyond easily measurable outputs * How to capture changes in trust, resilience, or information integrity * How learning can inform future programming, not only current reporting # Communications Teams Communications teams play a critical role in shaping how support to independent media and information integrity is understood, perceived, and sustained. Decisions taken at this level—on visibility, messaging, branding, and public positioning—directly influence both the effectiveness of programmes and the safety and independence of media actors. This function sits at the intersection of public diplomacy, accountability, and risk management. Communications choices can strengthen public trust, build political support, and demonstrate impact—but if poorly calibrated, they can expose partners to harm, distort local media dynamics, or undermine credibility. Consultations consistently highlighted the need to balance visibility with context sensitivity, particularly in fragile or authoritarian environments. This section provides practical guidance to help communications teams align their work with the OECD DAC Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment—ensuring that communication strategies reinforce, rather than compromise, media independence and information integrity. #### How to use this section Depending on your needs, you can navigate directly to: [**Start here: Quick checklist**](/toolkit/role/communications-teams/start-here-quick-checklist-for-communication-teams)\ A rapid “stress test” to assess whether communication approaches are safe, context-appropriate, and aligned with programme objectives. [**Key considerations for communications**](/toolkit/role/communications-teams/key-considerations-for-communications-teams)\ Common challenges, trade-offs, and what effective communication looks like in sensitive and complex media environments. [**Detailed guidance by principle**](/toolkit/role/communications-teams/applying-the-oecd-principles-in-practice)\ Actionable recommendations aligned with the six OECD Principles. {% hint style="info" %} **Tip**\ If you are new to media and information integrity, start with the [narrative section](/toolkit/role/communications-teams/key-considerations-for-communications-teams).\ If you are planning visibility or communications activities, begin with the [checklist](/toolkit/role/communications-teams/start-here-quick-checklist-for-communication-teams). {% endhint %} # Start here: Quick checklist for communication teams {% hint style="info" %} **How to use this checklist**\ This is a quick entry point. For detailed guidance and examples, see the principle-based checklists below. {% endhint %} ### Context & relevance ☐ Do you have a clear understanding of the local media and information ecosystem (actors, audiences, political context)? ☐ Have communication requirements been adapted to the local political and media context? ☐ Does your communication plan reflect locally relevant priorities, informed by partner input where possible? ☐ Does your communication approach reflect how people access and trust information locally? ### Do no harm ☐ Have you assessed whether visibility could expose journalists or partners to political, legal, digital, or reputational risks? ☐ Have visibility and attribution requirements been adapted to the context? ☐ Have you consulted partners on safe levels of visibility and public association? ☐ Are safeguards in place to prevent unintended harm through communication activities? {% hint style="info" %} **Quick test**\ If visibility requirements were removed, would the programme be *safer and more effective*?\ If yes, reconsider whether current communication expectations are appropriate. {% endhint %} ### Increase financial and other forms of support ☐ Does your communication plan clearly explain why media and information integrity matter (e.g. governance, stability, economic outcomes)? ☐ Is communication framed in a way that supports sustained political and financial commitment? ☐ Does messaging highlight both impact and the risks of underinvestment? ☐ Are success stories framed in a way that strengthens political buy-in without compromising editorial independence or credibility? ### Take a whole-of-system approach ☐ Does communication reflect the broader media and information ecosystem, rather than only individual projects or actors? ☐ Does messaging reflect the diversity of actors involved (media, content creators, infrastructure, enabling environment)? ☐ Is communication aligned across related sectors (e.g. governance, digital, security)? ☐ Does communication avoid reinforcing fragmented or isolated narratives? ### Strengthen local leadership and ownership ☐ Are local actors able to shape how their work and narratives are presented? ☐ Does communication prioritise local voices and perspectives? ☐ Are communication approaches co-developed with partners where appropriate? ☐ Does communication reinforce editorial independence and credibility? ### Improve coordination of support ☐ Is communication aligned across teams (programme, political, communications)? ☐ Is messaging consistent with other donor or partner activities? ☐ Are communication efforts coordinated to reduce duplication and partner burden? ☐ Are opportunities for joint communication or visibility explored where appropriate? ### Invest in knowledge, research, and learning ☐ Is your communication approach informed by audience insights, data, or contextual analysis? ☐ Do you understand how information is accessed and trusted in the local context? ☐ Are feedback loops in place to capture input from partners or audiences? ☐ Can communication approaches be adapted based on changing conditions or risks? **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/U9yGGUAYEtwYyCLQ0O0e" %} # Key considerations for communications teams {% hint style="info" %} ### **In brief** **Communications around media support are not neutral.** They shape how programmes are perceived, who is seen as legitimate, and - critically - whether partners can operate safely. For communications teams, the challenge is not only to demonstrate impact and visibility, but to do so in ways that respect editorial independence, reflect local realities, and avoid unintended harm. {% endhint %} ### Balancing visibility and safety **A consistent tension identified in consultations is the pressure to demonstrate visibility while managing risk.** This includes branding, storytelling, and public positioning - often in environments where visibility can create real harm. In restrictive or politically sensitive contexts, associating journalists or media outlets too closely with donor funding can expose them to surveillance, legal pressure, or reputational attacks ([*see case study 3: operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety)). This requires communications teams to move away from standardised visibility requirements and adopt flexible, context-driven approaches. **In some contexts, the safest and most effective communication strategy may be limited visibility - or none at all.** > Field Note\ > “But it's still very unsure how much the project is the cause of it and gave visibility to this journalist, or how journalists might have been already in focus before the project started.”\ > *– Consultation participant* ### Aligning messaging with media independence **Communications can unintentionally undermine the independence they aim to support.** When messaging is overly donor-driven or politically framed, it risks positioning independent media as extensions of external agendas ([*see case study 1: credibility risk linked to donor visibility*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-1-credibility-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility)). Communications approaches should prioritise editorial independence and local control over narratives. For communications teams, this means ensuring that storytelling and messaging: * **Protect editorial independence** * **Avoid political instrumentalisation of media actors** * **Enable local actors to define and lead their own narratives** > Field Note\ > “Giving them resources and letting them decide how to communicate narratives if they choose to do that.”\ > *– Donor representative* ### Understanding the information ecosystem **Effective communication depends on understanding how information flows in a given context.** This includes who produces it, how audiences engage with it, and which actors are trusted. Consultations highlighted that available data and insights are not always sufficient to fully capture how local populations consume and trust information. Communication strategies should therefore be grounded in context-specific audience insights and continuously updated as conditions evolve. > Field Note\ > “The data that is available is often insufficient.”\ > *– Donor representative* ### Communicating the value of media support **Communications teams play a key role in shaping how media support is understood.** This includes demonstrating impact, linking media support to broader policy priorities, and making the implications of underinvestment visible. Framing media support as a strategic investment - rather than a niche or technical issue - is essential to sustaining political and financial commitment. **Clear and consistent narratives are critical to building this understanding across stakeholders.** > Field Note\ > “There is still a lack of a clear narrative on the role of media.”\ > *– Consultation participant* ### Bridging institutional divides **Communications teams often operate across institutional silos.** They work with programme managers, political sections, and press teams that may have different priorities, timelines, and incentives. Effective communication requires alignment across these functions : * Ensuring that messaging reflects programme realities * Avoiding contradictions between political communication and operational objectives * Coordinating visibility and narrative across teams and partners ([*See case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts)) > Field Note\ > “More communication is needed to coordinate support and funding, also to avoid duplication.”\ > *– Consultation participant* **Taken together, these considerations point to a shift in how communications are approached.** Rather than being treated as a downstream function focused on visibility, communications should be understood as a strategic component of media support - one that requires the same level of context sensitivity, coordination, and adherence to the OECD DAC Principles as programme design itself. # Applying the OECD Principles in practice ### Principle 1: Ensure support does no harm **In practice:**\ Communications decisions - on visibility, branding, and messaging - can affect partner safety, credibility, and operational space ([*see case study 3: operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety)). **Risk-aware communication should be integrated throughout the programme cycle**, rather than introduced only at later stages. **Do** * **Adapt visibility and branding requirements to the political and security context** * Consult partners on safe levels of visibility and public association * Use flexible approaches (e.g. anonymisation, delayed communication, off-record formats) * Align communication plans with programme-level risk assessments * Regularly reassess communication risks as contexts evolve **Avoid** * Applying standardised visibility requirements in sensitive environments * Publicly associating partners with donor support without their consent * Prioritising visibility over partner safety or operational viability * Treating communications decisions as risk-neutral **Consider** * How visibility may increase scrutiny from authorities or other actors * **How messaging may affect partners’ perceived independence** * **What level of communication is necessary - and what can safely be reduced** ### Principle 2: Increase financial and other forms of support **In practice:**\ How media support is communicated directly influences political prioritisation, funding decisions, and long-term sustainability. **Communications shape whether media support is understood as a strategic investment or a marginal issue.** **Do** * Frame communication to clearly articulate why media and information integrity matter (e.g. governance, stability, economic outcomes), building on the narrative set out in the communication strategy * Use evidence and results to demonstrate impact and relevance * Tailor messaging to different audiences, including non-media specialists * Highlight both successes and the risks of underinvestment **Avoid** * Treating communications as purely promotional rather than a strategic function * Using overly technical or sector-specific messaging that limits broader uptake * Focusing only on outputs rather than systemic impact * Avoiding politically sensitive but necessary narratives **Consider** * **Whether communication supports sustained or increased funding and political buy-in** * How to frame media support in relation to wider policy priorities * **Whether the risks of not supporting media are clearly communicated** ### Principle 3: Take a whole-of-system approach **In practice:**\ Communications should reflect how media and information ecosystems function as a whole. **Messaging that captures relationships between actors, incentives, and structures is more likely to support strategic understanding and engagement.** **Do** * Frame communication around media and information ecosystems, not just individual activities * Reflect the diversity of actors by showing how different stakeholders (media, civil society, regulators, audiences) interact and contribute within the system * Align messaging across related sectors (e.g. governance, digital, security) * Ensure coherence between programme, political, and public communication **Avoid** * Overly project-centric communication that ignores systemic context * Messaging that unintentionally privileges certain actors or perspectives * Fragmented narratives across teams or programmes * Treating media support as separate from broader governance or digital agendas **Consider** * Whether communication reflects how the ecosystem actually functions * **How messaging interacts with broader policy narratives and priorities** * **Whether communication strengthens or fragments understanding of the ecosystem** ### Principle 4: Strengthen local leadership and ownership **In practice:**\ Communications should reinforce local ownership by ensuring that local actors shape how their work is presented and understood. **Credibility and legitimacy are strengthened when communication reflects locally defined narratives and priorities** ([*see case study 1: credibility risk linked to donor visibility*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-1-credibility-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility)). **Do** * Prioritise local voices and perspectives in communication outputs * Enable partners to define how their work is presented * Co-create communication products where appropriate * Respect editorial independence in all storytelling **Avoid** * Applying externally developed narratives that do not reflect local realities * Using partners primarily as visibility vehicles * Framing local actors predominantly through external perspectives * Influencing or shaping editorial content **Consider** * **Who defines the narrative - and whose voice is amplified** * Whether communication reflects local realities and priorities * **How communication affects perceptions of independence** ### Principle 5: Improve coordination of support **In practice:**\ Uncoordinated communication can lead to duplication, mixed messaging, and increased risks for partners. **More structured coordination can improve coherence while reducing burden on those receiving support.** **Do** * Align communication with other donors and partners where appropriate * Coordinate messaging across internal teams (programme, political, press) * Share communication approaches, lessons, and materials * Support joint visibility where it reduces burden and improves coherence **Avoid** * Conducting communication in isolation from other actors * Issuing conflicting messages across teams or donors * Creating overlapping visibility demands on partners * Relying solely on informal, personality-driven coordination **Consider** * Whether communication contributes to fragmentation or coherence * **How coordination can reduce pressure and duplication for partners** * **Trade-offs between visibility, ownership, and joint approaches** ### Principle 6: Invest in knowledge, research, and learning **In practice:**\ Effective communication depends on understanding audiences, media landscapes, and information flows. **Without this, messaging risks being misaligned, ineffective, or poorly targeted.** **Do** * Use audience insights and local data to inform communication strategies * Invest in understanding how information is accessed and trusted locally * Capture and integrate lessons from communication efforts * Share learning across teams and with partners **Avoid** * Designing communication without evidence or audience insight * Applying generic messaging across different contexts * Treating communication as one-way dissemination * Failing to document and learn from what works and what does not **Consider** * Whether messaging reflects how audiences actually consume information * **What gaps exist in knowledge about the local information environment** * **How learning can inform future communication approaches** # Policy Officers / Thematic Specialists Policy Officers and Thematic Specialists play a central role in shaping how support to independent media and information integrity is prioritised, framed, and integrated across institutional policies and funding approaches. Decisions taken at this level - on strategic priorities, thematic frameworks, and policy guidance - directly influence whether media support is treated as a core component of broader agendas or remains fragmented and under-prioritised. This role operates at the intersection of policy development, strategic planning, and cross-sector coordination. Policy choices determine how media and information integrity are understood within wider domains such as governance, digital transformation, security, and development cooperation. This includes how media systems function in practice - across regulatory frameworks, market conditions, and the ways in which information is produced, distributed, and trusted by audiences. These choices also shape how priorities are translated into programming guidance, funding instruments, and operational decisions. Consultations highlighted that even where commitments to media freedom and information integrity exist, they are not always consistently reflected across policies, instruments, or sectors. In practice, this can result in gaps between strategic ambition and implementation, including limitations linked to funding frameworks, coordination mechanisms, and competing priorities. Policy choices at this level also influence how risks affecting media actors - including political pressure, regulatory constraints, and visibility considerations - are recognised and addressed. Strengthening coherence, integration, and strategic positioning at this level is therefore critical to ensuring that support is effective, aligned, and sustained over time. This section provides practical guidance to support policy development and thematic programming in line with the OECD DAC Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment. ### How to use this section Depending on your needs, you can navigate directly to: [**Start here: Quick checklist**](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists/start-here-quick-checklist-for-policy-officers-thematic-specialists)\ A rapid “stress test” to assess whether policy frameworks and thematic priorities are coherent, context-sensitive, and effectively integrated across sectors. [**Key considerations for policy and thematic approaches**](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists/key-considerations-for-policy-and-thematic-approaches)\ Common challenges, strategic trade-offs, and what effective policy-level support looks like in practice. [**Detailed guidance by principle**](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists/applying-the-oecd-principles-in-practice)\ Actionable recommendations aligned with the six OECD Principles. {% hint style="info" %} **Tip** If you are new to media and information integrity, start with the [narrative section](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists/key-considerations-for-policy-and-thematic-approaches). If you are developing strategies or reviewing policy frameworks, begin with the [checklist](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists/start-here-quick-checklist-for-policy-officers-thematic-specialists). {% endhint %} # Start here: Quick checklist for Policy Officers / Thematic Specialists ### Context & relevance ☐ Do you have a clear understanding of the local media and information ecosystem (including media markets, regulatory environment, key actors, and how information is produced and consumed)? ☐ Have you distinguished between media actors and other civil society actors in your policy approach (e.g. roles, risks, funding needs)? ☐ Does your policy framework reflect how media systems function in practice (including regulation, market conditions, and audience trust)? ☐ Are media and information ecosystem considerations integrated into broader policy areas (e.g. governance, digital, security)? ### Do no harm ☐ Have you identified risks specific to different types of media actors (e.g. local outlets, investigative journalists, public interest media), including risks arising from the political and regulatory context as well as from the intervention itself? ☐ Have you considered potential unintended harm not only to media actors, but also to other groups (e.g. civil society actors, audiences, or marginalised communities)? ☐ Are these risks clearly reflected in policy frameworks and thematic guidance, not only at programme level? ☐ Have you considered how policy decisions (e.g. visibility requirements, funding modalities) may affect editorial independence and credibility? ☐ Are safeguards in place to prevent unintended harm to partners, beneficiaries, and wider affected groups (e.g. civil society actors, audiences, or marginalised communities)? {% hint style="info" %} ### Quick test If media-specific risks (e.g. regulatory pressure, political sensitivity, visibility) increase, would the current policy approach still be appropriate? {% endhint %} ### Increase financial and other forms of support ☐ Are media and information integrity clearly positioned within funding frameworks and policy priorities? ☐ Do funding instruments allow programme officers to support media-specific needs (e.g. sustainability, infrastructure, or ecosystem-level interventions)? ☐ Are policy priorities aligned with what programme officers can realistically support within existing instruments? ☐ Do funding approaches reflect the economic realities of media markets, including revenue constraints and long-term sustainability challenges? ### Take a whole-of-system approach ☐ Does your policy approach reflect the full media ecosystem (content production, distribution channels, infrastructure, regulation, audiences) and its interaction with other programmes and interventions in-country? ☐ Does the policy framework enable programme officers to address interconnections between media, digital platforms, governance systems, and regulation (e.g. digital policy, anti-corruption, public administration)? ☐ Are media considerations integrated across relevant sectors (e.g. governance, digital, security), rather than treated as standalone? ☐ Does your approach avoid reinforcing fragmented or isolated interventions? ### Strengthen local leadership and ownership ☐ Do policy approaches recognise the role of local media actors, journalist networks, and support organisations in shaping media ecosystems? ☐ Are local actors able to influence priorities and strategies at policy level? ☐ Do policy frameworks reinforce editorial independence and credibility? ☐ Are different types of media actors (e.g. local outlets, investigative journalists, support organisations) reflected in policy approaches? ### Improve coordination of support ☐ Does the policy framework or strategy define clear criteria for when coordination or joint approaches should be used (e.g. through existing donor platforms, working groups, or joint initiatives)? ☐ Are roles and responsibilities across donors, teams, and instruments clearly defined? ☐ Are there clear criteria for when coordination or joint approaches are required versus optional? ☐ Does the policy approach help reduce duplication and conflicting priorities across donors? ### Invest in knowledge, research, and learning ☐ Is your policy approach informed by media-specific data (e.g. media markets, audience trust, information consumption patterns)? ☐ Do you understand how information is accessed and trusted in the local context? ☐ Are known gaps in media sector data acknowledged and addressed where possible? ☐ Are feedback loops in place to ensure learning informs policy updates and strategic decisions? **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/gfbDzyTYWfFx1kqgWAxH" %} # Key considerations for policy and thematic approaches {% hint style="info" %} ### In brief Policy Officers and Thematic Specialists shape how support to independent media and information integrity is defined, prioritised, and integrated across institutional strategies and funding frameworks. Through policy development, thematic guidance, and strategic planning, this role determines how high-level commitments are translated into operational directions and programme design. {% endhint %} ### Why this role matters Commitments to media freedom and information integrity are widely recognised across policy frameworks. However, consultations suggest that these commitments are not always consistently reflected across sectors, instruments, or programming approaches. At this level, the challenge is not only whether media support is included, but how it is positioned. **How media and information integrity are framed within policy directly influences whether they are treated as cross-cutting priorities or as isolated, technical issues.** In practice, this affects how priorities are taken forward across governance, digital, and security agendas, and whether they are translated into funding decisions and programme design. This includes how media systems function in practice - from regulatory frameworks and market conditions to how information is produced, distributed, and trusted by audiences. Institutional constraints - including existing frameworks, instruments, and competing priorities - shape what is possible. At the same time, consultations indicate that clearer framing and stronger integration can significantly influence how consistently these priorities are applied. ### Where this role has influence Policy Officers and Thematic Specialists shape the enabling environment for media support across multiple levels. This influence is often indirect, but it is central to how support is structured and delivered in practice. **Strategic framing and prioritisation**\ How media and information integrity are positioned within broader agendas, including their relevance to media markets, regulatory frameworks, and information flows. **Policy and thematic guidance**\ How strategies, action plans, and thematic priorities define objectives, approaches, and expected outcomes. **Integration across sectors**\ How media and information ecosystem considerations are integrated across governance, digital, security, and regulatory policy areas. **Alignment with funding instruments**\ How policy priorities are translated into funding frameworks, including how media-related objectives are reflected in calls, eligibility criteria, and programme guidance. **Coordination and coherence**\ How approaches are aligned across teams, instruments, and external partners ([*see case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts)). {% hint style="info" %} Taken together, these areas shape not only what is supported, but how consistently and effectively support is applied across contexts. {% endhint %} ### Core challenges Consultations on media support point to a set of recurring challenges, many of which relate to how policy commitments are translated into practice. One of the most consistent issues is **fragmented integration across policy areas**, particularly where media-specific considerations are not systematically reflected in governance, digital, or regulatory frameworks ([*see case study 4: governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-4-governance-risk-and-the-role-of-media-oversight-in-infrastructure-investments)). Media and information integrity may be recognised in principle, but not consistently embedded across sectors, leading to gaps or duplication ([*see case study 5: regulatory risk and political capture*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-5-regulatory-risk-and-political-capture-in-media-reform)). At the same time, **competing institutional priorities** can affect how media support is positioned. In practice, this can mean that media-related objectives are deprioritised relative to more established sectors, despite their cross-cutting relevance. Variation across instruments and teams also plays a role. Differences in mandates, procedures, and timelines can result in **inconsistent application of policy commitments**, even where overall objectives are aligned. A further challenge is the **translation from strategy to implementation**, where commitments to media and information integrity are not always clearly reflected in operational guidance or funding decisions ([*see case study 2: funding instability and system-level dependency*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-2-funding-stability-and-system-level-dependency-rfe-rl)). Finally, policy ambitions are often shaped by **constraints linked to funding frameworks and instruments**, which may limit flexibility or alignment with sector needs. At the same time, consultations indicate that there has been progress in recent years. Media and information integrity are increasingly reflected in governance and democracy frameworks, and policy development is more frequently informed by needs assessments and stakeholder consultations. These challenges are not isolated - they tend to reinforce each other, making coherence and integration difficult without deliberate effort. ### What good looks like in practice Effective policy and thematic approaches ensure that media and information integrity are consistently reflected across strategies, sectors, and funding decisions. In practice, this involves moving beyond standalone approaches and embedding media support within broader policy frameworks. **Strong policy approaches position media and information integrity as cross-cutting priorities, linked to governance, security, and development outcomes.** This includes recognising how media ecosystems function - across content production, distribution channels, regulatory environments, and audience trust. This also requires alignment - between strategic priorities, policy guidance, and funding instruments - ensuring that media-related objectives are reflected in how programmes are designed and funded. Context sensitivity remains essential. Policy frameworks need to reflect political, economic, and regulatory realities affecting media actors, while allowing for adaptation across different environments. This includes recognising risks, as well as the diversity of actors within media ecosystems. Finally, effective approaches support coordination across teams, instruments, and external partners, helping to reduce fragmentation and improve coherence. At policy level, the challenge is not only to recognise the importance of media, but to ensure that this recognition is consistently reflected across strategies, sectors, and funding decisions in ways that respond to how media systems operate in practice. > #### Field insights > > “Media is often recognised as important, but not always integrated across the different policy areas where it actually matters.”\ > \- *EU official, consultation* > > “Even when there are strong commitments, they do not always translate into how programmes are designed or funded.”\ > \- *Donor representative, consultation* # Applying the OECD Principles in practice ### Principle 1: Ensure support does no harm **In practice:**\ Context matters in how policy and thematic approaches define and operationalise support across strategies and guidance. This includes how political pressure, regulatory constraints, and market conditions affecting media actors are recognised and reflected. **If risks specific to media actors are not clearly articulated at policy level, they are unlikely to be consistently addressed in programmes** ([*see case study 5: regulatory risk and political capture in media reform*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-5-regulatory-risk-and-political-capture-in-media-reform)).\ This includes how factors such as media regulation, ownership structures, and information control shape the operating environment for independent media. **Do** * Ensure policy frameworks explicitly reflect risks faced by journalists and media organisations, including political, legal, and economic pressures * Integrate media and information ecosystem analysis into country strategies and sectoral frameworks * Reflect differences between open, transitional, and restrictive environments in policy guidance * Encourage the use of partner and field-level insights to inform policy positioning **Avoid** * Treating media support as context-neutral or interchangeable with broader civil society support * Overlooking sector-specific risks such as regulatory capture, ownership concentration, or information manipulation * Assuming that general governance or civil society analysis sufficiently captures media dynamics * Applying uniform policy approaches across contexts without differentiation **Consider** * Whether policy frameworks distinguish between media actors and other civil society organisations * How political and regulatory risks are reflected in thematic priorities * The implications of misreading the media environment for programme design ### Principle 2: Increase financial and other forms of support **In practice:**\ Policy framing shapes whether media and information integrity are recognised as strategic priorities within funding frameworks and instruments. This includes how clearly these priorities are linked to governance, security, and development outcomes. **If media support is not clearly positioned within funding logic, it is unlikely to be prioritised in resource allocation.**\ This includes how funding approaches account for the economic realities of media markets, including sustainability challenges, revenue constraints, and reliance on external support. **Do** * Position media and information integrity as relevant to core policy priorities, including governance, stability, and resilience * Ensure that policy guidance is reflected in funding frameworks, calls, and eligibility criteria * Align thematic priorities with existing instruments to enable practical uptake * Support the inclusion of media-related objectives across sectors, rather than in standalone programmes only **Avoid** * Treating media support as a niche or standalone issue disconnected from broader funding priorities * Developing policy priorities that are not reflected in available instruments or calls * Using overly narrow or technical framing that limits cross-sector relevance * Assuming that recognition at policy level will automatically translate into funding **Consider** * Whether existing instruments are sufficiently flexible to support media-related objectives * How policy priorities influence what programme officers can realistically fund or design * Trade-offs between strategic ambition and instrument constraints ### Principle 3: Take a whole-of-system approach **In practice:**\ Policy approaches shape whether support reflects the full media and information ecosystem, including content production, infrastructure, regulation, and audience dynamics. This requires recognising how these elements interact across sectors. **Without system-level framing, policy risks reinforcing fragmented or partial interventions** ([see case study 4: governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-4-governance-risk-and-the-role-of-media-oversight-in-infrastructure-investments)).\ This includes how information is produced, distributed, and consumed, and how digital platforms, regulatory frameworks, and market conditions influence these dynamics. **Do** * Reflect the interconnections between media, digital platforms, governance systems, and regulatory environments * Integrate media considerations into related sectors such as digital policy, anti-corruption, public administration, and competition policy * Ensure thematic guidance captures both content and enabling environment dimensions * Encourage cross-sector approaches that reflect how information flows in practice **Avoid** * Focusing policy frameworks only on media content or individual actors * Taking into account structural factors such as infrastructure, regulation, or market conditions only partially or inconsistently * Treating media support as separate from digital or governance agendas * Designing policy approaches that assign responsibility for media-related issues to a single sector or team, limiting cross-sector engagement **Consider** * Whether policy frameworks enable programme officers to address interconnections across sectors * How policy areas such as digital regulation, competition policy, governance reform, and public administration influence media viability and independence * Risks of duplication or gaps where links between different parts of the media ecosystem (e.g. regulation, funding, distribution) are not recognised ### Principle 4: Strengthen local leadership and ownership **In practice:**\ Policy decisions influence how local actors are positioned within media ecosystems, including whether they are recognised as independent actors or primarily as implementers of externally defined priorities. **Policy frameworks that do not clearly account for local agency risk undermining both credibility and effectiveness.**\ This includes how local media, journalist networks, and support organisations contribute to content production, distribution, and public trust. **Do** * Reflect the role of local media actors, networks, and support organisations in policy frameworks * Encourage approaches that allow local actors to shape priorities and strategies * Ensure that thematic guidance recognises diversity within the media sector, including smaller or emerging actors * Support policy approaches that reinforce editorial independence **Avoid** * Designing policy frameworks that implicitly prioritise external actors or models * Treating local organisations primarily as delivery partners * Overlooking local perspectives in defining priorities or success criteria * Applying uniform approaches to ownership and participation **Consider** * How policy frameworks influence who sets priorities and narratives * Trade-offs between accountability requirements and local ownership * The impact of policy choices on perceived independence of media actors ### Principle 5: Improve coordination of support **In practice:**\ Policy and thematic guidance influence how coordination is structured, incentivised, and implemented across institutions and donors. This includes whether existing coordination mechanisms are used and how roles are defined. **Without clear policy direction, coordination often remains ad-hoc and dependent on individual initiative** ([*see case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts)).\ This includes coordination across donors, sectors, and instruments addressing media, digital governance, and information integrity. **Do** * Reference and promote the use of existing coordination mechanisms and platforms where they exist * Align thematic priorities with those of other donors and institutional actors where appropriate * Clarify roles and responsibilities across teams, instruments, and partners * Encourage information sharing and joint approaches in policy guidance **Avoid** * Limiting coordination to informal or voluntary engagement * Overlooking existing coordination structures or mechanisms * Creating parallel or competing priorities across policy areas * Assuming coordination will happen without clear incentives or expectations **Consider** * Which coordination mechanisms already exist and how they are used in practice * Criteria for when coordination or joint approaches are appropriate * Trade-offs between coordination, visibility, and flexibility ### Principle 6: Invest in knowledge, research, and learning **In practice:**\ Policy approaches depend on how evidence and knowledge about media ecosystems are generated and used. Consultations indicate that available data is often uneven or incomplete, particularly in rapidly evolving information environments. **Policy decisions made without sufficient sector-specific knowledge risk misalignment with actual media dynamics.**\ This includes understanding audience trust, information consumption patterns, and the role of digital platforms in shaping public discourse. **Do** * Integrate media-specific data and analysis into policy development and thematic guidance * Support the generation and use of evidence on media markets, audiences, and information flows * Encourage feedback loops between policy, programming, and local actors * Promote learning across sectors and instruments **Avoid** * Relying solely on general governance or civil society data * Applying generic assumptions across different media environments * Treating knowledge as static rather than evolving * Failing to incorporate lessons from implementation into policy updates **Consider** * What evidence is available - and where gaps remain * How uncertainty affects policy choices and prioritisation * How learning can be systematically integrated into policy processes # Heads of Mission / Ambassadors Heads of Mission and Ambassadors play a central role in shaping how support to independent media and information integrity is prioritised, positioned, and acted upon at country level. Decisions taken at this level - on political engagement, signalling, and strategic direction - directly influence whether media support is recognised as a core component of broader diplomatic, governance, and development objectives. This role operates at the intersection of political leadership, diplomacy, and programme oversight. Heads of Mission engage with national authorities, donors, and other stakeholders, and help define how priorities are communicated and pursued in-country. This includes how media and information integrity are positioned within political dialogue, how risks are assessed and managed, and how different parts of the mission align around shared objectives. Consultations highlighted that political leadership and signalling can be decisive in determining whether media support is feasible, prioritised, and sustained. At the same time, this role operates within complex political and diplomatic constraints, where decisions must balance competing priorities, sensitivities, and risks. How media issues are raised - and whether they are raised at all - can have direct implications for both the scope and feasibility of media support interventions and partner safety. This section provides practical guidance to support Heads of Mission and Ambassadors in aligning political engagement, strategic direction, and diplomatic action with the OECD DAC Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment. ### How to use this section Depending on your needs, you can navigate directly to: [**Start here: Quick checklist**](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors/start-here-quick-checklist-for-heads-of-mission-ambassadors)\ A rapid “stress test” to assess whether political positioning, engagement, and signalling support effective and context-appropriate media interventions. [**Key considerations for political engagement and leadership**](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors/key-considerations-for-heads-of-mission-ambassadors)\ Common challenges, trade-offs, and what effective leadership looks like in complex political and media environments. [**Detailed guidance by principle**](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors/applying-the-oecd-principles-in-practice)[TED Toolkit](/toolkit/about)\ Actionable recommendations aligned with the six OECD Principles. {% hint style="info" %} **Tip** If you are new to media and information integrity, start with the [narrative section](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors/key-considerations-for-heads-of-mission-ambassadors).\ If you are engaging in political dialogue or setting strategic direction, begin with the [checklist](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors/start-here-quick-checklist-for-heads-of-mission-ambassadors). {% endhint %} # Start here: Quick checklist for Heads of Mission / Ambassadors ### Context & relevance ☐ Do you have a clear, up-to-date understanding of the local media and information ecosystem (including media markets, regulatory environment, and information flows)? ☐ Are media and information integrity reflected in how broader political, governance, and diplomatic priorities are framed? ☐ Does your engagement reflect how media systems interact with political power, regulation, and public trust? ☐ Are media-related issues appropriately integrated into political dialogue and country-level positioning? ### Do no harm ☐ Are risks specific to media actors (e.g. political pressure, legal constraints, surveillance, risks linked to visibility and donor association) clearly identified and considered? ☐ Have you considered how your public positioning, diplomatic engagement, or political signalling may affect the safety, credibility, or independence of media actors? ☐ Are decisions on visibility, statements, and engagement informed by context-specific risk analysis? ☐ Are there internal processes to ensure that political priorities and messaging do not unintentionally expose partners to harm? {% hint style="info" %} ### Quick test If political attention on media increases (e.g. through public statements or high-level engagement), could this increase risks for partners or constrain their ability to operate? {% endhint %} ### Increase financial and other forms of support ☐ Is support to independent media and information integrity reflected in country-level priorities and strategic dialogue? ☐ Do your political signals and engagement support sustained funding and prioritisation of media-related programmes? ☐ Are funding priorities aligned with the realities of media systems, including sustainability challenges and market constraints? ☐ Are programme teams able to prioritise media within existing instruments and constraints? ### Take a whole-of-system approach ☐ Does your strategic positioning reflect the full media and information ecosystem (including content production, distribution, regulation, and audiences)? ☐ Are linkages between media, digital policy, governance, and security reflected in political dialogue and engagement? ☐ Does your approach avoid reinforcing narrow, project-based understandings of media support? ☐ Are different parts of the mission aligned in how they approach media and information integrity (political, programme, communications)? ### Strengthen local leadership and ownership ☐ Are local media actors able to inform how media-related issues are understood and raised at mission level? ☐ Does your engagement reinforce the independence and credibility of local media actors? ☐ Are considerations of how and when media-related issues are raised at mission level explicitly discussed and reflected in strategic direction? ☐ Are diverse media actors (e.g. local outlets, investigative journalists, support organisations) considered in how priorities are set? ### Improve coordination of support ☐ Are existing donor coordination mechanisms (e.g. working groups, platforms, joint initiatives) actively used across sectors and donors? ☐ Are you aligning with other donors at political level to reduce mixed signals and fragmentation? ☐ Are roles and responsibilities across donors and within the mission clearly understood? ☐ Are there clear criteria for when joint positions or coordinated engagement are appropriate? ### Invest in knowledge, research, and learning ☐ Is your engagement informed by up-to-date analysis of the media and information environment? ☐ Do you have access to relevant insights on audience trust, information flows, and media dynamics? ☐ Are gaps in understanding of the media landscape identified and addressed where needed? ☐ Are lessons from previous programmes and partner engagement reflected in political positioning and strategic direction? **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/UrMfC778X2YDTySpr96V" %} # Key considerations for Heads of Mission / Ambassadors Heads of Mission and Ambassadors play a critical role in shaping how support to independent media and information integrity is prioritised, understood, and acted upon at country level. While they are not directly responsible for programme design or implementation, their decisions - and the signals they send through political engagement, public positioning, and internal prioritisation - influence whether media support is treated as a strategic issue or remains peripheral. This role sits at the intersection of political leadership, diplomatic engagement, and internal coordination. Ambassadors operate within institutional mandates and guidance from headquarters, while also drawing on inputs from across the mission and engagement with external partners. In this context, what is prioritised, raised in dialogue, or given political visibility often depends on how issues are surfaced, framed, and understood. Consultations highlighted that media and information integrity are not always consistently recognised as strategic priorities at this level. Even where commitments exist, they are not always reflected in political dialogue, donor coordination, or country-level positioning. Strengthening awareness, coherence, and informed engagement at this level is therefore an important factor in ensuring that support to media is effective, aligned, and sustained. #### Where this role has influence Heads of Mission influence media support primarily through: * **Political dialogue** - what issues are raised with national authorities and partners * **Public positioning** - how media and information integrity are framed in statements and engagement * **Internal prioritisation** - what receives attention across political, programme, and communications functions * **Donor coordination** - how collective positions and approaches are shaped at country level This influence is indirect but significant. **What is prioritised at this level is more likely to be acted on across the mission**, while issues that are not surfaced or framed strategically may remain fragmented or overlooked. #### Political signalling and prioritisation Decisions taken at Head of Mission level shape how media issues are positioned within broader diplomatic engagement. This includes whether media freedom, information integrity, and risks affecting media actors are raised in political dialogue, reflected in public statements, or integrated into country-level priorities. A consistent challenge is that media support is often treated as a technical or sector-specific issue, rather than as part of wider governance, democratic resilience, or stability agendas. Where this is the case, it is less likely to be consistently addressed across programmes, coordination platforms, or engagement with national authorities. In practice, this requires **linking media support to broader political and policy priorities**, ensuring that it is framed in terms that resonate with wider institutional objectives. #### Balancing visibility, diplomacy, and risk Ambassadors regularly engage in public and diplomatic activities that shape how media actors are perceived ([*see case study 1: credibility risk linked to donor visibility*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-1-credibility-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility)). This includes statements, events, partnerships, and forms of visibility that carry political and reputational weight. A key challenge identified in consultations is balancing visibility with risk. In some contexts, visible support to independent media can strengthen legitimacy and signal commitment. In others, it may expose media actors to political pressure, regulatory scrutiny, surveillance, or reputational risks ([*see case study 3: operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety)). These risks are not always visible at senior level, particularly where they are highly context-specific or affect different types of media actors in different ways. In practice, this requires **careful calibration of visibility and diplomatic engagement**, including recognising when lower visibility, indirect engagement, or reliance on intermediaries may be more appropriate. #### Working through the mission Heads of Mission operate through a combination of political, programme, and communications functions. These parts of the mission may have different priorities, timelines, and incentives, which shape how media-related issues are understood and addressed. A recurring challenge is ensuring coherence across these functions. Where alignment is limited, there is a higher risk of mixed signals, fragmented prioritisation, or unintended consequences - including situations where political messaging, programme design, and visibility approaches pull in different directions. In practice, this means **ensuring that media-related risks, opportunities, and priorities are consistently reflected across political, programme, and communications functions**, while allowing for different roles and mandates. #### Coordination and collective positioning Heads of Mission play a role in shaping how donors engage collectively on media and information integrity at country level. This includes participation in coordination mechanisms, alignment of messaging, and decisions on when joint positions or actions are appropriate. Consultations highlighted that coordination mechanisms often exist - such as governance or media-related working groups - but are not always used consistently or strategically. This can result in duplication, gaps in support, or inconsistent political messaging across donors ([*see case study 7: coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-7-coordination-challenges-and-joint-responses-in-crisis-contexts)). At the same time, coordination involves trade-offs. Joint positions may strengthen collective influence but can also limit flexibility or require compromise across different priorities. In practice, this requires **using existing coordination mechanisms deliberately**, including clarifying when alignment strengthens impact and when flexibility is needed. #### Understanding media systems and constraints Engagement at this level depends on a clear understanding of how media systems function in a given context. This includes regulatory conditions, ownership structures, market dynamics, infrastructure constraints, and patterns of information consumption and trust. A consistent gap identified in consultations is that these factors are not always systematically integrated into political engagement. As a result, structural risks to media viability and independence - such as restrictive regulation, market concentration, or limited access to distribution channels - may be under-recognised. In practice, this does not require detailed technical expertise, but it does require **ensuring that available analysis on media systems and constraints informs political engagement and strategic positioning**. {% hint style="info" %} Taken together, these considerations point to the role of Heads of Mission and Ambassadors as enablers of strategic direction rather than implementers of programmes. Their influence lies in how issues are prioritised, how risks are managed, and how different parts of the system are brought together. When media and information integrity are clearly understood and appropriately positioned at this level, support is more likely to be coherent, context-sensitive, and sustained over time. {% endhint %} # Applying the OECD Principles in practice ### Context & relevance **In practice:**\ At Head of Mission and Ambassador level, ensuring that context matters is less about generating analysis and more about **ensuring that political engagement and positioning reflect how media systems actually function in a given country context**. This includes regulatory conditions, ownership structures, market dynamics, and patterns of information access and trust. Where these factors are not reflected, media-related risks and constraints are less likely to be recognised in political dialogue. Do * Ensure that political engagement reflects key features of the media environment, including regulatory constraints and market conditions * Raise media-related issues in ways that are grounded in local realities and sensitivities * Encourage context-specific approaches across different parts of the mission Avoid * Applying standardised narratives or approaches that do not reflect the local media landscape * Treating media support as a generic governance issue without recognising sector-specific dynamics Consider * How media systems intersect with governance, digital policy, and political power * Whether available analysis on media regulation, ownership, and market structure is reflected in engagement ### Principle 1: Do no harm **In practice:**\ Decisions taken at this level - particularly around public positioning, visibility, and diplomatic engagement - can have direct implications for the safety and independence of media actors. **Even well-intended political support can increase exposure to risk if not carefully calibrated to context**, particularly in environments where media are subject to surveillance, legal pressure, or political targeting ([*see case study 3: operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety)). Do * Take into account risks related to visibility, public association, and political signalling * Ensure that engagement and statements do not unintentionally expose media actors to pressure or retaliation * Support approaches that allow flexibility in how visibility and attribution are handled Avoid * Public positioning that may compromise the perceived independence of media actors * Applying visibility or engagement approaches that do not reflect context-specific risks Consider * How different types of media actors (e.g. investigative journalists, local outlets, community media) face different risk profiles * Whether lower visibility, indirect engagement, or use of intermediaries may reduce risk ### Principle 2: Increase financial and other forms of support **In practice:**\ While funding decisions are taken elsewhere, Heads of Mission influence how media support is prioritised and sustained through political engagement and strategic positioning. **Clear political signalling can determine whether media support is treated as a core priority within funding frameworks or remains marginal**, particularly where competing priorities are present. Do * Reflect media and information integrity in strategic dialogue and country-level priorities * Reinforce the relevance of media support in relation to governance, stability, and democratic resilience * Support an enabling environment where media-related programmes can be prioritised within existing instruments Avoid * Treating media support as a secondary or technical issue in political engagement * Sending mixed or inconsistent signals that may weaken prioritisation across programmes Consider * How political engagement influences what programme teams are able to prioritise within existing instruments * Whether media support is consistently reflected across different areas of engagement ### Principle 3: Take a whole-of-system approach **In practice:**\ Media and information integrity are shaped by a wider system that includes regulation, digital infrastructure, platform dynamics, market conditions, and audience behaviour. At this level, **the key role is to ensure that these interconnections are recognised and reflected in political engagement and strategic positioning**, rather than treating media as an isolated sector. Do * Reflect linkages between media, digital policy, governance, and security in engagement and dialogue * Encourage approaches that consider both content and enabling environment (e.g. regulation, infrastructure, market conditions) * Support alignment across different functions of the mission Avoid * Reinforcing siloed approaches that treat media in isolation from related policy areas * Focusing only on visible outputs rather than underlying system dynamics Consider * How policy areas such as digital regulation, competition policy, and public administration affect media viability and independence * Whether engagement reflects how information is produced, distributed, and consumed across the system ### Principle 4: Strengthen local leadership and ownership **In practice:**\ Political engagement can influence how local media actors are perceived and whether they are able to operate independently. **Supporting local leadership requires ensuring that engagement reinforces - rather than undermines - the credibility and autonomy of media actors**, particularly in contexts where external association may affect trust. Do * Engage in ways that respect and reinforce the independence of local media actors * Ensure that local perspectives inform how media-related issues are raised and addressed * Recognise the diversity of media actors, including smaller outlets and emerging voices Avoid * Positioning media actors as extensions of external agendas * Over-associating media actors with donor or political actors in ways that affect credibility Consider * How public positioning may affect perceptions of independence among audiences and authorities * Whether engagement enables local actors to shape narratives and priorities ### Principle 5: Improve coordination of support **In practice:**\ Heads of Mission shape how coordination is used at country level through engagement in existing mechanisms, alignment of messaging, and decisions on joint approaches. **Effective coordination depends less on creating new structures and more on using existing mechanisms strategically and with clear criteria for engagement**. Do * Engage actively in existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. working groups, joint initiatives) across sectors and donors * Align political messaging with other donors where appropriate * Clarify when coordinated approaches add value and when flexibility is needed Avoid * Creating parallel processes that duplicate existing coordination structures * Engaging in coordination without clear objectives or criteria Consider * Which coordination mechanisms exist and how they are used in practice * Trade-offs between coordination, visibility, and flexibility ### Principle 6: Invest in knowledge, research, and learning **In practice:**\ At this level, the focus is not on generating knowledge directly, but on ensuring that engagement and positioning are informed by relevant analysis. **Where media systems are not well understood, structural risks and opportunities are more likely to be overlooked in political engagement**, particularly in rapidly evolving digital and information environments. Do * Ensure that engagement draws on available analysis of media systems and information environments * Support the use of insights on audience trust, information flows, and platform dynamics * Encourage feedback from programmes and partners to inform positioning Avoid * Relying solely on general governance or civil society analysis * Applying generic assumptions across different media environments Consider * What evidence is available on media markets, audiences, and information flows - and where gaps remain * How uncertainty or limited data may affect political positioning # Senior Management / Strategy Leads Senior Management and Strategy Leads play a central role in shaping how support to independent media and information integrity is prioritised, resourced, and embedded across institutional strategies. Decisions taken at this level - on strategic priorities, funding allocations, and institutional direction - directly influence whether media support is treated as a core component of broader governance, security, and development objectives. This role operates at the intersection of strategic planning, resource allocation, and institutional leadership. Senior Management defines overarching priorities, determines how resources are distributed, and sets the internal signals that guide policy development and programming. This includes how media and information integrity are positioned across sectors, how risks are understood and framed, and whether funding and institutional incentives enable sustained and coherent support. Consultations highlighted that while media freedom and information integrity are often recognised in principle, they are not always consistently reflected in strategic priorities, instruments, or internal incentives. Strategic direction and leadership signalling are therefore critical in determining whether media support is systematically integrated across the institution or remains dependent on individual initiative. At the same time, this role operates within constraints related to competing priorities, budget limitations, and available instruments, requiring trade-offs between ambition, feasibility, and risk. This section provides practical guidance to support Senior Management and Strategy Leads in aligning strategic direction, resource allocation, and institutional signalling with the OECD DAC Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment. ### How to use this section Depending on your needs, you can navigate directly to: [**Start here: Quick checklist**](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads/start-here-quick-checklist-for-senior-management-strategy-leads)\ A rapid stress test to assess whether strategic priorities, resource allocation, and institutional signals enable effective and context-appropriate support to media and information integrity. [**Key considerations for Senior Management / Strategy Leads**](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads/key-considerations-for-senior-management-strategy-leads)\ Common challenges, trade-offs, and what effective leadership looks like in aligning priorities, resources, and cross-sector engagement. [**Applying the OECD Principles in practice**](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads/applying-the-oecd-principles-in-practice)\ Actionable recommendations aligned with the six OECD Principles. {% hint style="info" %} **Tip**\ If you are new to media and information integrity, start with the [narrative section](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads/key-considerations-for-senior-management-strategy-leads).\ If you are setting strategic direction or making resource decisions, begin with the [checklist](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads/start-here-quick-checklist-for-senior-management-strategy-leads). {% endhint %} # Start here: Quick checklist for Senior Management / Strategy Leads ### Context & relevance ☐ Is support to independent media and information integrity clearly reflected in strategic priorities and leadership messaging? ☐ Are links between media support and core objectives - such as governance, stability, and security - explicitly recognised? ☐ Are media-related considerations integrated across relevant policy areas (e.g. governance, digital transformation, security), rather than treated as a standalone issue? ### Do no harm ☐ Are risks to different types of media actors (e.g. local outlets, investigative journalists, public interest media) recognised at strategic level? ☐ Is there clarity on acceptable levels of risk when supporting independent media in politically sensitive environments? ☐ Are trade-offs between visibility, accountability, and partner safety explicitly considered in strategic direction? {% hint style="info" %} #### Quick test If media support were removed from current priorities, would this create gaps in governance, accountability, or information integrity outcomes?\ Are media-related risks and opportunities sufficiently visible in strategic discussions and decision-making?\ Do current priorities enable teams to recognise and act on media-related issues across sectors? {% endhint %} ### Increase financial and other forms of support ☐ Do funding decisions reflect the long-term nature of media development and sustainability challenges? ☐ Are resources allocated in a way that enables continuity, not only short-term or project-based interventions? ☐ Are funding instruments sufficiently flexible to support media-related objectives across different contexts? ### Take a whole-of-system approach ☐ Does strategic planning reflect how media systems interact with regulation, markets, digital platforms, and governance dynamics? ☐ Are media considerations integrated into broader initiatives (e.g. anti-corruption, public administration reform, digital policy, competition policy)? ☐ Is there awareness of how decisions in other sectors may affect media viability and independence? ### Strengthen local leadership and ownership ☐ Do strategic priorities recognise the role of local media actors, networks, and support organisations as independent actors? ☐ Are approaches designed to avoid positioning media actors as extensions of external agendas? ☐ Are trade-offs between accountability requirements and local ownership considered at strategic level? ### Improve coordination of support ☐ Are existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. donor working groups, platforms, joint initiatives) actively used across sectors and donors? ☐ Are roles and responsibilities clearly defined to avoid duplication or gaps across teams, instruments, and partners? ☐ Are criteria clear for when coordination or joint approaches are expected or required? ### Invest in knowledge, research, and learning ☐ Are strategic decisions informed by up-to-date, media-specific analysis (e.g. market conditions, audience trust, information flows)? ☐ Are field-level insights and partner perspectives used to inform strategic priorities and adjustments? ☐ Are lessons from implementation systematically reflected in strategy updates and planning cycles? **Download and print the checklist from here:** {% file src="/files/eodwZd0eeyVpqnjeTHCT" %} # Key considerations for Senior Management / Strategy Leads {% hint style="info" %} ### In brief Senior Management and Strategy Leads set the overall direction, priorities, and resource allocation that determine how support to independent media and information integrity is positioned within institutional agendas. Through strategic planning, funding decisions, and internal signalling, they influence whether media support is treated as a core component of governance, security, and development objectives - or remains fragmented and under-prioritised. {% endhint %} ### Why this role matters Decisions taken at this level shape what is possible elsewhere in the system. Strategic priorities influence how policy frameworks are developed, how programmes are designed, and what teams are incentivised to focus on. Where media and information integrity are clearly reflected in leadership direction, they are more likely to be integrated across sectors and supported through appropriate instruments. Consultations suggest that even where commitments to media freedom exist, they are not always consistently translated into strategic priorities, funding allocations, or institutional incentives. **When media support is not clearly prioritised at leadership level, it is unlikely to be addressed systematically in policy or programming.** This can result in gaps between stated commitments and operational reality ([*see case study 2: funding instability and system-level dependency*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-2-funding-stability-and-system-level-dependency-rfe-rl)). ### Where this role has influence **Strategic prioritisation and signalling**\ Senior Management determines how media and information integrity are framed within broader institutional objectives. This includes how clearly these issues are linked to governance, stability, and resilience, and whether they are reflected in strategic documents and leadership messaging. **Resource allocation and funding direction**\ Funding decisions at this level shape whether media support is sustained over time and whether it is accessible through existing instruments. This includes decisions on budget allocation, funding modalities, and the degree of flexibility available to programme teams. > **Field insights** > > “Sometimes media is mentioned in strategies, but it is not followed by concrete priorities or funding.” > > \- *EU official* **Risk appetite and institutional positioning**\ Leadership plays a key role in defining acceptable levels of risk when supporting independent media, particularly in politically sensitive or restrictive environments ([*see case study 3: operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-3-operational-risk-linked-to-donor-visibility-and-safety)). This includes balancing visibility, accountability, and partner safety. **Cross-sector integration and coherence**\ Senior Management influences whether media considerations are integrated across sectors such as governance, digital policy, anti-corruption, and security. This affects whether support reflects the full media and information ecosystem or remains siloed ([*see case study 4: governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-4-governance-risk-and-the-role-of-media-oversight-in-infrastructure-investments)). ### Core challenges Consultations highlight a number of recurring challenges at this level. Media and information integrity are often recognised in principle but not consistently prioritised in strategic planning or resource allocation. Competing priorities and limited budgets can make it difficult to sustain long-term support, particularly where impacts are less immediately visible. > **Field Insight** > > “There is interest at senior level, but translating that into instruments and programmes is not always straightforward.” > > *- Donor representative* There are also constraints related to funding instruments and institutional structures. Even where there is strategic intent, available instruments may not be sufficiently flexible to support media-related objectives across different contexts. This can limit what programme teams are able to implement in practice. Coordination across sectors and teams remains uneven. Without clear direction and incentives from leadership, media-related issues may be treated as the responsibility of a single unit rather than integrated across relevant policy areas. **This can reinforce fragmented approaches and limit the effectiveness of support.** > **Field insights** > > “Without clear direction, it depends a lot on individuals whether media is taken into account.” > > *- Consultation participant* Finally, risk management is not always clearly defined at strategic level. In sensitive environments, uncertainty around acceptable risk can lead to either overly cautious approaches or unaddressed exposure for partners. ### What good looks like in practice In practice, effective leadership on media support is reflected in how priorities, resources, and incentives are aligned across the institution. Media and information integrity are positioned as relevant to core objectives such as governance, accountability, and resilience. Strategic documents and leadership messaging make these links explicit, providing a clear basis for policy development and programming. Funding approaches reflect the structural and long-term nature of media development. This includes enabling continuity, supporting a range of actors across the media ecosystem, and ensuring that instruments are sufficiently flexible to respond to different contexts. Risk is addressed explicitly, with clarity on acceptable levels of exposure and how trade-offs between visibility, accountability, and safety are managed. This supports more consistent decision-making across teams and contexts. {% hint style="info" %} ### Cross-sector integration and coherence Cross-sector integration is actively encouraged. Media considerations are reflected in related areas such as digital policy, anti-corruption, and governance reform, enabling more coherent and system-level approaches. **Where leadership signals support for cross-sector engagement, teams are more likely to recognise and act on these interconnections.** {% endhint %} # Applying the OECD Principles in practice ### Context & relevance **In practice:**\ At senior management level, context and relevance are reflected in how media and information integrity are positioned within overarching strategic priorities. This includes whether links to governance, security, and development objectives are clearly articulated and recognised across the institution. **If media support is not framed as strategically relevant, it is unlikely to be prioritised consistently in policy, funding, or programming.** **Do** * Ensure that media and information integrity are explicitly reflected in strategic priorities and leadership messaging * Link media support to core objectives such as governance, accountability, stability, and resilience * Promote integration of media considerations across relevant policy areas (e.g. governance, digital transformation, security) **Avoid** * Treating media support as a niche or standalone issue disconnected from broader priorities * Using overly technical or sector-specific framing that limits cross-sector relevance * Assuming that recognition in principle will translate into prioritisation in practice **Consider** * How strategic framing influences whether media issues are visible in decision-making * Whether current priorities enable teams to act on media-related risks and opportunities * Trade-offs between competing strategic priorities ### Principle 1: Ensure support does no harm (Context matters) **In practice:**\ Context matters in how strategic priorities define acceptable approaches to supporting media across different environments. This includes whether political, legal, and economic risks affecting media actors are recognised and reflected in leadership direction. **If risks are not clearly articulated at strategic level, they are unlikely to be addressed consistently across the system.** **Do** * Ensure that strategic priorities reflect risks faced by different types of media actors (e.g. local outlets, investigative journalists, public interest media) * Promote the use of media and information ecosystem analysis in country and regional strategies * Support differentiated approaches across open, transitional, and restrictive contexts **Avoid** * Treating media support as interchangeable with broader civil society engagement * Relying solely on general governance or political analysis to assess risks * Applying uniform approaches across different contexts **Consider** * Trade-offs between how support is publicly positioned and communicated, and the potential risks this creates for partner safety * How strategic framing influences risk management downstream * The implications of misreading the media environment ### Principle 2: Increase financial and other forms of support **In practice:**\ Strategic prioritisation determines whether media support is translated into sustained funding and accessible instruments. This includes how priorities are reflected in budget allocation and funding frameworks. **If media support is not anchored in funding decisions at leadership level, it is unlikely to be implemented at scale** ([*see case study 2: funding instability and system-level dependency*](/toolkit/case-studies-and-field-insights/case-study-2-funding-stability-and-system-level-dependency-rfe-rl)). **Do** * Allocate resources that reflect the long-term and structural nature of media development * Ensure continuity of support beyond short-term project cycles * Align strategic priorities with available funding instruments and modalities **Avoid** * Recognising media support in strategy without corresponding resource allocation * Relying on fragmented or short-term funding approaches * Assuming that policy recognition will lead to funding availability **Consider** * Whether existing instruments are flexible enough to support media-related objectives * Trade-offs between strategic ambition and budgetary constraints * How funding decisions shape what programme teams can implement ### Principle 3: Take a whole-of-system approach **In practice:**\ Strategic leadership shapes whether support reflects the full media and information ecosystem, including regulation, markets, infrastructure, and digital platforms. This requires recognising how decisions in different sectors affect media viability and independence. **Without system-level framing, support risks remaining fragmented and addressing only isolated parts of the ecosystem.** **Do** * Integrate media considerations into related sectors such as digital policy, competition policy, governance reform, and public administration * Promote approaches that reflect how information is produced, distributed, and consumed * Encourage cross-sector collaboration to address structural factors affecting media systems **Avoid** * Focusing only on content or individual media actors * Treating media support as separate from digital, regulatory, or governance agendas * Limiting responsibility for media-related issues to a single sector or team **Consider** * How policy areas such as digital regulation, competition frameworks, and governance reforms influence media viability * Risks of duplication or gaps where links between parts of the ecosystem are not recognised * How leadership signals influence cross-sector engagement ### Principle 4: Strengthen local leadership and ownership **In practice:**\ Strategic direction influences whether local media actors are recognised as independent actors or positioned primarily as implementers of external priorities. **If local ownership is not reflected in strategic priorities, it is unlikely to be realised in practice.** **Do** * Recognise the role of local media actors, networks, and support organisations in strategic frameworks * Support approaches that allow local actors to shape priorities and narratives * Reinforce editorial independence through strategic positioning **Avoid** * Implicitly prioritising external actors or models * Treating local organisations primarily as delivery partners * Overlooking diversity within the media sector **Consider** * How strategic decisions influence who sets priorities and narratives * Trade-offs between accountability requirements and local ownership * The impact of external support on perceived independence ### Principle 5: Improve coordination of support **In practice:**\ Strategic leadership determines whether coordination is expected, structured, and used across teams, sectors, and donors. This includes whether existing coordination mechanisms are actively utilised. **Without clear direction from leadership, coordination often remains ad hoc and dependent on individual initiative.** **Do** * Promote the use of existing coordination mechanisms (e.g. donor working groups, platforms, joint initiatives) across sectors and donors * Clarify roles and responsibilities across teams, instruments, and partners * Align priorities with other donors and institutional actors where appropriate **Avoid** * Relying solely on informal coordination * Overlooking existing coordination structures * Allowing parallel or competing priorities across sectors **Consider** * Criteria for when coordination or joint approaches are appropriate * Trade-offs between coordination, visibility, and flexibility * How leadership signals influence coordination in practice ### Principle 6: Invest in knowledge, research, and learning **In practice:**\ Strategic decisions depend on how evidence about media ecosystems is generated and used. Consultations indicate that data is often incomplete or uneven. **Decisions made without media-specific knowledge risk misalignment with actual media dynamics.** **Do** * Ensure that strategic planning is informed by media-specific analysis (e.g. market conditions, audience trust, information flows) * Support the generation and use of evidence across contexts * Encourage feedback loops between strategic, policy, and programme levels **Avoid** * Relying only on general governance or civil society data * Applying generic assumptions across contexts * Treating knowledge as static **Consider** * Where evidence gaps exist and how they affect prioritisation * How uncertainty influences strategic decisions * How learning can be integrated into planning processes # Case studies and field insights This section provides a curated set of case studies that illustrate how the OECD Principles can be applied in practice across different political and operational contexts. Each case focuses on a specific challenge within the information environment - including issues related to safety, funding, coordination, regulatory frameworks, and local ownership - and highlights the types of trade-offs and decisions that shape outcomes in practice. The cases draw on interviews with donor representatives, implementing partners, and media organisations, as well as selected external research and sector evidence. They are designed to complement both: * the [**By Principles section**](/toolkit/principle), by showing how the principles operate in practice * the [**By Roles section**](/toolkit/role), by illustrating how different actors navigate constraints, risks, and operational choices Rather than presenting idealised examples, the cases highlight **real-world constraints, unintended consequences, and areas of tension**. They can be used to inform context-sensitive programme design, strengthen risk awareness, and support more coherent and effective approaches to media support.\ \ **(Links to each case study to be added below)** # Case Study 1: Credibility risk linked to donor visibility Visibility and credibility risks in donor-funded investigations {% hint style="info" %} ### **Core issue** Donor visibility and transparency requirements can be used to undermine the perceived independence and credibility of media actors. {% endhint %} ### **Context** The [Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project](https://www.occrp.org/en) (OCCRP) is a cross-border investigative journalism network that works with local media partners on corruption, organised crime, and financial investigations. Its model combines international coordination with locally grounded reporting, supported by a mix of public and philanthropic funding, including government donors. ### **What happened** OCCRP and its partners have faced recurring accusations of acting as foreign agents. In politically sensitive environments, these claims have been amplified to undermine the credibility of their reporting. In some cases, publicly known funding relationships - including support from government donors such as the United States Agency for International Development - have been used to question editorial independence. These dynamics have been used to: * discredit investigations and reduce audience trust * justify regulatory or administrative pressure * increase reputational and operational risks for local partner organisations In this context, transparency and visibility requirements - intended to support accountability - have at times been repurposed as tools for delegitimisation. ### **Why this matters** This case illustrates that visibility and transparency are not neutral in contested political environments.\ Consultations with media practitioners and donors highlight that how funding is disclosed and communicated can directly affect perceptions of independence. Where these dynamics are not taken into account: * support can increase exposure to political pressure * reputational attacks can undermine trust in reporting * local partners may carry disproportionate risk compared to international actors ### **Implications for practice** * Adapt visibility requirements to **political and media context**, rather than applying standardised approaches * Assess how funding relationships may be **interpreted or instrumentalised by local actors** * Recognise that **risk is unevenly distributed**, often falling more heavily on local partners * Integrate **reputational and narrative risks** into risk assessments, alongside legal and financial considerations * Ensure that transparency measures align with **credibility, safety, and editorial independence** ### **Most relevant for** * [**Heads of Mission / Ambassadors**:](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) Managing political sensitivities and public positioning of donor support * [**Programme and project managers**:](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) Designing grant agreements, including visibility clauses and reporting requirements * [**Policy officers / thematic specialists**:](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) Integrating independence, ownership, and risk into policy frameworks * [**Communications teams**:](/toolkit/role/communications-teams) Shaping how funding relationships are communicated and mitigating reputational risks {% hint style="info" %} ### **Linked principles** * [**Principle 1** ](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm)**– Ensure support does no harm** * [**Principle 4**](/toolkit/principle/4-support-local-leadership-and-ownership) **– Strengthen local leadership and ownership** {% endhint %} > **Evidence base** > > * Consultation inputs highlighting reputational and safety risks linked to donor visibility > * Public reporting and analysis relating to OCCRP and similar investigative networks operating in politically sensitive environments​ > * [OCCRP under attack](https://www.occrp.org/en/occrp-under-attack) > * ​[Global Investigative Journalism Network - statements on editorial independence](https://gijn.org/stories/how-defend-news-integrity-during-global-funding-crisis/) {% hint style="info" %} ### **Key lesson** Visibility and transparency can shape how support is perceived. In contested environments, they can strengthen accountability - or be used to undermine credibility and increase risk for media actors. {% endhint %} # Case Study 2: Funding stability and system-level dependency (RFE/RL) Sudden funding disruption and media system fragility (RFE/RL) {% hint style="info" %} **Core issue**\ Funding instability affecting system-critical media actors can have disproportionate impacts on the availability and resilience of independent information ecosystems. {% endhint %} ### **Context** [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty](https://www.rferl.org/) (RFE/RL) is a publicly funded international broadcaster operating in regions where independent media ecosystems are limited or under pressure. In a number of countries, it plays a structural role by: * providing independent news in restricted or high-risk environments * supporting local journalism through partnerships and content sharing * reaching audiences underserved by domestic media As such, RFE/RL functions not only as a media outlet, but as part of the broader infrastructure supporting access to independent information. ### **What happened** RFE/RL has experienced periods of funding uncertainty linked to political decisions and shifts in funding priorities affecting publicly funded international media support. Consultations and public reporting indicate that such uncertainty has led to: * operational instability and constraints on long-term planning * staff uncertainty and reduced organisational capacity * limitations on investment in content, infrastructure, and partnerships Given its structural role in certain markets, these disruptions have had wider system-level implications: * reduced availability of independent and trusted information * weakening of partnerships with local media organisations * increased space for state-controlled or low-quality information sources ### **Why this matters** This case illustrates how funding volatility can have consequences beyond individual organisations, particularly where media actors are not easily replaceable. Consultations and sector evidence highlight that: * short-term funding decisions can undermine long-term resilience * interruptions in support can lead to loss of capacity that is difficult to rebuild * ecosystem-level effects are often not fully accounted for in funding decisions ### **Implications for practice** Identify and prioritise support to **system-critical media actors** within the ecosystem * Ensure funding mechanisms provide **predictability and continuity**, particularly in fragile or restricted environments * Assess the **system-wide impact** of funding decisions, not only organisational performance * Develop **contingency mechanisms** to mitigate sudden funding disruptions * Align political and budgetary decisions with **operational realities on the ground** ### **Most relevant for** * [**Senior management and strategy leads**:](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads) Setting funding priorities and defining acceptable levels of continuity and risk * [**Heads of Mission / Ambassadors**:](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) Understanding how funding decisions affect stability, credibility, and influence in-country * [**Programme and project managers**:](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) Structuring funding to support continuity and reduce volatility * [**Policy officers / thematic specialists**:](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) Ensuring funding frameworks reflect ecosystem-level dynamics {% hint style="info" %} ### **Linked principles** * [**Principle 2**](/toolkit/principle/2-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding) **– Increase financial and other forms of support** * [**Principle 3**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) **– Take a whole-of-system approach** {% endhint %} > **Evidence base** > > * Consultation inputs highlighting the system-level impact of funding volatility in media support > * Public reporting and analysis on funding uncertainty affecting Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and similar publicly funded media actors > * [About Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty](https://about.rferl.org/) (RFE/RL) > * ​[BBC Media Action - Crisis in Journalism](https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/press-release/journalism-in-crisis-report) (2025) > * ​[Free Press Unlimited - Global impact of funding disruptions](https://www.freepressunlimited.org/en/current/new-report-reveals-global-fallout-us-government-funding-cuts)​ > * ​[OECD Development Co-operation Principles for Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4.html) {% hint style="info" %} ### **Key lesson** Where media actors play a structural role, funding continuity is a strategic issue. Interruptions can reshape the information environment in ways that are difficult to reverse. {% endhint %} # Case Study 3: Operational risk linked to donor visibility and safety Visibility waivers and operational risk in restrictive environments {% hint style="info" %} ### **Core issue** Standard donor visibility requirements can increase legal, reputational, and physical risks for media actors operating in restrictive or politically sensitive environments. {% endhint %} ### **Context** Donor visibility and branding requirements are standard features of development cooperation, intended to ensure transparency, accountability, and public recognition of funding. However, in restrictive or politically sensitive environments, visible association with external donors can expose media actors to heightened scrutiny, legal restrictions, or security risks. ### **What happened** Consultations indicate that in several contexts, donors have adapted or waived standard visibility requirements for media support projects where public attribution was assessed to increase risk. These adaptations have included: * removing or reducing donor logos and public branding * limiting public disclosure of funding relationships * adjusting communication outputs to avoid exposing partners These decisions were typically made on a case-by-case basis, informed by risk assessments and partner consultations. Where such flexibility was applied: * partners reported reduced exposure to legal and political pressure * risks linked to “foreign agent” narratives and regulatory targeting were mitigated * operational space for independent reporting was preserved Where flexibility was not applied, or where guidance was unclear: * partners faced increased scrutiny or reputational attacks * compliance requirements conflicted with safety considerations * decision-making became inconsistent across programmes and contexts ### **Why this matters** This case illustrates how administrative and compliance requirements can create operational risks if applied without contextual adaptation. Consultations and sector evidence highlight that: * visibility decisions can directly affect the safety and operational viability of media actors * risk levels vary significantly across contexts and cannot be standardised * partners are often best placed to assess their own exposure Balancing transparency and accountability with safety and independence is therefore a core operational challenge in media support. ### **Implications for practice** * Integrate **context-specific risk assessments** into visibility and communication requirements * Allow for **flexibility or waivers** where visibility requirements increases risk * Recognise that **partners are best placed to assess exposure and safety risks** * Avoid reliance on **ad hoc decision-making** by providing clear internal guidance * Align communication practices with broader **“do no harm” approaches**, including legal, physical, and reputational risk ### **Most relevant for** * [**Heads of Mission / Ambassadors**:](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) Setting the tone on balancing visibility with political and security risks * [**Programme and project managers**:](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) Designing flexible visibility clauses and managing compliance requirements * [**Policy officers / thematic specialists**:](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) Ensuring guidance reflects context-sensitive approaches to visibility * [**Communications teams**:](/toolkit/role/communications-teams) Adapting branding and messaging to minimise risk while maintaining accountability {% hint style="info" %} ### **Linked principles** * [**Principle 1**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm) **– Ensure support does no harm** * [**Principle 4**](/toolkit/principle/4-support-local-leadership-and-ownership) **– Strengthen local leadership and ownership** {% endhint %} > **Evidence base (to be added)** > > * Consultation inputs from EU Delegations, implementing partners, and media organisations on visibility-related risks > * Donor guidance and practices on visibility waivers and risk-based adaptations (e.g. EU, Sida) > * Sector experience in restrictive environments where public attribution increases exposure to legal or political pressure {% hint style="info" %} **Key lesson**\ Visibility requirements should not be treated as fixed rules. In certain contexts, adapting or waiving them is necessary to ensure that support does not unintentionally increase risk for partners. {% endhint %} # Case Study 4: Governance risk and the role of media oversight in infrastructure investments Investigative journalism and oversight in large-scale infrastructure initiatives (Global Gateway) {% hint style="info" %} ### **Core issue** Large-scale infrastructure investments can face governance and credibility risks when independent scrutiny is not integrated into programme design. {% endhint %} ### **Context** The Global Gateway is the EU’s flagship investment strategy, mobilising significant resources for infrastructure across sectors such as energy, transport, digital, health, and education. Infrastructure programmes of this scale are often exposed to risks related to: * corruption and procurement manipulation * limited transparency in implementation * weak or fragmented public oversight These risks are typically addressed through formal governance and compliance mechanisms. Independent scrutiny by media actors further addresses these risks by strengthening accountability and should therefore be systematically integrated into programme design. ### **What happened** The EU increasingly positions infrastructure investments as opportunities to integrate broader governance, transparency, and accountability objectives, rather than treating them solely as technical delivery processes. However, consultations suggest that the systematic integration of independent scrutiny within infrastructure programming remains uneven in practice. In response, some programmes and initiatives have begun to explore ways of incorporating journalistic oversight, including: * support for investigative reporting on procurement and project delivery * collaboration between local and international media partners * training in data, budget, and infrastructure reporting In parallel, investigative journalism networks have monitored public procurement and infrastructure spending across regions, demonstrating that media scrutiny can: * identify irregularities and risks at an early stage * complement formal accountability mechanisms * improve public understanding of complex projects These approaches remain uneven, but where they are systematically embedded across infrastructure programmes, they can strengthen transparency, accountability, and public trust. ### **Why this matters** This case illustrates the importance of linking media support with broader governance and development interventions. Consultations and sector evidence highlight that where independent scrutiny is absent or weak: * corruption and mismanagement risks increase * public trust in infrastructure investments can erode * information gaps can be filled by speculation or competing narratives Integrating media support into infrastructure programmes can therefore strengthen both accountability and credibility. ### **Implications for practice** * Consider integrating **independent media and investigative capacity** into infrastructure and governance programmes * Treat media scrutiny as a **complement to formal oversight**, not a separate activity * Support **collaboration between journalists, civil society, and governance actors** * Address **information gaps proactively** to reduce space for disinformation or speculation * Ensure that communication strategies go beyond promotion and support **transparency and public understanding** of projects ### **Most relevant for** * [**Heads of Mission / Ambassadors**:](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) Positioning infrastructure investments within broader governance and credibility considerations * [**Programme and project managers**:](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) Designing projects that integrate transparency and media components * [**Policy officers / thematic specialists**:](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) Ensuring coherence between media support, governance, and development policy * [**Communications teams**:](/toolkit/role/communications-teams) Framing infrastructure investments in ways that support transparency and public trust *** {% hint style="info" %} ### **Linked principles** * [**Principle 3**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) **– Take a whole-of-system approach** * [**Principle 5**](/toolkit/principle/5-improve-coordination) **– Improve coordination of support** {% endhint %} > **Evidence base** > > * Consultation inputs highlighting the need to integrate independent scrutiny into large-scale development and infrastructure programmes > * Public information on Global Gateway and similar infrastructure initiatives > * [European Commission - Global Gateway overview](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/global-gateway-overview_en)​ > * ​[OECD - Anti-corruption and infrastructure governance](https://www.oecd.org/en/about/projects/infrastructure-anti-corruption.html) > * Evidence from investigative journalism networks monitoring procurement and public spending across regions > * OECD and other research on governance risks in infrastructure investment {% hint style="info" %} **Key lesson**\ Infrastructure investment and information integrity are closely linked. Integrating independent scrutiny can strengthen accountability, credibility, and public trust.[OECD - Anti-corruption and infrastructure governance](https://www.oecd.org/en/about/projects/infrastructure-anti-corruption.html) {% endhint %} # Case Study 5: Regulatory risk and political capture in media reform Regulatory reform and risks of political capture (EMFA implementation) {% hint style="info" %} ### **Core issue** Legal and regulatory reforms can fail to deliver meaningful change where institutions are subject to political capture or weak enforcement. {% endhint %} ### **Context** The [European Media Freedom Act](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/protecting-democracy/european-media-freedom-act_en) (EMFA) aims to strengthen media freedom across the EU by addressing issues such as: * independence of media regulators * transparency of media ownership * protection of public service media However, implementation depends heavily on national-level institutions, governance conditions, and political dynamics. ### **What happened** Assessments of media regulation and reform processes across parts of Europe, including candidate and neighbouring countries, point to persistent risks of regulatory capture. These include: * politicised or insufficiently independent regulatory bodies * weak or inconsistent enforcement of existing rules * concentration of media ownership linked to political or economic interests * cross-border influence that bypasses or undermines national regulatory frameworks In such contexts, formal alignment with EU standards has not consistently translated into effective implementation. ### **Why this matters** This case illustrates that legal and regulatory reform alone is insufficient where underlying governance conditions are weak. Consultations and sector evidence highlight that: * reforms may be implemented in form but not in practice * regulatory tools can be applied selectively or inconsistently * independent media actors may remain structurally vulnerable Without addressing these dynamics, support to regulatory reform risks reinforcing systems that do not function as intended. ### **Implications for practice** * Integrate **political economy analysis** into the design of regulatory and policy support * Assess not only legal frameworks, but also **institutional independence and enforcement capacity** * Support **independent oversight actors** (including media and civil society) alongside formal institutions * Recognise and address **cross-border influences** affecting national media systems * Combine regulatory reform with **longer-term support to media viability and resilience** ### **Most relevant for** * [**Heads of Mission / Ambassadors**:](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) Understanding political dynamics affecting regulatory credibility and reform outcomes * [**Programme and project managers**:](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) Designing interventions that go beyond formal legal alignment * [**Policy officers / thematic specialists**:](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) Ensuring regulatory support reflects systemic risks and constraints * [**Communications teams**:](/toolkit/role/communications-teams) Communicating reforms in ways that manage expectations and avoid legitimising ineffective or captured systems {% hint style="info" %} ### **Linked principles** * [**Principle 1**](/toolkit/principle/1-do-no-harm) **– Ensure support does no harm** * [**Principle 3**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) **– Take a whole-of-system approach** {% endhint %} > **Evidence base (to be added)** > > * Consultation inputs highlighting risks of regulatory capture and uneven implementation > * Regional assessments of media regulation and governance (e.g. South East Europe and neighbouring regions) > * Public information and analysis related to the European Media Freedom Act and its implementation challenges > * [European Commission - European Media Freedom Act](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/protecting-democracy/european-media-freedom-act_en)​ > * ​[SEENPM: Regional assessments of media regulation and implementation challenges](https://seenpm.org/regional-collection-risk-assessments-of-digital-platform-and-media-regulation-in-see/) {% hint style="info" %} ### **Key lesson** Regulatory reform is not only a legal process. Without attention to political and institutional dynamics, formal improvements may not translate into real change. {% endhint %} # Case study 6: Local leadership and adapting compliance frameworks (Digital Democracy Initiative {% hint style="info" %} ### **Core issue** Donor compliance requirements can limit the ability of local organisations to access and manage funding, constraining local leadership and the effectiveness of media support. {% endhint %} ### **Context** Many donor-funded media development programmes are designed and administered through international intermediaries due to fiduciary, legal, and administrative requirements. While these safeguards are intended to reduce risk, they can unintentionally restrict the role of local organisations, particularly where compliance capacity is limited. The Digital Democracy Initiative (DDI), supported by multiple European donors, was designed to address this constraint by enabling greater local leadership while maintaining accountability standards. ### **What happened** The DDI programme introduced funding and implementation approaches aimed enable locally led responses to challenges such as disinformation and declining media trust. These included: * channeling funding through consortia that include strong local partners * investing in compliance and administrative capacity of local organisations * allowing greater flexibility in programme design and implementation * accepting higher levels of operational risk in exchange for stronger local ownership Rather than treating compliance as a barrier to participation, the programme incorporated compliance support as part of its intervention model. ### **Why this matters** Consultations highlight that many local organisations are effectively excluded from direct funding due to complex donor requirements, despite having strong contextual knowledge and networks. This case illustrates that compliance barriers are not fixed constraints and can be addressed through programme design. Consultations and sector evidence highlight that: * risk management approaches shape who can access and lead funding * local leadership requires structural adjustments in how funding is delivered, not only increased financial support Without such adjustments, support may reinforce dependency on intermediaries and limit long-term sustainability. ### **Implications for practice** * Treat **compliance capacity as a development objective**, not only a precondition for funding * Design funding mechanisms that enable **local actors to lead**, rather than only implement * Build **longer-term partnerships** that support institutional strengthening * Adjust **risk management approaches** to enable greater local ownership * Ensure flexibility is matched by **clear and proportionate accountability mechanisms** ### **Most relevant for** * [**Senior management and strategy leads**:](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads) Defining acceptable risk thresholds and funding approaches * [**Heads of Mission / Ambassadors**:](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) Supporting locally led approaches in-country and navigating institutional constraints * [**Programme and project managers**:](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) Designing funding mechanisms and partnership models * [**Policy officers / thematic specialists**:](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) Setting priorities around localisation and risk {% hint style="info" %} ### **Linked principles** * [**Principle 4**](/toolkit/principle/4-support-local-leadership-and-ownership) **– Strengthen local leadership and ownership** * [**Principle 2**](/toolkit/principle/2-increase-the-amount-and-effectiveness-of-funding) **– Increase financial and other forms of support** {% endhint %} > **Evidence base** > > * Consultation inputs referencing the Digital Democracy Initiative as an example of adapting compliance frameworks to support local leadership > * Public information and programme documentation available via the Digital Democracy Initiative > * Broader sector evidence highlighting compliance barriers as a constraint to localisation in media development support {% hint style="info" %} ### **Key lesson** Local ownership requires adapting donor systems, incentives, and risk frameworks. Without this, funding may not translate into meaningful local leadership. {% endhint %} # Case study 7: Coordination challenges and joint responses in crisis contexts Coordinating support for Ukraine and Lebanon {% hint style="info" %} ### **Core issue** Limited coordination between donors and implementing partners can lead to duplication, inefficiencies, and increased administrative burden, particularly in crisis contexts where rapid support is required. {% endhint %} ### **Context** In crisis and post-crisis environments, media support often involves a large number of donors, implementing organisations, and local partners operating simultaneously. While this can mobilise significant resources, it also creates risks of fragmentation, including: * overlapping or duplicative interventions * gaps in coverage and support * increased administrative and reporting burdens for media organisations Coordination mechanisms are often introduced to address these challenges, but their effectiveness varies depending on design, participation, and incentives. ### **What happened** This case illustrates both the potential and limitations of coordination mechanisms in crisis contexts. In Ukraine, donor coordination structures established following the 2014 Euromaidan events, and further developed in response to the 2022 full-scale invasion, have aimed to align funding priorities, share information, and reduce duplication. These mechanisms have included: * shared mapping of projects and funding streams * regular information-sharing meetings * collaboration between donors, implementing organisations, and local actors In Lebanon, following the 2020 Beirut port explosion, media support organisations and donors established a joint coordination mechanism and a Media Recovery Fund to align funding and respond to urgent needs. These approaches have enabled: * joint fundraising and resource mobilisation * coordinated allocation of support across multiple priority areas * stronger alignment with local needs through collaboration with national actors However, across both contexts, consultations and sector analysis highlight persistent challenges: * coordination often remains focused on information sharing rather than joint strategy * donor participation can be limited or inconsistent * competition for funding can reduce incentives to share information * coordination mechanisms can add to administrative burden if not streamlined ### **Why this matters** This case illustrates that coordination is widely recognised as essential but is difficult to sustain and operationalise effectively. Consultations and sector evidence highlight that: * without coordination, duplication and inefficiencies increase * poorly designed coordination mechanisms may have limited impact beyond information exchange * sustained coordination requires incentives, resources, and clear leadership In crisis contexts, these challenges are amplified by urgency, scale, and rapidly changing needs. ### **Implications for practice** * Move beyond information sharing to support **joint planning and strategic alignment** * Ensure coordination mechanisms are **adequately resourced and sustained over time** * Align donor incentives to encourage **collaboration rather than competition** * Reduce administrative burden by **streamlining reporting and funding processes** * Prioritise **local actor participation and leadership** in coordination efforts ### **Most relevant for** * [**Senior management and strategy leads**:](/toolkit/role/senior-management-strategy-leads) Defining coordination priorities and aligning funding approaches across actors * [**Heads of Mission / Ambassadors**:](/toolkit/role/heads-of-mission-ambassadors) Supporting coordination at country level and engaging with other donors and stakeholders * [**Programme and project managers**:](/toolkit/role/programme-and-project-managers) Aligning programmes with existing initiatives and reducing duplication * [**Policy officers / thematic specialists**:](/toolkit/role/policy-officers-thematic-specialists) Ensuring coherence between interventions and supporting system-level approaches {% hint style="info" %} ### **Linked principles** * [**Principle 5**](/toolkit/principle/5-improve-coordination) **– Improve coordination of support** * [**Principle 3**](/toolkit/principle/3-adopt-a-whole-of-system-approach) **– Take a whole-of-system approach** {% endhint %} > **Evidence base** > > * Consultation inputs highlighting coordination challenges and practices in crisis and transition contexts > * Evidence from coordination mechanisms in Ukraine and Lebanon and\ > GFMD research and analysis on coordination of media assistance > * [Coordination of media support to Ukraine, including donor coordination groups and information-sharing initiatives](https://gfmd.info/coordination-of-media-assistance-in-ukraine/) > * [Coordinating Media Assistance and Journalism Support Efforts](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SXCDFckkWpLspejBA49ecYGHoE8baHdNEfz2tnzsWX4/edit?usp=sharing) - Ukraine and Lebanon {% hint style="info" %} ### **Key lesson** Coordination is essential for effective media support, but it does not happen automatically. It requires sustained incentives, resources, and alignment between donors and implementing partners to move beyond information sharing toward collective impact. {% endhint %} # Go deeper # Evidence and arguments The why. Evidence and arguments for supporting independent media and the information environment depending on your key objectives and mandate. #### 🧭 Evidence and Arguments This section brings together the evidence base that links media freedom and information integrity to broader development, governance, and security objectives - from sustainable development and economic growth to democratic resilience and stability. It demonstrates why supporting independent journalism is not only a rights commitment but also a practical investment in effective governance, stability, and prosperity. # Development goals Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) ### **Why media and access to information matter for the SDGs** Independent media are not simply instruments for communication — they are *enablers* of development. Free and pluralistic information ecosystems make it possible for citizens, communities, and governments to identify problems, monitor progress, and hold institutions to account. Without credible public information, the [**Sustainable Development Goals**](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs) (SDGs) risk becoming aspirational rather than operational. **The 2030 Agenda in Context** Adopted by all UN Member States in 2015, the [**2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development**](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-goals/) set out 17 Goals and 169 targets to address poverty, inequality, human rights, peace, justice, and climate action. Achieving these goals requires transparent institutions, informed citizens, and mechanisms for accountability — all of which depend on a healthy information environment. While states bear primary responsibility for implementing the SDGs, progress depends on cooperation between governments, civil society, and the private sector. The European Union, through its development cooperation and external action, plays a key role in enabling these partnerships — but this work can only succeed where citizens have access to trustworthy information and the freedom to participate in public debate. ### **SDG 16.10 - Public Access to Information and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms** [**SDG 16**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16) calls for “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, access to justice for all, and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions.”\ Target 16.10 commits governments to “ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.” This target cannot be achieved through legislation alone. Access to information laws must be accompanied by independent media that can *request, interpret, and translate* data into public understanding and policy accountability. In practice, media are the vehicle through which the right to information becomes a lived reality. ### **Why support for independent media is central to SDG 16.10** * **Turning rights into practice:** Laws on access to information are ineffective without actors able to use them. Journalists and media outlets transform data and legal rights into actionable public knowledge. * **Accountability and oversight:** Investigative and local media make institutions more transparent, deterring corruption and misuse of public funds. * **Participation and empowerment:** Informed citizens are more likely to engage in democratic and development processes, improving social cohesion and trust. **Policy responses and implementation trends**\ Policymakers and donors pursuing SDG 16.10 increasingly: * Enact and implement access to information laws with enforcement mechanisms. * Protect journalists and sources through legal and safety frameworks. * Invest in independen and community media to ensure diverse, local coverage. * Support journalism training, research, and cross-sector media development. * Integrate information access and media freedom into SDG monitoring frameworks and ODA reporting. ### **Why a healthy information environment underpins *****all***** SDGs** Access to trustworthy information is both a right in itself and a multiplier across the entire 2030 Agenda. | **SDG Area** | **How media enable progress** | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Good governance & peace (**[**SDG 16**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16)**)** | Strengthens accountability, reduces corruption, and builds public trust in institutions — improving efficiency and legitimacy of development spending. | | **Health & climate (SDG** [**3**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3) **&** [**13**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal13)**)** | Trusted reporting and public information campaigns increase uptake of health services, support evidence-based climate action, and foster behavioural change. | | **Economic growth & innovation (SDG** [**8**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal8) **&** [**9**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal9)**)** | Free media expose corruption, provide reliable market information, and attract responsible investment. As Joseph Stiglitz notes, “Free and independent media can expose corruption, provide a voice for citizens, and enable markets to work better.” | | **Gender equality & inclusion (SDG** [**5**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal5) **&** [**10**](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal10)**)** | Independent media amplify marginalised voices and document inequality, contributing to more inclusive policy design. | In short, *information integrity is development integrity*. \ **Public interest media create the conditions for every other SDG to succeed:** better governance delivers better services; informed citizens make better choices; transparent markets drive fairer growth. > ***“Free and independent media can expose corruption in government and the corporate sector, provide a voice for citizens to be heard, help build public consensus to bring about change, and enable markets to work better by providing reliable economic information”*** > > **–** [**Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize laureate in Economics**](https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/opinion/IHT-third-world-development-strategies-a-free-press-is-crucial-in.html) {% hint style="info" %} #### Key Takeaway Supporting independent media and access to information is not an optional add-on to development cooperation — it is a prerequisite for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.\ For donors and partner governments, integrating media and information integrity into development strategies means investing in the infrastructure of accountability: the systems that enable citizens to access reliable information, hold power to account, and shape their societies. {% endhint %} **For more information, follow these links:** {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} # Economic prosperity This section shows how independent media drive growth, innovation, and accountability. It positions journalism as essential economic infrastructure for sustainable prosperity and stability. ### **Linking Media Support to Economic Prosperity** Just as access to information is vital for achieving social and developmental goals, it is equally foundational to economic growth and stability. Reliable, independent journalism underpins trust in markets, strengthens governance, and enables innovation. When media systems fail, corruption flourishes, investment declines, and misinformation distorts competition. Supporting public-interest media is therefore not only a democratic priority — it is an economic strategy for resilience and long-term prosperity. ### **Why public interest media are an economic investment** Independent journalism is not only a democratic good — it is an economic necessity.\ Free and pluralistic media create the informational conditions that markets, investors, and societies depend on to function. They enhance governance, expose corruption, increase transparency, and build the trust that sustains economic growth. As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz observes, “Free and independent media can expose corruption in government and the corporate sector, provide a voice for citizens to be heard, help build public consensus to bring about change, and enable markets to work better by providing reliable economic information.” **The economic case: media as infrastructure for prosperity** The [*High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media*](https://informationdemocracy.org/the-high-level-panel-on-public-interest-media/) compares independent journalism to **“the central banks of the informational economy”** — institutions that provide the confidence necessary for economies to function. In an age defined by data and digitalisation, every sector — from education and health to energy, trade, and defence — depends on a reliable supply of verified knowledge. {% embed url="" %} Public interest media contribute to prosperity in at least four interlinked ways: 1. **Supporting growth and stability** * Research across almost 100 countries shows a clear correlation between press freedom and GDP growth: economies with freer media experience higher standards of living and more stable investment climates. * Investigative journalism strengthens market integrity. The [*Panama Papers*](https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/) led to more than **USD 1.86 billion** in recovered taxes worldwide — including **€450 million in France alone** — demonstrating the measurable fiscal return of public-interest reporting. 2. **Improving governance and investment conditions** * Countries with strong, independent media attract more sustainable investment. Media oversight reduces corruption, strengthens accountability, and limits policy uncertainty — all of which improve investor confidence and reduce risk premiums. * Studies by the World Bank and OECD show that freedom of information and robust media systems are directly linked to effective control of corruption and the efficiency of public spending. 3. **Enabling innovation and competitiveness** * Public-interest media fuel innovation by ensuring informed debate, identifying societal needs, and exposing inefficiencies. Economists emphasise that innovation ecosystems depend on *trusted information flows* — the transparent exchange of ideas across sectors. * When journalism collapses, innovation slows: misinformation raises uncertainty, distorts incentives, and weakens the feedback loops essential to technological progress. 4. **Protecting Europe’s information economy** * The digital advertising market has decoupled profit from truth, sending billions in revenue to low-quality or fraudulent content while starving independent outlets. This constitutes a market failure that undermines competitiveness. * Rebalancing digital markets through fair revenue-sharing, algorithmic transparency, and public-interest investment is therefore an economic reform — not only a democratic one. ### **Why this matters for EU economic and industrial policy** Public interest media form part of the democratic, digital, and economic infrastructure that underpins societies and markets. They enable the conditions for competitive markets and long-term prosperity by: * **Attracting sustainable investment:** Transparent and trustworthy information reduces risk and strengthens investor confidence. * **Ensuring fair competition:** Media pluralism curbs monopolies, deters corruption, and encourages equitable market participation. * **Improving fiscal governance:** Investigative and data-driven journalism expose tax abuse, illicit finance, and fraud, directly improving public revenues. * **Enhancing productivity and innovation:** Reliable information empowers entrepreneurs, consumers, and policymakers to make better, evidence-based decisions. Recognising journalism as a public good allows governments and investors to apply the same long-term policy instruments used for other essential infrastructure — ensuring that economies are built on transparency, trust, and accountability. ### **Policy implications** * **Treat journalism as economic infrastructure:** Integrate support for media viability into competitiveness, innovation, and investment frameworks. * **Blend financing tools:** Combine grants, concessional loans, and equity mechanisms to attract private and impact investment while safeguarding editorial independence. * **Correct digital market failures:** Enforce transparency in advertising and algorithmic systems, and ensure fair value distribution between platforms and publishers. * **Support local and cross-border innovation:** Invest in independent media SMEs and new business models as part of ongoing digital and market transitions. * **Strengthen fiscal accountability:** Fund investigative and cross-border reporting that exposes illicit financial flows and improves governance efficiency. {% hint style="info" %} #### Key takeaway Media freedom is not only a matter of values - it is a matter of value.\ A healthy, independent information ecosystem makes economies more transparent, innovative, and resilient. Investing in trustworthy media is therefore an **economic imperative** — essential to competitiveness, fiscal integrity, and long-term prosperity. {% endhint %} # Epistemic security This section defines epistemic security as the basis for reliable decision-making. It shows how protecting knowledge systems strengthens democracy and resilience. ### **What it means and why it matters** **Epistemic security** is the capacity of societies to produce, distribute, and use reliable information so that public beliefs and decisions - by citizens, institutions, and governments - are grounded in truth, evidence, and accountable processes.\ When this capacity is weakened, misinformation and manipulation distort decision-making, erode trust in institutions, and undermine both democratic and economic resilience. Recent research describes epistemic security as distinct from - but interdependent with - information integrity and media freedom. Where information integrity concerns the *quality* of content, epistemic security concerns the *stability of the knowledge system itself*: how societies know what they know, and whether those processes remain trustworthy. ### **Why threats to epistemic security are urgent** Across Europe and globally, information systems face structural threats: coordinated disinformation campaigns, opaque platform algorithms, synthetic media, and the unchecked use of generative AI. These forces increase the speed, scale, and credibility of false information, compromising elections, public health, and crisis response. The effects are cumulative. When decision-makers act on distorted information, errors multiply: vaccine hesitancy rises, emergency resources are misallocated, and climate action stalls. Such *epistemic harms* cascade into policy, social, and economic harms. Strengthening epistemic security therefore reduces downstream governance and fiscal costs while improving societal resilience. ### **How to build epistemic resilience** No single intervention can secure a society’s knowledge system. Effective strategies combine legal, technical, educational, and civic measures that reinforce one another. Research and practice highlight five interlocking levers for policy action: 1. **Cross-sector coordination**\ Treat epistemic security as a whole-of-government issue linking national security, public health, education, and communications. Establish inter-ministerial and civil-society taskforces to align actions and avoid duplication. 2. **Measurement and monitoring**\ Commission ecosystem mapping, exposure studies, and resilience indices to understand vulnerabilities. As policy institutes note: you cannot manage what you cannot measure. 3. **Investment in public-interest information**\ Fund independent journalism, local reporting, and fact-checking networks as the operational backbone of epistemic security. Plural, trustworthy media enable societies to detect and correct informational threats. 4. **Platform accountability and algorithmic transparency**\ Require clear disclosure of content-moderation and amplification systems, mandate independent audits, and enforce crisis-communication protocols that prioritise verified information while safeguarding freedom of expression. 5. **Public information resilience**\ Support media and digital literacy, trusted scientific and community intermediaries, and pre-tested emergency communication playbooks that help citizens navigate uncertainty and recognise manipulation. ### **Policy implications** Strengthening epistemic security demands long-term investment in evidence, cooperation, and public trust. Policymakers should: * Integrate epistemic-security objectives into digital, research, and education strategies at national, regional, and international levels. * Fund interdisciplinary R\&D on counter-AI misinformation tools and measurement frameworks. * Embed rights-based safeguards - such as independent oversight and sunset clauses - to prevent misuse of “security” framing. * Support civil society and academia as independent monitors of information-ecosystem health. {% hint style="info" %} #### Key takeaway Epistemic security is the foundation on which democratic decision-making, economic stability, and social cohesion depend.\ Protecting the integrity of knowledge systems - through trusted media, accountable platforms, and informed publics -is not an abstract ideal but a **strategic necessity** for security, prosperity, and societal resilience in the information age. {% endhint %} # Information integrity This section explains how reliable, trustworthy information underpins democracy and stability. It shows why supporting media, regulation, and literacy is vital to protect information integrity. ### **What it means and why it matters** Information integrity refers to the accuracy, consistency and reliability of information, as well as the systems and processes through which it is created, distributed and received. In a modern media-ecosystem, weak information integrity undermines public debate, erodes trust in institutions, and compromises decision-making at all levels — from individual citizens up to governments. Information integrity is deeply interwoven with media health and freedom: when the structures of independent journalism collapse, the informational “pipes and filters” of public life become distorted. In their publication '[*Facts not Fakes*](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/03/facts-not-fakes-tackling-disinformation-strengthening-information-integrity_ff96d19f/d909ff7a-en.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)', the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) notes, “the accelerated spread of false or misleading information … creates confusion and exacerbates polarisation, distorts public-policy debates, and further deteriorates trust in government.” ### **Why strengthening information integrity is urgent now** Several structural trends are undermining information integrity across contexts: * Digital platforms, generative AI and advanced tools have accelerated the spread of manipulated or superficially credible content, making the “volume, velocity and veracity” of information a strategic challenge. {% embed url="" %} * When information environments are degraded — be it through echo-chambers, algorithmic bias, or deliberate disinformation campaigns — the consequences ripple into governance, public health, crisis response, and national resilience. For example, distorted information leads to mis-allocation of resources, public confusion in emergencies, and weakened institutional legitimacy. {% embed url="" %} * Governments, civil society and industry now recognise that maintaining information integrity is a public good and a strategic policy priority — not a side issue. ### **How to support and sustain information integrity** Achieving robust information integrity requires coordinated action across the ecosystem — not just regulation of platforms or support for media alone. The OECD identifies [three complementary policy dimensions](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/03/facts-not-fakes-tackling-disinformation-strengthening-information-integrity_ff96d19f/d909ff7a-en.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com): (i) transparency, accountability and plurality of information sources, (ii) societal resilience to disinformation, and (iii) institutional and governance frameworks that uphold the integrity of the information space. Key policy levers for sustainably supporting information integrity include: * **Safeguarding plural and trustworthy media outlets**: Independent journalism and local media act as filters, watchdogs and translators of raw information into public knowledge. * **Regulating and auditing digital platforms**: Ensuring transparency in algorithms, advertising and content-moderation mechanisms — especially in crisis or high-risk situations. * **Investing in measurement and research**: Commissioning ecosystem mapping, resilience indices, exposure studies and tools to monitor and diagnose information integrity across contexts. * **Strengthening public information resilience**: Supporting media- and digital-literacy initiatives, trusted messengers, community-level intermediaries, and rapid-response communication playbooks for crisis settings. * **Embedding cross-sector governance**: Approaching information integrity as a whole-of-government and multi-stakeholder issue — involving communications, security, health, education and technology sectors. ### **Policy implications for policymakers and donors** For the European Union and member states, embedding information integrity into broader policy frameworks means: * Recognising information integrity as **core infrastructure** of democratic societies and markets, deserving sustained and strategic investment. * Adopting blended funding models that support media viability, platform accountability and public-information resilience together. * Ensuring regulatory frameworks (e.g. platform governance frameworks such as the EU’s Digital Services Act) are paired with strong enforcement, multidisciplinary research, and independent oversight. * Prioritising local and regional media ecosystems as part of the “information-infrastructure” of democratic societies — including support for underserved communities and language-minority regions. {% hint style="info" %} #### Key Takeaway Information integrity is not simply a technical term — it is the foundation upon which trust, participation and effective decision-making rest. Supporting independent media, strengthening platform accountability, and investing in resilient information ecosystems are therefore not optional extras: they are **essential enablers** of democracy, security and economic stability in the 21st-century information environment. {% endhint %} # Guides for donors & funders Most recently published or updated toolkits and guides for media development donors ## [Shifting Power with Partners (2024)](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/shifting-power-with-partners_7987e8db-en.html) #### OECD Toolkit for Implementing the DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian AssistanceReport. {% embed url="" %} ## [Funding Civil Society in Partner Countries (2023)](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/funding-civil-society-in-partner-countries_9ea40a9c-en.html) #### OECD Toolkit for Implementing the DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance. {% embed url="" %} ## [PRESSProtect: Everything you need to support journalist safety in one place (2022)](https://pressprotect.ecpmf.eu/#search) **European Centre for Press and Media Freedom** {% embed url="" %} "PRESSProtect provides information about support funds for emergency situations as well as resources to prevent threats. It focuses on living expenses, psychosocial support and medical aid, support for digital and physical safety, relocation, legal support and support in exile." ## [Best Practices in Development Co-operation (2021)](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/best-practices-in-development-co-operation_d571f17c-en) **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)** {% embed url="" %} *"The international principles and standards for development co-operation set by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) come in different forms. While a few become official, legally binding OECD instruments, most of them are only indicative, yet very influential guidance documents as they represent the political will of Adherents. This series brings them together."* The most recent principles and standards were released on June 18, 2021. ## [How to Fund Investigative Journalism: Insights from the Field and its Key Donors (2020)](https://akademie.dw.com/en/how-to-fund-investigative-journalism/a-55039200) **DW Akademie - SAMEER PADANIA** {% embed url="" %} > [**This report**](https://www.dw.com/downloads/55038461/dwa-investigative-journalism-web.pdf) **is designed to give funders a succinct and accessible introduction to the practice of funding** [**investigative journalism**](https://www.dw.com/en/dw-akademie/investigative-journalism-and-media-development/s-50364390) **around the world**, via major contemporary debates, trends and challenges in the field. It is part of a series from DW Akademie looking at practices, challenges and futures of investigative journalism around the world. > > [The paper](https://www.dw.com/downloads/55038461/dwa-investigative-journalism-web.pdf) is intended as a stepping stone, or a springboard, for those who know little about [investigative journalism](https://www.dw.com/en/dw-akademie/investigative-journalism-and-media-development/s-50364390), but who would like to know more. It is not a defense, a mapping or a history of the field, either globally or regionally; nor is it a description of or guide to how to conduct investigations or an examination of investigative techniques. These are widely available in other areas and (to some extent) in other languages already. > > Rooted in 17 in-depth expert interviews and wide-ranging desk research, [**this report**](https://www.dw.com/downloads/55038461/dwa-investigative-journalism-web.pdf) **sets out big-picture challenges and opportunities facing the investigative journalism** field both in general, and in specific regions of the world. It provides donors with an overview of the main ways this often precarious field is financed in newsrooms and units large and small. Finally **it provides high-level practical advice – from experienced donors and the** [**investigative journalism**](https://www.dw.com/en/dw-akademie/investigative-journalism-and-media-development/s-50364390) **field – to help new, prospective or curious donors to the field to find out how to get started, and what is important to do, and not to do**. ## [The Role of Media in Creating Inclusive, Just and Peaceful Societies: Guidelines for SDC Media Assistance (2020)](https://www.shareweb.ch/site/DDLGN/Documents/Media%20Assistance%20EN%20200312%20web.pdf) **Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)** #### [**Guidelines for SDC media assistance - online version**](https://www.shareweb.ch/site/DDLGN/guidelinesandpolicy/MediaSupport/GuidelinesForSDCmediaAssistanceEN/SitePages/Home.aspx) {% embed url="" %} The guidance provides an overall understanding of the media sector and its reference framework, as well as needs assessments for various media types, information on SDC’s approach to media assistance, and a range of media interventions. It also offers guidance on how to assess and mitigate risks and how to monitor and evaluate media work. {% embed url="" %} The guidance aims to give SDC staff and members of the DDLG network an updated view on media development. The guidance provides an overall understanding of the media sector and its reference framework, as well as needs assessments for various media types, information on SDC’s approach to media assistance, and a range of media interventions. It also offers guidance on how to assess and mitigate risks and how to monitor and evaluate media work. {% embed url="" %} * [Lignes directrices de la DDC pour le soutien aux médias - version en ligne](https://www.shareweb.ch/site/DDLGN/guidelinesandpolicy/MediaSupport/GuidelinesForSDCmediaAssistanceFR/SitePages/Home.aspx) * [Promouvoir l’avènement de sociétés ouvertes, équitables et pacifiques: le rôle des médias: Lignes directrices de la DDC pour le soutien aux médias](https://www.shareweb.ch/site/DDLGN/Documents/Media%20Assistance%20FR%20200312%20web.pdf) ## [Decoding Media Impact: Insights, Advice and Recommendations (2020)](https://mediaimpactfunders.org/reports/decoding-media-impact-insights-advice-recommendations/) **Media Impact Funders - KATIE DONNELLY** {% embed url="" %} > This report provides an examination of the current state of the field of media impact assessment, which Media Impact Funders (MIF) has been tracking for seven years. It also draws on insights from a few leading experts engaged in media impact assessment. ## [Guidelines for EU support to media freedom and media integrity in enlargement countries, 2014-2020](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/press_corner/elarg-guidelines-for-media-freedom-and-integrity_210214.pdf) **European Commission** {% hint style="info" %} Download the guidelines [here](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/press_corner/elarg-guidelines-for-media-freedom-and-integrity_210214.pdf). {% endhint %} The guidelines cover: * Freedom of expression and media * The EU's enlargement agenda for media freedom and media integrity, which includes; the enabling environment for free expression and media; media outlets assuming responsibility for improved internal governance and production; increasing capacity and representativeness of journalist professional organisations. * Measuring results and impact * A draft results framework ## [Guidelines for EU Support to Media Freedom and Media Integrity in Enlargement Countries 2014-2020 (2014)](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/guidelines-eu-support-media-freedom-and-media-integrity-enlargement-countries-2014-2020_en) **European Commission** {% file src="/files/SjYUNdMysKlEdHBtuMvj" %} ***"**Freedom of expression is a fundamental right safeguarded by international law, including the European Convention on Human Rights, and forms an integral part of the functioning of a pluralistic democracy. It belongs to the values on which the European Union is founded (as referred to in Article 2, the Treaty on European Union).The respect of these values and commitment to promote them is the main criteria to assess the aspirations of a country to become a member of the Union (Article 49, ibid.). Thereafter freedom of expression is an intrinsic part of the Copenhagen political criteria for accession to the European Union.* *It should be underlined that while being a fundamental human right, freedom of expression and media is often precondition for implementation of other rights and freedoms. Deprived of a free media, citizens are denied the right to balanced, factual and reliable information, without exposure to bias and propaganda that in turn is undermining democracy and the effectiveness of institutions. The pluralistic content in the media landscape serves to reveal the multifaceted nature of society and promotes dialogue and tolerance. Critical scrutiny by media of the political processes guarantees their transparency and ensures that governments adhere to predictable policies – free from the interests of narrow pressure groups. Al in all this improves the governance in the given accession country, and thus creates confidence in future Member States."* ## [Sida's Guidelines for Media Development (2010)](https://cdn.sida.se/publications/files/sida61274en-sidas-guidelines-for-media-development.pdf) **Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) - ANDREW PUDDEPHATT** {% hint style="info" %} The full document is available [here](https://cdn.sida.se/publications/files/sida61274en-sidas-guidelines-for-media-development.pdf). {% endhint %} > In developing guidelines for media development interventions it is important to understand how the media supports democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Without a diverse and plural media environment that provides widespread access to information and debate, democratic politics cannot flourish and government cannot be held to account for its actions by the wider population. By acting as a platform for exchanging information the media plays an important role in ensuring the transparency of a society. And of course media helps ensure accountability of public administration by highlighting the actions of public officials and correcting the natural asymmetries of information between governed and governing. In this way media devel- opment programmes can support development objectives. For some years there have been concerns that aid programmes will only be effective and serve the interests of the poor if they are fully transparent and accounta- ble – an independent pluralistic media can help ensure this. > > Media environments capable of supporting democracy can be thought of as the corner sections of a triangle. > > * the legal and regulatory environment; > * professional capacity (both managerial, technical and journalistic); > * a sound and sustainable base. The guidelines cover: * **Media that serves democracy, human rights and development:** legal and regulatory environment, professional capacity, sustainability. * **Media Development:** Authoritarian states: Countries with democracy and human rights deficit, conflict and post-conflict situations, fragile democracies in the early stages of democratisation, stagnating democratisation processes, new democracies in the process of consolidation * **Media Development Indicators:** regulation and legal framework, possible, professional capacity, economic sustainability. # Studies, reports & briefings Resources relevant to implementation of the principles in order of publication, with the most recent featured first. ## [The Value of journalism](https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000398492) (June 2026) A new global evidence review commissioned by UNESCO in partnership with IFPIM and DW Akademie, demonstrates that free and independent media has a profound and positive impact on societies globally. {% embed url="" %} [The State of Media Development Report](https://akademie.dw.com/en/state-of-media-development-report-2026/a-76301549) (Apr. 2026) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This report takes stock of the current situation for organizations engaged in expanding and strengthening spaces for reliable information world-wide. It’s alarming, but organizations see a clear path forward. {% embed url="" %} ## [Safeguarding Media Freedom in the Age of Big Tech Platforms and AI](https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/598525) (Oct. 2025) This [policy manual](https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/598525) highlights how the current digital information ecosystem — dominated by Big Tech platforms (very large social media and search engines) – has become increasingly captured in ways that undermine media freedom. It underscores the need for democratic state intervention based on rule of law to ensure an enabling environment for independent, pluralistic journalism. The Manual offers a vision for healthy online information spaces, where the availability and accessibility of high-quality, public interest information is ensured. The Policy Manual puts forward urgent mitigation measures and key recommendations for States to implement long-term structural reforms and sustained investments to address the distortions in today’s online information ecosystem. {% embed url="" %} ## TED Network desktop study of EU funding to media and information integrity (2025) The study of EU funding to media and information integrity analyses the extent to which existing practices align with the principles and includes a summary of discussion with EU Member States. Please contact the TED Network Secretariat to access the report. ## [The State of Media Development](https://akademie.dw.com/en/the-state-of-media-development-vis-%C3%A0-vis-the-oecd-principles/a-71897327) (Apr. 2025) DW Akademie A new report by DW Akademie's think tank DW Freedom takes a thorough look at the media development sector, a crucial part of international cooperation. It offers recommendations for its organizations and their funders. {% embed url="" %} ## [Media Viability Manifesto](https://mediaviabilitymanifesto.org/) (2024) The MVM provides a common framework for joint action from the global media development community and aims to foster strategic collaboration and coordinated implementation. GFMD has been a member of the coalition of organisations that developed the manifesto and is well-placed to ensure that it is incorporated into the Toolkit. {% embed url="" %} ## [Mapping ODA to media and information environment integrity](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/GOVNET\(2023\)13/en/pdf) (June 2024) OECD This OECD report reflects findings from a quantitative mapping of ODA support (from DAC and nonDAC development partners who report to DAC) to public interest media and the broader information environment, and a qualitative review of development partners’ policies and practices through four case studies of media assistance to Ukraine/Western Balkans, Myanmar, Tanzania and global core funding programmes since 2016. {% embed url="" %} ## [**Transforming Media Development – Recommendations for Effective Funding and Collaboration**](https://gfmd.info/briefings/transforming-media-development/) **(June 2023)** GFMD This GFMD study is based on a body of desk research as well as a series of online interviews with GFMD members from Eastern Europe, Asia and South America. It documents the challenges that GFMD’s members face daily in their attempts to raise funds and live up to donor expectations on reporting and accountability. {% embed url="" %} ## [Coordinating media assistance & journalism support](https://impact.gfmd.info/activities-services/mediadev-principles) (Nov. 2022) GFMD In the context of the process to ["Renew the principles for effective media assistance"](https://impact.gfmd.info/activities-services/mediadev-principles) GFMD IMPACT has produced a report on "Coordinating Media Assistance and Journalism Support Efforts" which analyses the scope and focus of media assistance coordination efforts (in Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine and in a few other cases), highlighting common pitfalls as well as best practice. The report presents a set of recommendations for practical steps that could be used to orchestrate future coordination initiatives, including in conflict and emergency situations. #### How to access the report [**Summary of the key findings and recommendations**](https://gfmd.info/briefings/coordinating-media-assistance-journalism-support) **(4 pages)** [**The full report**](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SXCDFckkWpLspejBA49ecYGHoE8baHdNEfz2tnzsWX4/edit?usp=sharing) **(40 pages)** {% embed url="" %} ## [Confronting the Crisis in Independent Media: A Role for International Assistance (2019)](https://www.cima.ned.org/publication/confronting-the-crisis-in-independent-media/) **CIMA- NICHOLAS BENEQUISTA** {% embed url="" %} *"This report argues that complexity is no excuse for inaction. Solutions to this crisis will require that political agency rise to the daunting level of the challenge, and that the structures of international cooperation—forged as the global response to World War II—are now put into motion to safeguard the foundations of independent media."* ## [Recipient Perceptions of Media Development Assistance](https://1400954439-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2F-MMufMUvuw1XZB7k8wBn%2Fuploads%2Fo3n2dZen7BrRfpTwGoQy%2FRecipient%20perception%20of%20media%20development%20assistance%20\(1\).pdf?alt=media\&token=7c9293fc-4fb8-435c-8b7a-b7147f050790) (2019) GFMD {% embed url="" %} # Definitions of key concepts A glossary of terms related to international development aid, media development and journalism support. ### **Asset recovery** > ***Asset recovery** involves* [*finding the proceeds of corruption hidden in foreign jurisdictions and returning them to their country of origin*](https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/22/send-the-bill-to-the-dictator-banks-corruption-stolen-asset-recovery/)*. Asset recovery represents a huge opportunity to find needed development funds and sends a clear message to citizens that corruption is not being tolerated.* *(*[*Brookings Institute, 2021*](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/02/08/the-quiet-revolution-what-congress-should-know-about-foreign-assistance-today/)*)* ### Civil society > *“Occupying the middle ground between the state and private life, the civil sphere encompasses everything from associations to protests to church groups to nongovernmental organisations**.**” (*[*from The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society by M. Edwards, 2011, OUP*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195398571.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195398571)*)* ### **Communication for Development (C4D)** > *Inclusive of approaches known as behavior change communication, social and behavior change, and entertainment-education, C4D traditionally aims to foster pre-determined awareness, attitudes, and ultimately behaviors that have proven to contribute to better health or development.* > > *Well established and relatively well funded, this field boasts the ability to make credible links between donor investments and desired health outcomes.* *(*[*CIMA Book Review of Martin Scott’s Media and Development - 2014*](https://www.cima.ned.org/blog/review-media-development-martin-scott/)*)* ### **De-risking** **innovation** **De-risking** **innovation** **is a term used to describe how** > *"international aid can be leveraged to identify and test new approaches that can then be scaled up by government or the private sector." This approach is used as "governments and the private sector are often not able to take the risks required to develop more cost-effective and scalable solutions." (*[*Brookings Institute, 2021*](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/02/08/the-quiet-revolution-what-congress-should-know-about-foreign-assistance-today/)*)* ### Development finance > *Development finance is the use of* [*public sector resources*](https://www.brookings.edu/research/development-finance-filling-todays-funding-gap/) *to catalyze private capital investments in developing countries. It can take many forms including direct equity investments, loans and loan guarantees, political risk insurance, and technical assistance to identify and accelerate investment projects.* ([Brookings Institute, 2021](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/02/08/the-quiet-revolution-what-congress-should-know-about-foreign-assistance-today/)) See also [*Development finance: Filling today’s funding gap (2018)*](https://www.brookings.edu/research/development-finance-filling-todays-funding-gap/) Brookings Institite - [George Ingram](https://www.brookings.edu/experts/george-ingram/) and [Robert A. Mosbacher, Jr.](https://www.brookings.edu/author/robert-mosbacher-jr/) {% embed url="" %} ### **Digitisation (or Digitalisation)** > *Digital transformation impacts on human society and activities as a whole. This disruptive, transformational process can be described as the ‘digital revolution’ or the third industrial revolution. It is important for the media sector in Namibia to be aware that digitization has taken many forms and advanced in many formats. The media sector is on the cusp of a new wave of disruption as artificial intelligence technologies start to impact the real world, driving greater efficiency and automation on the one hand, but also enabling content to be remixed in unpredictable ways. This hopefully will help media companies do more with less, as well as open up opportunities in the creation and distribution of smarter content. (*[*Media viability: discussion paper for Namibian media*](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23/namibia#regional-and-namibian-resources-on-media-viability)*)* ### **Domestic resource mobilization (DRM)** > ***Domestic resource mobilization (DRM)** is what national governments employ to increase their revenue, particularly through fair, effective, and efficient tax collection. When donor countries and other international organizations help and incentivize governments to carry out DRM more effectively, it also helps them to finance their own development needs. (*[*Brookings Institute, 2021*](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/02/08/the-quiet-revolution-what-congress-should-know-about-foreign-assistance-today/)*)* ### Effectiveness > *What are the best methodologies for helping countries to produce a high-quality, sustainable and independent media? How do we design these programs and measure results?* > > *Those are the questions we are trying to answer by looking at the concept of effectiveness.* > > *Ensuring the effectiveness and improving outcomes from media development interventions is one of the biggest challenges facing not only donors and program implementers but also country-level activists. (*[*CIMA*](http://www.cima.ned.org/what-is-media-development/effectiveness)*)* ### Funding > *Despite the role that media plays in helping to build free and open societies, media development programs are often fragmented and poorly funded, making up a tiny fraction of overall development spending.* > > *The estimated $625 million spent on media development each year comes from a variety of sources, however, including governments and private institutions.* > > *The funding models for media development projects vary from top-down approaches to grassroots investment. (*[*CIMA*](http://www.cima.ned.org/what-is-media-development/funding)*)* ### **Global information environment** > The **global information environment** is the space where humans, and increasingly machines, process information to make sense of the world. > > It includes the norms and rules determining information processing and content, the technologies used (print, radio, TV, digital, etc.) and the different forms in which information is presented (spoken, written, image, etc.) ([Wanless A., 2022\[39\]](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf)) ### **Independent media** > *Media not owned or directly operated by the state, a political party, a religious order, an ethnic entity, a lobby group, or anyone promoting a particular ideology or a particular narrative. It is increasingly difficult to draw clear definitions for independent media: It requires detailed content analysis over time, and the degree of independence can shift as circumstances change. (*[*PRIMED*](https://www.comminit.com/global/content/protecting-independent-media-effective-development-primed-programme-approach-and-glossar)*)* {% hint style="info" %} **Example:** As part of due diligence, the PRIMED project will conduct detailed content analysis to understand the extent of editorial independence of proposed partners. During the PRIMED project, the term "independent media" will be used sparingly to describe outlets that have shown no editorial bias. {% endhint %} ### **Information ecosystem** > An **information ecosystem** is a geographic subset of this information environment where information is processed to generate a shared understanding ([Adam, 2023\[40\]; Radsch, 2023\[41\]](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf)). ### Information integrity > Information integrity refers to the consistency and openness of access to pluralistic sources of verifiable information. > > Information integrity also requires audiences that understand information as originally intended by the producer/sender and an environment characterised by physical and digital safety ([UN, 2023\[42\]](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf)). ### Innovation > *In the 21st century, new practices, new actors, and new arenas are changing the media landscape. Access to information, and access to the technologies that provide that information, are key to success in the information age. With the breathtaking pace of evolution in new technologies, including the spread of mobile phones throughout the world, media developers are finding new ways to achieve their goals. (*[*CIMA*](http://www.cima.ned.org/what-is-media-development/innovation)*)* > *Innovation is the action or process of innovating—creating an invention linked to commercial or social exploitation. This typically entails the exploitation of a new product, service or process leading to results in marketplace commercialisation. It involves a strategic process and can be at a system level, competence level or incremental level. (*[*Media viability: discussion paper for Namibian media*](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23/namibia#regional-and-namibian-resources-on-media-viability)*)* ### **Institutional viability** > *A resilient, resourceful, and innovative media outlet that is strong enough to maintain its editorial independence and fulfil its critical role of providing society with relevant timely and reliable information. Viability implies an enduring nature, in that media must be able to pay for the production and distribution of public interest content in the long term. Viability may, but does not necessarily, imply profitability, and revenues may come from any source (for example, advertising, philanthropic grants, state subsidies, user subscriptions). (*[*PRIMED*](https://www.comminit.com/global/content/protecting-independent-media-effective-development-primed-programme-approach-and-glossar) *- This is derived from* [*Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF)*](https://www.mdif.org/)*'s definition of viability)* ### **Media** > *The media is assumed to denote mainly (but not exclusively) the news media, and to encompass all printed, electronic and digital forms of mass communication. (*[*BBC Media Action*](http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/globalsynth.pdf)*)* ### Media development > *The term media development refers to evolution and change in the fields of news media and communications. Such change relates to a range of institutions, practices, and behaviors including the rule of law, freedoms of expression and press, education systems for journalists, business environments, capacities of journalists and managers, as well as support for a diversity of views in society. This evolution can be stimulated by donor support, private investment, or local processes of change led by media owners, managers, journalists, media industry associations, and other collective efforts. (*[*CIMA*](https://www.cima.ned.org/what-is-media-development/)*)* ### Media development versus media for development > Within the media development sector, many experts differentiate between ‘media development’ and ‘media for development’. > > While media development seeks to develop the media sector in a country as an intrinsic good it its own right, media for development tends to work with or through the media to achieve developmental objectives, such as better governance, improved health, reduced social or political marginalisation or increased income for people living in poverty. *(*[*BBC Media Action*](http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/globalsynth.pdf)*)* ### **Media representations of development** > *Characterized by the author \[Martin Scott] as the portrayal of the “global South” and development efforts to Northern audiences, these take the form of humanitarian appeals, NGO fundraising efforts, news, documentaries, films, novels, reality TV, and more.* > > *Such efforts often attempt to show both causes and solutions (usually entailing Northern intervention) to global poverty, disease, inequity and more.* > > *Among global development practitioners, this wide-ranging set of ideas and formats doesn’t get much notice, and is not often analyzed as a whole, or for its effects on the other fields. (*[*CIMA Book Review of Martin Scott’s Media and Development - 2014*](https://www.cima.ned.org/blog/review-media-development-martin-scott/)*)* ### **Media resilience** > *The ability of communities of media producers, comprised of organisations, networks of individuals, collectives, and other organisational forms, to collectively produce information and journalism that help people participate in civic and political life, regardless of any environmental shocks and stresses, such as sustained or opportunistic attempts of coercion or the success or failure of any one media outlet. (*[*PRIMED*](https://www.comminit.com/global/content/protecting-independent-media-effective-development-primed-programme-approach-and-glossar)*)* ### **Media sustainability or Media viability** > *Media Viability is the ability of media outlets and media landscapes to produce high-quality journalism in a sustainable way. Media viability is crucial for citizens to have stable access to reliable information. (*[*Deutsche Welle Akademie - Media Viability Indicators*](https://www.dw.com/en/media-viability-new-indicators-show-what-is-at-stake/a-47874028)*)* > Media sustainability concerns the continuous financial viability of media operations. “Sustainability” and “viability” are used interchangeably by the media development sector, with differing interpretations of what this means in practice. > > “Viability”, which “is not limited to financial sustainability but also the ability and capacity of media outlets to produce high-quality journalism in the long-term”. > > Media “viability” is about the existing and potential ability of individual media partners to cover the cost of producing and distributing public interest journalism without having to compromise their values and ethical standards. > > In so doing, media fulfil a demand or perceived need for this content. > > “Media business viability” therefore relates to the capabilities on the business side of individual media operations and their requirements for running those over time. > > Media viability and sustainability is also an important issue for overall press freedom since a media outlet that is under considerable financial pressure is far more likely to cut back on journalistic capacity and curtail reporting that might negatively impact advertisers and other revenue-providers whether private or state. Furthermore, a lack of resources can impact on the level and scale of quality reporting that a media organisation can conduct. *(*[*Media viability: discussion paper for Namibian media*](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23/namibia#regional-and-namibian-resources-on-media-viability)*)* ### **Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (MEL)** ### ### **Non-government/non-state media** > *Replaces the imprecise use of "independent media", as well as other terms such as "private media", "commercial outlets", or "community media".* > > *The latter will still be used, however, especially in the case of Sierra Leone, where such a distinction is useful.* > > *The programme recognises the scarcity of independent media outlets in the three countries and plans to be working with a variety of outlets with different business models and varying degrees of non-affiliation. (*[*PRIMED*](https://www.comminit.com/global/content/protecting-independent-media-effective-development-primed-programme-approach-and-glossar)*)* ### Official development finance (ODF) > *Official development finance is measured in relation to the receipts of developing countries. It is a broad measure of developing countries’ official receipts for developmental purposes, and is defined as the sum of bilateral ODA and bilateral other official flows (e.g. non-concessional developmental loans) except grants and loans for commercial purposes, and all grants and loans by multilateral development institutions. (*[*OECD*](https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/index-terms.htm#ODA)*)*‌ ### Official development assistance (ODA) > *The term “aid” usually refers to official development assistance (ODA).* > > *ODA is defined as flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies. In addition, each transaction must be administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and be concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%). (*[*OECD*](https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/index-terms.htm#ODA)*)* ### Public dialogue > *Public dialogue refers to engagement between and among citizens, civil society and politicians on public policy and issues of public importance faced by individuals, communities and society as a whole. (*[*BBC Media Action*](http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/globalsynth.pdf)*)* ### **Public interest content** > *News, current affairs, and any other programming formats that act as conduits through which the public's right to information may be served. Anyone producing public interest content will invariably need to adhere to ethical professional standards. This term is used in PRIMED instead of "quality journalism". Public interest content can be provided by media outlets with varying operating and ownership models, including outlets that have some political/ethnic affiliation. (*[*PRIMED*](https://www.comminit.com/global/content/protecting-independent-media-effective-development-primed-programme-approach-and-glossar)*)* ### Public interest media > Public interest media are media that create and distribute content that: > > * Exists to inform the public on matters that concern them. > * Provides fact-based information in a trustworthy manner. > * Commits to the demonstrable pursuit of truth, for example through sourcing practices\ > and the representation of the audiences it hopes to serve. > * Is editorially independent. > * Is transparent about processes, finances, and policies used to produce it ([IFPIM, n.d.\[38\]](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/05/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_e8c617a4/76d82856-en.pdf)). ### SDG 16.10 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015. At its heart are the 17 [Sustainable Development Goals ](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/)(SDGs). > [16.10 - ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements. ](https://indicators.report/targets/16-10/) {% embed url="" %} ### Sustainability > *Sustainability is media’s ability to operate independently over time. This means independent of editorial or financial interference or influence, and thus refers to the legal, economic, and political enabling environments for media organizations and journalists. At the societal level, media’s sustainability is ensured by stable legal structures and a healthy marketplace that keep the press free and open, where ownership structures reflect a diversity of opinions. (*[*CIMA*](http://www.cima.ned.org/what-is-media-development/sustainability)*)* {% embed url="" %} ### Transitional countries > *Transitional countries can either be defined as those that have made a shift away from autocracy toward democracy, or as those economies that have moved from central planning towards market systems.* *(*[*BBC Media Action*](http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/globalsynth.pdf)*)* ## ## RELATED GLOSSARIES ### EU Aid Explorer - Glossary of Terms and Concept > For an explanation of the main terms and concepts used in the EU Aid Explorer, see below. For a more detailed [Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts](http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm) concerning Official Development Assistance and an [Index of financing for sustainable development terms](http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/index-terms.htm), please consult the website of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. For detailed information about the [IATI Standard](https://iatistandard.org/en/iati-standard/) see the website of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). {% embed url="" %} ### OECD - DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts {% embed url="" %} ### OECD - Index of financing for sustainable development terms {% embed url="" %} ## WHAT IS MISSING? {% hint style="warning" %} This resource page is a work in progress. Please get in touch to let us know what is missing [using this form](https://forms.gle/ZAjDBxAk2D3V5Bes8). {% endhint %} # Consultation & adoption This page records the development of the principles, their adoption, and milestones in their implementation. The OECD Development Co-operation Principles for Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment are a product of the Development Assistance Committee’s Network on Governance. ## Why were the principles developed? The 2014 OECD Principles on media assistance were no longer fit for purpose given: {% hint style="danger" %} Unprecedented challenges and existential threats to free and independent media and information integrity {% endhint %} {% hint style="danger" %} Increasing disinformation, polarization, and autocratization undermining free media and public trust. {% endhint %} {% hint style="danger" %} Growing threats to journalist safety and media capture escalating challenges to information integrity. {% endhint %} {% hint style="danger" %} No new dynamic in ODA to media and free flow of information. {% endhint %} ## How were the principles developed? The Principles are the successful culmination of more than two years of consultations and advocacy led by GFMD and the Centre for International Media Assistance (CIMA) in collaboration with: * Bilateral donor agencies (including Sweden, Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) * Intergovernmental institutions including the [Media Freedom Coalition, through its Media Development Working Group](https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/joint-statement/2024/oecd-development-assistance-committees-media-and-information-principles/) and [UNESCO’s International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC)](https://www.unesco.org/en/international-programme-development-communication) * Implementing organisations * Civil society representatives * and media development experts. {% hint style="success" %} *On 22 March 2024, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted* [*the Development Cooperation Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment.* ](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_76d82856-en) {% endhint %} This exciting milestone follows two years of consultations among more than 200 representatives from bilateral donor agencies, implementing organisations, civil society representatives, and media development experts. {% hint style="info" %} The full timeline for the development and adoption of the principles is included below. {% endhint %} ## 2025 {% hint style="success" %} **July 2025** - OECD DAC GovNet meeting. {% endhint %} ## 2024 {% hint style="success" %} **November 2024** - OECD DAC GovNet members discuss implementation, based on voluntary member reporting during the annual meeting. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **21 – 22 November 2024: UNESCO** [**Decisions taken at the 34th session of the Intergovernmental Council of the International Programme for the Development of Communication**](https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000392224.locale=en) Looking ahead, the Council underscored the urgent need for increased support to locally driven media development. It welcomed the new voluntary [“Development Cooperation Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment”](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC\(2024\)15/FINAL/en/pdf) and encouraged Member States to review and implement their own policies. The Council, having examined Document CI-24/COUNCIL.34/4 *Recalling* the Windhoek +30 Declaration and its call to action in countering “the severe economic crisis which is posing an existential threat to independent news media worldwide,” *Recalling* also this Council’s welcoming of the possibility of a set of non-binding principles for effective support to journalism and media (CI-22/COUNCIL.33/Dec), *Recognizing* the urgent need for increased support to the media development sector and locally-led interventions in support of free, independent, and pluralistic media, especially in light of rapid developments in the media sector related to digital transformation and innovation such as AI, and *Underlining* the IPDC’s dual role as a grant-maker and as a platform for inclusive international discussion, standard-setting, and mobilization in support of information as a public good, 1 - Notes with appreciation and recognizes the merits of the new voluntary “Development Cooperation Principles on Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment”; 2 - Welcomes UNESCO’s Secretariat’s contributions, including those of the IPDC Secretariat, to the process of developing these Principles and related multi-stakeholder consultations in sharing good practices as both a grant-maker and implementer; 3- Encourages Member States to consider these voluntary Principles in reviewing and implementing their own policies and contribute extrabudgetary support to UNESCO to enable its engagement and coordinating role in the implementation of the Principles; 4 - Requests the Secretariat to: a) Continue to advocate for greater support to the media development sector, emphasizing a locally-led and holistic approach to that support; b) Collaborate with multilateral partners and experts to highlight and extend its own good practices as a grant-maker and further engage with current and potential donors; c) Provide further updates at the 35th Council session in 2026. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **May 29, 2024** -[ "*At the conclusion of their annual meeting in Copenhagen, the Board of Directors of WAN-IFRA issued a series of resolutions addressing critical issues facing the global media landscape."*](https://wan-ifra.org/news/greater-support-to-professional-representative-bodies-for-media/) [*"Acknowledging the recently updated OECD Development Co-operation Principles for Relevant and Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment, Drawing specific focus on Section 3 of the ‘Principles’, outlining the need for a ‘whole of system approach’ for support to the media and information environment, Welcoming the inclusion of media representative bodies in this ‘whole of system approach"*](https://wan-ifra.org/news/greater-support-to-professional-representative-bodies-for-media/) {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} ## May 2024 - GFMD regional meetings for the wider European region and Latin America and Caribbean focused on how to disseminate and implement the principles. * [**GFMD Latin America & Caribbean Summit (May 2024):** ](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/gfmd-latin-america-and-caribbean-summit-may-2024)This summit brought together key regional stakeholders to discuss tailored strategies for applying the Principles within the unique media landscapes of Latin America and the Caribbean. * [**GFMD Regional Meeting for the Wider European Region (May 2024):**](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/regional-meeting-european-region) Participants from across Europe convened to explore regional challenges and opportunities for supporting media and information integrity, aligning their efforts with the newly adopted Principles. {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="success" %} **March 26, 2024 - Media Freedom Coalition Statement on the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Media and Information Principles** The members of the Media Freedom Coalition are in an excellent position to strongly support the implementation of these principles. Collective implementation of the principles offers the prospect that independent media will be safeguarded, and global information integrity preserved. {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="success" %} **March 2024** - Media development community welcomes the adoption of principles {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} {% embed url="" %} > "*A big thing just happened. The West’s major donor countries adopted principles for more and better support to journalism in developing countries.* > > *In 2026, they will review any progress made.* > > *After two years, civil society action by the Global Forum for Media Development built enough momentum to get 32 donor country reps to agree the principles. Kudos! It happened on 22 March at the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.* > > *Fifty member countries of the Media Freedom Coalition have also since signed up.* > > *The OECD principles follow research showing that total annual donor funding allocated to media and the information environment is only 0.5% of the total Official Development Assistance.* > > *Germany and the UK claim higher fractions, but this is because they brazenly include as “development spending” allocations to the Deutsche Welle and the BBC World Service.* > > *What actually goes towards media in developing countries is only 8% of the 0.5%. In a massive understatement, the OECD recognises that this is “insufficient to address the challenges...”.* > > *Exactly. Where’s the logic of putting aid into health or schooling, yet ignoring support for journalism to monitor accountability for what happens on the ground?* > > *The current proportions in funding need radical revision – especially when media is in crisis, and when developing countries have not just information deficits, but are facing floods of disinformation.*" -[ LinkedIn post](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/guy-berger-b641b2_ramping-up-support-for-independent-journalism-activity-7180226184301993985-USah?utm_medium=member_desktop\&utm_source=share) by **Guy Berger**, Former Director for Freedom of Expression and Media Development at UNESCO {% hint style="success" %} **March 22 2024.** - The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) **adopted the** [**final principles**](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co-operation-principles-for-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-the-information-environment_76d82856-en.html)**.** {% endhint %} {% embed url="" %}
{% hint style="success" %} **March 2024** - Final principles presented to and approved by the OECD DAC GovNet.​ {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Feb. 2024** - Principles draft finalised by OECD DAC GovNet drafting committee. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Dec. 2023 - Feb. 2024** - The OECD DAC Network on Governance organised [public consultations](https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institutions/public-consultation-draft-principles-relevant-and-effective-support-to-media-and-information-environment.htm) on the principles, including opportunities to provide written feedback. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Jan. 2024** - As part of this process CIMA and GFMD hosted a virtual panel discussion on 16 January 2024. {% endhint %} ## 2023 {% hint style="success" %} **Dec. 2023** - OECD DAC GovNet launched a consultation process for all stakeholders to comment and make suggestions on the draft principles. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Sept. 2. 2023** - GFMD launches report on funding in the media development sector: “[Transforming Media Development – Recommendations for Effective Funding and Collaboration](https://gfmd.info/briefings/transforming-media-development/)“. This study is based on a body of desk research as well as a series of online interviews with GFMD members from Eastern Europe, Asia and South America. It documents the challenges that GFMD’s members face daily in their attempts to raise funds and meet donor expectations on reporting and accountability. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **28 June 2023** - OECD DAC GovNet members at the annual plenary meeting welcomed and made constructive comments on a first draft of the Principles on Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment document. France offered to join Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US as the drafting group for the next steps of the process. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **16 June 2023** - The 67th meeting of the Bureau of the Intergovernmental Council of Unesco's International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) welcomes the OECD DAC GovNet process to Principles on Effective Support to Media and the Information Environment document. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **7 June 2023** - A group of OECD donors, including Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US take over the process of drafting the principles from GFMD and CIMA in order to present them to the OECD DAC GovNet plenary meeting on 28 June. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **1 May 2023 -** GFMD and CIMA convene a meeting of directors and CEOs of GFMD members attending UNESCO's World Press Freedom Day in New York to update them on the process and for further consultations. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **28 April 2023** - GFMD co-organises with Philea (Philanthropy Europe Association) a briefing of European foundations on how best to support independent media and journalism in Ukraine. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **30 March 2023** - GFMD & CIMA host a working meeting on how to operationalise the principles for effective media assistance on the sidelines of the Summit for Democracy in The Hague, The Netherlands. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **27 March 2023 -** As part of the process to gather commitments to the Summit for Democracy via the Media Freedom Cohort: The Media Freedom Coalition’s Media Development Working Group, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the United Kingdom, GFMD, and CIMA committed to advancing their engagement with the GovNet to update the existing media assistance principles,in line with a GovNet commitment in its programme of work 2023-2024. To complement this commitment GFMD and CIMA issued a [statement calling for engagement by the Summit for Democracy and the Media Freedom Coalition](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1VXZKXTAJz32jW_29p1DIoc7OLtwjvv0gAZFym2ep81o/edit#heading=h.30j0zll). {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Feb. 3, 2023** - in partnership with UNESCO IPDC, the Namibia Media Trust, and the Editors' Forum of Namibia, GFMD organised a [roundtable on media viability in Namibia](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23/namibia). The roundtable was part of a [series of national consultations](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23) that brought together key local and international stakeholders, including media support organisations, donors, big tech representatives, policymakers, and media professionals around the question of building resilience in the Namibian media sector. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Jan. 24, 2023** - in partnership with UNESCO IPDC, the Al Khatt Foundation, and the EU's Programme d'appui aux médias tunisiens, GFMD organised a [roundtable on media viability in Tunisia](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23/tunisia). The roundtable was part of a [series of national consultations](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23) that brought together key local and international stakeholders, including media support organisations, donors, big tech representatives, policymakers, and media professionals around the question of building resilience in the Tunisian media sector. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Jan. 18, 2023** - in partnership with UNESCO IPDC, the Samir Kassir Foundation, and the Maharat Foundation, GFMD organised a [roundtable on media viability in Lebanon](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/unesco-media-viability-jan-23/lebanon). The roundtable was part of that brought together key local and international stakeholders, including media support organisations, donors, big tech representatives, policymakers, and media professionals around the question of building resilience in the Lebanese media sector. {% endhint %} ## 2022 {% hint style="success" %} **Nov. 25, 2022 -** UNESCO's IPDC council welcomes the principles process. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Nov. 23, 2022 -** GFMD co-organsied a seminar with the EU-funded Sahafa Med project on the [challenges and perspectives for media support programs ](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/challenges-perspectives-media-support-sahafa-med)in the Southern Neighbourhood region. The meeting brought together 40+ donors, NGOs supporting media and journalists and implementing partners working with media outlets and journalists in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **21-22 Nov. 2022** -The process to develop principles for effective media development is adopted into the OECD DAC GovNet programme of work 2023-24. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Sept. 13, 2022** - The process to develop principles for effective media development is adopted into the OECD DAC GovNet programme of work 2023-24. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Aug. 4, 2022 -** In partnership with Article 19 Tunisia & MENA, the CIMA organized a roundtable discussion in Arabic with media support organizations, media outlets, and civil society based in Tunisia. The 25 participants discussed how to make principles for effective media assistance more specific, actionable in Tunisia and the MENA region. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **June 28, 2022** - GFMD Chair Zoe Titus presents the principles process at a joint GovNet-UNESCO event on ‘The economic Impact of Covid-19 on media and potential ODA responses’. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **June 2022 -** GFMD held a series of meetings for members (in English, French and Spanish) with members to discuss the structural, environmental, and administrative challenges they face when applying, implementing, and reporting on journalism support and media development projects and programmes. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **June 15-16, 2022** - The principles process is accepted onto the official agenda of the annual meeting of UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Council of the [International Programme for the Development of Communication](https://www.unesco.org/en/international-programme-development-communication)(IDPC) in November 2022. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **May 2-3, 2022** - With UNESCO and the Government of Uruguay, CIMA and GFMD hosted a [roundtable discussion](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/wpfd-may-2022/principles-media-assistance#world-press-freedom-day-consultation-principles-for-effective-support-of-the-media-sector-may-2-2022) with participants at the UNESCO’s World Press Freedom Day Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay. CIMA and GFMD also hosted a [panel discussion](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/wpfd-may-2022/principles-media-assistance#developing-principles-for-effective-media-assistance-may-3-2022) at UNESCO’s World Press Freedom Day Conference in Uruguay - “Developing Principles for Effective Media Assistance” - featuring Abraji, Sembra Media, and UNESCO. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **April 14, 2022** - In partnership with the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), GFMD organised a [roundtable discussion in Belgrade, Serbia](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/principles-for-effective-mediadev-belgrade-april-22). The 25 participants were asked to contribute ideas for how to make the general principles for effective media development more specific and actionable and to interpret how the principles might be actioned in specific contexts. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **April 13, 2022 -** GFMD's Executive Director presented the work on the principles to date to the OECD DAC's GovNet session on Overseas Development Aid (ODA), public interest media and information ecosystems. The objective of the session is to firm up interest among OECD member states and galvanise support for this area of ODA for GovNet's programme of work 2023-24. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Feb. 9, 2022** - CIMA and GFMD organised a session on [renewing the principles for effective media support](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/mfc-estonia#renewing-the-principles-for-effective-media-support) at the Global Conference for Media Freedom in Tallinn, Estonia. The session was co-convened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), United Kingdom Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (UK FCDO), and UNESCO. As well as hearing from all co-conveners, the session also heard from the Council of Europe, as well as regional and international media development organisations. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Feb. 1, 2022** - After a review of the literature to identify the general principles and guidelines for effective support and engagement, GFMA [launched a survey](https://uk.surveymonkey.com/r/3K6Z93R) to gather perspectives from across the field. The survey was used to query donors, practitioners and other stakeholders on which of the general principles have seen the greatest progress, which the least, which should be prioritised and gaps. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Jan, 27, 2022 -** CIMA and GFMD convened an invitation-only virtual [roundtable](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/principles-for-effective-mediadev-jan.-22) to discuss principles for effective media assistance with 18 representatives of national and regional media development organisations, members of [GFMD’s policy and learning committee](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/principles-for-effective-mediadev-jan.-22), and [GFMD IMPACT regional coordinators](https://impact.gfmd.info/about/gfmd-impact-regional-coordinators). {% endhint %} ## 2021 {% hint style="success" %} **Dec. 7, 2021 -** CIMA and GFMD hosted a [webinar on principles for effective media development](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/gfmd-impact-learning-meetings-in-2021/principles-Dec-2021), which was one of over 40 events held on 7 December as part of the [Global Democracy Coalition Forum](https://globaldemocracycoalition.org/), a virtual 24-hour event convened to provide [recommendations to the Summit for Democracy](https://globaldemocracycoalition.org/recommendations/). The webinar, which heard from four civil society and media development stakeholders, as well as representatives from UK FCDO and UNESCO, distilled [three recommendations to the Summit for Democracy](https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/gfmd-impact-learning-meetings-in-2021/principles-Dec-2021#recommendations-to-the-summit-for-democracy). {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **Nov. 23, 2021** - A first draft of the [concept note](https://impact.gfmd.info/activities-services/mediadev-principles#concept-note-2022), developed by CIMA and the [GFMD IMPACT help desk](https://impact.gfmd.info/activities-services/help-desk), was discussed at the Media Freedom Coalition’s Working Group on Media Development. After the meeting the roadmap and rationale were revised. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **July 2021 -** Recommendations from the submission were used as a basis for an options note presented by the UK FCDO to a meeting of the MFC Working Group on Media Development. The option to review and update the principles for effective media development was among the options that were received positively. {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} **May 2021** - Responding to a request from the Media Freedom Coalition, the[ GFMD IMPACT help desk](https://impact.gfmd.info/activities-services/help-desk) - in partnership with CIMA, produced a two-page briefing on ways MFC could work with members to improve media assistance, ODA data, and information sharing. {% endhint %} # Literature review ### What is epistemic security? **Epistemic security** is the capacity of societies to produce, distribute, acquire, interpret and use reliable information so that public beliefs and decisions (by citizens, institutions and governments) are grounded in truth, evidence and accountable processes. Weak epistemic security undermines democratic decision-making, emergency response, public trust in institutions, and ultimately national resilience. Recent policy literature frames epistemic security as distinct from — but deeply connected to — information integrity, media health, and information-ecosystem resilience: protecting knowledge systems is both a public-good and a strategic national interest. > Key reading: [Tackling threats to informed decision making in democratic societies - Promoting epistemic security in a technologically-advanced world](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf), Turing Institute 2020 ### ### Why you should care right now {% hint style="warning" %} Threats are urgent and structural: coordinated disinformation campaigns, platform amplification dynamics, and generative-AI-enabled content manipulation increase the speed, scale and plausibility of false information. These threats affect elections, public health responses, climate policy, and crisis management. ([European Parliament](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/767153/EPRS_BRI%282024%29767153_EN.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) {% endhint %} {% hint style="danger" %} Epistemic harms cascade into policy harms: when publics or officials act on systematically distorted information, policy options narrow and errors proliferate (poor uptake of vaccines, misallocation of emergency resources, paralysis over climate action). Strengthening epistemic security thus reduces downstream governance and economic costs. ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-02/UNDP-Information-Integrity-Forging-a-Pathway-to-Truth-Resilience-and-Trust.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) {% endhint %} {% hint style="success" %} Policy levers work best in combination: research and practice show no single fix. Effective approaches combine media/communication policy, platform regulation, civil-society capacity, public-interest journalism, education, technical safeguards and targeted research funding. ([nitrd.gov](https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/Roadmap-Information-Integrity-RD-2022.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) {% endhint %} ### Practical implications for policymakers (brief) 1. Treat epistemic security as cross-sectoral policy (national security, public health, education, communications). Coordinate across ministries and with independent institutions. ([Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf)) 2. Invest in measurement & research — you cannot manage what you do not measure (ecosystem mapping, exposure studies, cross-national resilience indices). ([nitrd.gov](https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/Roadmap-Information-Integrity-RD-2022.pdf)) 3. Support independent media, local journalism and public-interest content creation as core infrastructure. ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-02/UNDP-Information-Integrity-Forging-a-Pathway-to-Truth-Resilience-and-Trust.pdf)) 4. Regulate platform incentives transparently (algorithmic accountability, crisis protocols) while protecting free expression. ([European Parliament](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/767153/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)767153_EN.pdf)) 5. Build public information resilience: media literacy, trusted intermediaries (e.g., scientists and community leaders), and emergency communication playbooks. ([Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf)) *** ## Literature review — best resources (annotated & evaluated) Below are some of the essential resources into conceptual foundations, policy frameworks/guidance, empirical research & measurement, technical/operational guidance, and newer/emerging work. Each item has a succinct summary, its utility to policymakers, strengths, and limitations. ### A. Conceptual foundations (what to read first) 1. **Turing Institute — *****Tackling threats to informed decision-making: An evidence-based definition of epistemic security*** (2020).\ *Summary:* Offers an operational definition of “epistemically secure society” and explains causal pathways by which information threats impair decision-making. Useful as a primer linking theory to measurable harms.\ *Why read:* Strong, policy-oriented conceptual framing; good entry point for officials designing cross-government strategies. ([Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf))\ *Limitations:* UK-centric examples; newer threats (post-2020 generative AI) are not covered. 2. **Wardle, C. & Derakhshan, H. — *****Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking***** (Council of Europe, 2017).**\ *Summary:* Introduces the widely-used taxonomy — misinformation, disinformation, malinformation — and maps phases and actors in “information disorder.”\ *Why read:* Foundation for distinguishing types of problems and tailoring interventions (education vs. counter-propaganda vs. platform policy). ([Council of Europe](https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77))\ *Limitations:* More about classification than programmatic policy evaluation. ### B. Policy frameworks, guidance and strategic roadmaps 3. **UNDP — *****Information Integrity: Forging a Pathway to Truth, Resilience and Trust***** (2022).**\ *Summary:* Strategic guidance linking information integrity to governance, peacebuilding and development; emphasizes plural, rights-respecting responses.\ *Why read:* Useful for ministries working at the intersection of development and information policy; provides practical program ideas (supporting local media, fact-checking networks). ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-02/UNDP-Information-Integrity-Forging-a-Pathway-to-Truth-Resilience-and-Trust.pdf))\ *Limitations:* High-level recommendations; implementation detail varies by context. 4. **NITRD / US Roadmap for Information Integrity R\&D (IIRD Roadmap, 2022).**\ *Summary:* Identifies R\&D priorities: ecosystem models and metrics, safeguards for people, technical detection tools, evaluation methods, and public-sector needs.\ *Why read:* Essential for research funders and tech policy designers — tells you where to invest to improve measurement and tools. ([nitrd.gov](https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/Roadmap-Information-Integrity-RD-2022.pdf))\ *Limitations:* US federal research focus; applicability depends on national research capacity. 5. **Carnegie Endowment — *****Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide***** (2024).**\ *Summary:* Reviews evidence for policy proposals (content moderation, transparency, civic education, platform design changes) and ranks their effectiveness and trade-offs.\ *Why read:* Pragmatic, up-to-date policy menu; helpful for weighing interventions under political or legal constraints. ([Carnegie Endowment](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/01/countering-disinformation-effectively-an-evidence-based-policy-guide))\ *Limitations:* Rapidly evolving landscape (AI); recommendations need continual revalidation. 6. **European Parliament / EU brief — *****Information integrity and the European democracy shield***** (2024).**\ *Summary:* Policy brief on EU responses, regulations and the interplay between AI, platform rules and democratic safeguards.\ *Why read:* Useful as a model for legislative approaches (e.g., transparency obligations, crisis protocols). ([European Parliament](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/767153/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)767153_EN.pdf)) ### C. Empirical research & resilience measurement 7. **Humprecht, Eszter et al. — *****Resilience to Online Disinformation: A Framework for Cross-National Comparative Research***** (2020, many citations).**\ *Summary:* Proposes a comparative theoretical framework to measure country-level resilience to disinformation, including media system features, digital literacy and trust levels.\ *Why read:* For policymakers seeking indicators and diagnostic tools to prioritize interventions. ([repository.uantwerpen.be](https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/e88310/166168.pdf))\ *Limitations:* Measurement is complex — requires commissioning nationally-representative studies. 8. **G20 / Academic mapping of the information integrity debate (2024)**\ *Summary:* Recent mapping document that situates global policy debates and highlights governance gaps at the international level.\ *Why read:* Good for multilateral policy coordination and identifying best practices to import. ([g20.utoronto.ca](https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2024/P3_-_G20_DEWG_Brasil_2024_-_Mapping_the_Information_Integrity_Debate.pdf)) ### D. Operational & technical guidance (platforms, crisis comms, AI) 9. **UNESCO / Global Initiative on Information Integrity (climate change focus and broader resources).**\ *Summary:* Programmatic work on trusted science communication, platform engagement, and training for journalists and officials.\ *Why read:* Practical toolkits for crisis communication (climate and health), and partnerships with scientific communities. ([UNESCO](https://www.unesco.org/en/information-integrity-climate-change)) 10. **Practical policy toolkits and case studies (various briefings: UN, EU, national bodies, think tanks — e.g., Demos UK ‘Epistemic Security 2029’).**\ *Summary:* National-level strategy documents arguing for treating epistemic security as a strategic objective (example: Demos UK paper).\ *Why read:* Useful to see concrete proposals for national governance architectures and cross-sector coordination. ([Demos](https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Epistemic-Security-2029_accessible.pdf)) ### E. Emerging, critical and normative work 11. **Recent academic critiques on *****epistemic security***** and power (various 2023–2025 papers).**\ *Summary:* Literature that interrogates how “securitizing” knowledge risks centralizing epistemic authority or enabling censorship when poorly designed.\ *Why read:* Important check for policymakers: ensure measures respect pluralism, avoid concentration of information power, and include safeguards for speech and accountability. ([Taylor & Francis Online](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2023.2276343)) *** ## How to use these resources — recommended reading path & policy checklist **Reading path (quick):** 1. Turing Institute paper (concept + definition). ([Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf)) 2. Wardle & Derakhshan (taxonomy of information disorder). ([Council of Europe](https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77)) 3. UNDP guidance and UNESCO practical initiatives (implementation angles). ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-02/UNDP-Information-Integrity-Forging-a-Pathway-to-Truth-Resilience-and-Trust.pdf)) 4. NITRD Roadmap + Carnegie guide (R\&D and evidence-based interventions). ([nitrd.gov](https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/Roadmap-Information-Integrity-RD-2022.pdf)) 5. Recent critiques on securitization risks before drafting law. ([Taylor & Francis Online](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2023.2276343)) **Policy checklist (operational)** * Create an interagency epistemic security taskforce (include civil society, media, academic and platform representatives). ([Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf)) * Commission an ecosystem mapping and resilience assessment (use frameworks like Humprecht et al. and NITRD priorities). ([repository.uantwerpen.be](https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/e88310/166168.pdf)) * Fund public-interest journalism & local reporting (UNDP guidance). ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-02/UNDP-Information-Integrity-Forging-a-Pathway-to-Truth-Resilience-and-Trust.pdf)) * Require platform transparency for crisis periods (matching EU/EP practices) and independent audits of algorithmic amplification. ([European Parliament](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/767153/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)767153_EN.pdf)) * Scale public information resilience: media literacy curricula, rapid-response trusted messengers, and pre-tested crisis comms playbooks. ([Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf)) * Set up an R\&D fund for ecosystem monitoring and counter-AI misinfo tools (per NITRD roadmap). ([nitrd.gov](https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/Roadmap-Information-Integrity-RD-2022.pdf)) * Embed rights safeguards: judicial oversight, sunset clauses, and oversight bodies to prevent misuse of epistemic-security measures. ([Taylor & Francis Online](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2023.2276343)) *** ## Strengths and gaps across the literature (brief) * **Strengths:** Clear conceptual frameworks (Wardle & Derakhshan), operational roadmaps (NITRD, UNDP), and increasing cross-sector policy guidance (UNESCO, EU, Carnegie). Evidence synthesis is improving, and R\&D agendas are clearer. ([Council of Europe](https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77)) * **Gaps:** Real-time evaluation of interventions (what works at scale), standardized resilience metrics across countries, and guidance on managing AI-driven content manipulation remain nascent — policymakers must treat these as priority investments. ([nitrd.gov](https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/Roadmap-Information-Integrity-RD-2022.pdf)) {% embed url="" %} *** ## Short annotated bibliography (one-line takeaways) * **Turing Institute (2020)** — Operational definition of epistemic security; start here for policy framing. ([Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-10/epistemic-security-report_final.pdf)) * **Wardle & Derakhshan (2017, Council of Europe)** — Classic taxonomy of information disorder; use it to classify problems and match responses. ([Council of Europe](https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77)) * **UNDP (2022)** — Programmatic guidance linking information integrity to development and peacebuilding. ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-02/UNDP-Information-Integrity-Forging-a-Pathway-to-Truth-Resilience-and-Trust.pdf)) * **NITRD Information Integrity Roadmap (2022)** — R\&D priorities and measurement agenda for funders and researchers. ([nitrd.gov](https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/Roadmap-Information-Integrity-RD-2022.pdf)) * **Carnegie Endowment (2024)** — Evidence-based policy guide on countering disinformation, with trade-off analysis. ([Carnegie Endowment](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/01/countering-disinformation-effectively-an-evidence-based-policy-guide)) * **UNESCO initiatives (ongoing)** — Practical toolkits and multilateral programs (climate, health). ([UNESCO](https://www.unesco.org/en/information-integrity-climate-change)) * **European Parliament brief (2024)** — Legislative/regulatory perspectives and EU policy approaches. ([European Parliament](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/767153/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)767153_EN.pdf)) * **Humprecht et al. (2020)** — Measurement framework for cross-national resilience to disinformation. ([repository.uantwerpen.be](https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/e88310/166168.pdf)) * **Demos UK — *****Epistemic Security 2029***** (2025)** — National strategy style paper arguing for treating epistemic security as a strategic objective. ([Demos](https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Epistemic-Security-2029_accessible.pdf))